[Cite as C.V. v. Ullom, 2026-Ohio-967.]
COURT OF APPEALS LICKING COUNTY, OHIO FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
C.V. Case No. 2025 CA 00060
Petitioner - Appellee Opinion And Judgment Entry
-vs- Appeal from the Court of Common Pleas, Case No. 23CV001276 GARY ULLOM Judgment: Affirmed Respondent – Appellant Date of Judgment Entry: March 19, 2026
BEFORE: Andrew J. King; William B. Hoffman; David M. Gormley, Appellate Judges
APPEARANCES: MAX SUTTON, for Plaintiff-Appellee; SAMUEL H. SHAMANSKY, DONALD L. REGENSBURGER, ASHTON C. GAITANOS, for Defendant-Appellant.
King, P.J.
{¶ 1} Respondent-Appellant Gary Ullom appeals the May 1, 2024 judgment of the
Licking County Court of Common Pleas which granted Petitioner-Appellee C.V.'s
November 8, 2023 Petition for a Civil Stalking Protection Order. We affirm the trial court.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
{¶ 2} This matter involves Ullom's behavior towards two neighbors, C.V. and his
family and T.D. and her family.
{¶ 3} Ullom and C.V. are neighbors residing in Newark, Ohio. C.V. and his family
live across the street from Ullom. They have been neighbors for more than 15 years. In
the years leading up to C.V.'s petition for a protection order, their relationship had
deteriorated. Ullom and T.D. are also neighbors. T.D.'s home in next to Ullom's. Due to concerns similar to those of C.V., T.D. also filed a petition for a protection order on
November 8, 2023. The facts of each matter overlap.
{¶ 4} The incident that caused each petitioner to request a protection order took
place on November 7, 2023. On that day, Ullom became angry with T.D. for allegedly
blowing debris onto the side of his freshly power washed house. Ullom contacted his
friend and neighbor of 30 years, R.C. Appellant told R.C. he was angry about the incident
with T.D. and wanted to "take some neighbors out." He also made threats of "suicide by
cop." Transcript of Trial (T.) at 40. While R.C. alleged he did not think appellant would
carry out the threats, he was concerned enough to make a call to a family member of T.D.
to warn her and C.V.'s family of the threat. This warning, in turn prompted a call to the
Sherriff's Department. Ullom was ultimately transported to Licking Memorial Hospital due
to his threat of suicide, and was also charged with aggravated menacing.
{¶ 5} Events leading up to C.V.'s petition began in 2011 when Ullom fired a gun
inside his home which sent a bullet across the street into C.V.'s home and into drywall
directly above where his wife, J.V. and their child were lying on the sofa. While the parties
agreed this was an accidental discharge, later events caused appellee to fear for the
safety of himself and his family, particularly given appellant's access to and reckless
handling of firearms.
{¶ 6} In 2021, J.V. witnessed Ullom screaming at his wife in the front yard. She
immediately went inside and shut the door, but could still hear Ullom screaming. She
further witnessed Ullom shooting at dogs and cats that would enter his yard.
{¶ 7} In summer of 2022, T.D. was having a graduation party for her son. During
the party appellant became angry about a car parked on his property. C.V. heard appellant yelling about the matter. T.D. had the car moved and believed that ended the
matter. But shortly thereafter, Ullom started shooting his guns outside in his yard. C.V.
heard the gunshots. When questioned by T.D., appellant retorted "you don't know who
you're fucking with" and reached for his hip where he often had a gun tucked into the
waistband of his pants. The Sheriff's Department became involved and addressed the
matter with Ullom. Ullom then erected a sign in his yard which read "Someone lied!
Making false reports to the Licking County Sheriff is a crime." Petitioner's Exhibit 5.
{¶ 8} During summer, 2023 Ullom became angry about a comment C.V. made on
social media. He texted C.V. "I never thought about the two-faced cowards I have for
neighbors." Then at 1:30 a.m. Ullom texted "It's no wonder you have a $600 electric bill.
It's 1:30 a.m. and all the lights on isn't helping.
{¶ 9} The same summer, Ullom would routinely yell profanities at C.V. as he went
into or out of his home. C.V. would not respond.
{¶ 10} In September 2023, Ullom made a post on the Madison Township Facebook
page stating he had been disrespected by "spoiled brats and cowards (my neighbors)"
and further posted "obviously he's afraid of the old man." Petitioner's Exhibit F.
{¶ 11} Following the November 7, 2023 incident, the trial court issued an ex parte
civil stalking protection order (CSPO) and set the matter for an evidentiary hearing on
December 19, 2023.
{¶ 12} Ullom requested and received two continuances which moved the final
hearing to March 1, 2024. On that date, C.V., who was acting pro se, asked that the
hearing be continued so that he could reissue subpoenas. He was unaware that he needed to reissue subpoenas after each continuance. The magistrate granted the request
and set the final hearing for April 4, 2024.
{¶ 13} Before the hearing began, the magistrate ruled the C.V. and T.D. hearings
would be consolidated as the witness lists were the same.
{¶ 14} After hearing the evidence and taking the matter under consideration, on
May 1, 2024, the magistrate issued a CSPO designating C.V. and J.V. as protected
parties.
{¶ 15} On May 15, 2024, Ullom filed objections to the magistrate's decision and
filed supplemental objections on December 25, 2024. On July 15, 2025, the trial court
denied Ullom's objections.
{¶ 16} Ullom filed an appeal and the matter is now before this court for
consideration. He raises six assignments of error as follows:
I
{¶ 17} "THE TRIAL COURT’S ISSUANCE OF A CSPO WAS NOT SUPPORTED
BY SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE IN VIOLATION OF APPELLANT’S RIGHT TO DUE
PROCESS AS GUARANTEED BY THE FIFTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND COMPARABLE PROVISIONS OF THE
OHIO CONSTITUTION"
II
{¶ 18} "THE TRIAL COURT REPEATEDLY ALLOWED APPELLEE TO ELICIT
PREJUDICIAL AND INADMISSIBLE HEARSAY IN VIOLATION OF THE OHIO RULES
OF EVIDENCE, THEREBY DEPRIVING APPELLANT OF HIS RIGHTS TO DUE
PROCESS AND FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS AS GUARANTEED BY THE FIFTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND
COMPARABLE PROVISIONS OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTION."
III
{¶ 19} "THE TRIAL COURT'S ISSUANCE OF A CSPO WAS AGAINST THE
MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE IN VIOLATION OF APPELLANT'S RIGHT TO
DUE PROCESS AS GUARANTEED BY THE FIFTH AND FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND COMPARABLE
PROVISIONS OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTION"
IV
{¶ 20} "THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO APPLY THE APPROPRIATE LEGAL
STANDARD IN VIOLATION OF APPELLANT'S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS AS
GUARANTEED BY THE FIFTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED
STATES CONSTITUTION AND COMPARABLE PROVISIONS OF THE OHIO
CONSTITUTION."
V
{¶ 21} "THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY CONSOLIDATING
THE C.V CASE WITH THE T.D CASE MID-HEARING, THEREBY VIOLATING
APPELLANT'S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS AND FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS AS
GUARANTEED BY THE FIFTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED
CONSTITUTION." VI
{¶ 22} "THE TRIAL COURT'S CONTINUANCE OF THE FINAL HEARING IN THIS
CASE CONSTITUTED AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHICH RESULTED IN
PREJUDICE TO APPELLANT."
I, III, IV
{¶ 23} For ease of discussion, we address Ullom's first, third, and fourth
assignments of error together. In his first assignment of error, Ullom argues the issuance
of a CSPO is not supported by sufficient evidence. In his third assignment of error, he
argues the issuance of a CSPO is against the manifest weight of the evidence. In his
fourth assignment of error, Ullom accuses the trial court of crafting a new legal standard
when it determined Ullom knowingly engaged in a pattern of conduct that caused C.V. to
believe he would be physically harmed. According to Ullom, apprehension of harm or
distress is insufficient. We disagree with each of these arguments.
Standard of Review
{¶ 24} When the appellant asserts that there was not a preponderance of
competent, credible evidence to support the CSPO, our standard of review is whether
there was sufficient, credible evidence to support a finding that the respondent engaged
in acts of menacing by stalking. S.M. v. T.G., 2025-Ohio-1448, ¶ 26 (8th Dist.)
{¶ 25} Sufficiency of the evidence "is a test of adequacy. Whether the evidence is
legally sufficient to sustain a verdict [decision] is a question of law." State v. Thompkins,
78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386 (1997). Weight of the evidence concerns "the inclination of the
greater amount of credible evidence" supporting one side over the other. Eastley v.
Volkman, 2012-Ohio-2179 ¶ 12, applying State v. Thompkins, 1997-Ohio-52. We must not substitute our judgment for that of the trial court where there exists some competent
and credible evidence supporting the judgment rendered by the trial court. Eastley v.
Volkman, 2012-Ohio-2179. The weight to be given to the evidence and the credibility of
the witnesses are issues for the trier of fact. State v. Jamison, 49 Ohio St.3d 182, 189
(1990). The trier of fact "has the best opportunity to view the demeanor, attitude, and
credibility of each witness, something that does not translate well on the written page."
Davis v. Flickinger, 77 Ohio St.3d 415, 418 (1997).
Civil Stalking Protection Orders
{¶ 26} A civil staking protection order "is a special statutory remedy that is
designed to prevent violence." Bey v. Rasawehr, 2020-Ohio-3301 ¶ 16. "To be entitled to
a civil stalking protection order, a petitioner must show, by a preponderance of the
evidence that the respondent engaged in menacing by stalking, a violation of R.C.
2903.11, against the person seeking the order." Tumblin v. Jackson, 2006-Ohio-3270 (5th
Dist.). "Preponderance of the evidence" is "evidence which is of greater weight or more
convincing than the evidence which is offered in opposition to it; that is, evidence which
as a whole shows that the fact sought to be proved is more probable than not." Black's
Law Dictionary 1182 (6th Ed. 1990).
{¶ 27} R.C. 2903.211(A), menacing by stalking provides in relevant part:
(1) No person by engaging in a pattern of conduct shall knowingly
cause another person to believe that the offender will cause physical
harm to the other person or a family or household member of the
other person or cause mental distress to the other person or a family or household member of the other person. In addition to any other
basis for the other person’s belief that the offender will cause
physical harm to the other person or the other person’s family or
household member or mental distress to the other person or the
other person’s family or household member, the other person’s belief
or mental distress may be based on words or conduct of the offender
that are directed at or identify a corporation, association, or other
organization that employs the other person or to which the other
person belongs.
(2) No person, through the use of any form of written communication
or any electronic method of remotely transferring information,
including, but not limited to, any computer, computer network,
computer program, computer system, or telecommunication device
shall post a message or use any intentionally written or verbal
graphic gesture with purpose to do either of the following:
(a) Violate division (A)(1) of this section;
...
{¶ 28} "A person acts knowingly, regardless of purpose, when the person is aware
that the person's conduct will probably cause a certain result or will probably be of a
certain nature. A person has knowledge of circumstances when the person is aware that
such circumstances probably exist." R.C. 2901.22(B). Whether a person acts knowingly
can only be determined, absent a defendant's admission, from all the surrounding facts and circumstances, including the doing of the act itself. State v. Jacobs, 2021-Ohio-1611,
¶ 16 (5th Dist.) citing State v. Huff, 145 Ohio App.3d 555, 563 (1st Dist. 2001).
{¶ 29} A "pattern of conduct" is defined as "two or more actions or incidents
closely related in time, whether or not there has been a prior conviction based on any of
those actions or incidents." R.C. 2903.211(D)(1). "'In determining what constitutes a
pattern of conduct, courts must take every action of the respondent into consideration,
even if some of the actions in isolation do not seem particularly threatening.'" R.W.B. v.
T.V., 2024-Ohio-584, ¶ 15 (8th Dist.), quoting Lewis v. Jacobs, 2013-Ohio-3461, ¶ 10 (2d
Dist.).
{¶ 30} R.C. 2903.211(D)(2) states:
(2) "Mental distress" means any of the following:
(a) Any mental illness or condition that involves some temporary
substantial incapacity;
(b) Any mental illness or condition that would normally require
psychiatric treatment, psychological treatment, or other mental
health services, whether or not any person requested or received
psychiatric treatment, psychological treatment, or other mental
health services.
{¶ 31} Mental distress need not be incapacitating or debilitating, and expert
testimony is not required. Rufener v. Hutson, 2012-Ohio-5061 (8th Dist.); Jenkins v.
Jenkins, 2007-Ohio-422 (10th Dist.). Contrary to Ullom's assertion that apprehension of physical harm is insufficient to establish menacing by stalking, in Z.J. v. R.M., 2023-Ohio-
3552 (5th Dist.) this court found the statute does not require that the victim actually
experience mental distress or physical harm, but only that the victim believes the stalker
will cause mental distress or physical harm. Id. ¶11. Recognizing a conflict with our
holding in Z.J. and holdings in decisions in the Fourth, Seventh, and Ninth Districts, which
found a victim must actually experience mental distress, this court entered an order
certifying a conflict. No. 2022 CA 0071 (5th Dist. Mar. 4, 2024).
{¶ 32} The Supreme Court of Ohio agreed that a conflict existed and ordered the
parties to brief the conflict question certified by this court: "'Whether R.C. 2903.211(A)(1)
requires a victim to actually experience mental distress or only believe that the stalker will
cause the victim physical harm or mental distress, for a court to issue a civil stalking
protection order.'" Z.J. v. R.M., 2024-Ohio-1507, quoting No. 2022 CA 0071, at 7 (5th
Dist. Mar. 4, 2024). The Court affirmed this court's interpretation of the statute and held
"that a petitioner's belief that an offender will cause him mental distress is grounds for
showing a violation of the menacing-by-stalking statute to obtain a civil stalking protection
order." Z.J. v. R.M, 2025-Ohio-5662, ¶3.
{¶ 33} In evaluating a claim of mental distress, an objective standard is to be
applied to the impact upon a victim's state of mind as it relates to threatening
communications. Fleckner v. Fleckner, 2008-Ohio-4000 (10th Dist.).
Analysis
{¶ 34} Here, C.V. and his wife J.V. testified to an escalating course of conduct by
Ullom cumulating in his threats of November 7, 2023 to take his own life as well as those
of his neighbors. {¶ 35} The incidents began in 2011 when Ullom fired a gun in his own home
sending a projectile through the home of C.V. and J.V., narrowly missing J.V. and her
son, then exiting the home and coming to rest in a neighbor's swimming pool. Transcript
of trial (T.) 94. While both C.V. and J.V. believed this incident involved an accidental
misfire, it became a basis for concern regarding how Ullom handled firearms and himself
given the events that followed, and the gradual deterioration of their relationship with
Ullom. T. 124-125.
{¶ 36} In 2022 J.V. witnessed Ullom as he became aggressive with his wife while
the two were in their front yard. Ullom was screaming profanities at his wife because he
disapproved of how she was mowing the yard. Ullom's behavior was so aggressive that
J.V. felt the need to retreat into her home and shut her garage door. The same year, J.V.
witnessed Ullom shooting at his cat in his front yard. In a separate incident that year, she
witnessed Ullom shooting at a neighbor's dogs when they entered his front yard. This also
concerned J.V. as the homes on their shared lane are close together. T. 99 -102.
{¶ 37} In July 2023, J.V. heard Ullom screaming at C.V. as C.V. returned home
from work. Ullom was angry about something C.V. had posted on Facebook and was
calling him a "pussy" and a "keyboard warrior." T. 116. On July 3, 2023, Ullom texted C.V.
at 1:30 a.m. calling him and J.V. "two-faced cowards." He further felt the need to text C.V
about all the lights on in C.V.'s home at 1:30 a.m. Petitioner's Exhibit E. Thereafter Ullom
would routinely hurl insults at C.V. anytime he was outside his home, attempting to bait
him into confrontation. C.V.'s young son was present during some of these incidents. T.
133. In these situations, C.V. stated: "My whole goal is not to escalate any situation. I've seen it, how quickly things can escalate with [Ullom]. T. 133. C.V. also witnessed Ullom
behaving in the same manner towards his neighbor. T.D. Id.
{¶ 38} On September 14, 2023, Ullom posted on the "Madison Township Event,
Licking County, Newark Ohio" Facebook page stating he had been disrespected by
"spoiled brats and cowards (my neighbors)" Ullom further stated "I am not the convicted
felon but my neighbor, attempting to get elected to the school board is." Ullom concluded
his post with "Obviously he is afraid of the old man." Petitioner's Exhibit F.
{¶ 39} At the protection-order hearing, C.V. testified about the mental distress that
he felt on November 7, 2023, which was when he learned about Ullom’s threats to take
out some neighbors and kill himself. C.V. testified:
I was very fearful for my children that night. If Mr. Ullom had come
out of the door of his home, I would have sprinted across the yard if
I thought for an instant he was going to come back outside. I was
glad the situation was deescalated without any a – any incident. But
I can't tell you I knew what was going to happen that way. I didn't
know what was going to happen. You know, all these incidents, you
know, as one don't seem like very much. As they built and built, my
opinion of the defendant became one of more and more of this guy
could be dangerous. And that made me more and more uneasy. And
when I heard the alleged threats that he made that night, that's when
it became clear to me that Mr. Ullom could indeed be a very, very
real threat to myself and my family. Mr. Ullom had repeatedly expressed his displeasure with me defending [T.D.'s family] in any
such way, in anyway whatsoever from any . . .confrontation we've
had. . . .I have in my mind no doubts that when he refers to neighbors
as wanting to take them out, he's referring to myself, my family, and
[T.D.'s] family.
{¶ 40} T. 135-136.
{¶ 41} C.V's wife, J.V., also testified that based on Ullom's prior behavior, she too
was frightened for herself and her children on the evening of November 7, 2023. T. 102-
103. While she and C.V. were across the street warning another neighbor of the threat,
J.V. advised her children to remain locked inside their home. She was afraid to walk back
to her home before deputies arrived because she feared Ullom was armed and she would
be shot. Id.
{¶ 42} Thus, both C.V. and J.V. testified they experienced mental distress due to
Ullom's escalating behaviors and feared physical harm would follow. This is sufficient
evidence to establish menacing by stalking.
{¶ 43} Ullom argues he did not act with the requisite mental state as he never
directly threatened C.V. and his family and there is no evidence that he was aware that
his discussion with R.C. would be relayed to C.V. and T.D. Yet as noted above, one "acts
knowingly, regardless of purpose, when the person is aware that the person's conduct
will probably cause a certain result or will probably be of a certain nature." R.C.
2901.22(B). Telling one neighbor you wish to "take out" other neighbors and then commit
"suicide by cop," will probably cause that neighbor to alert those potentially in harm's way. {¶ 44} Additionally, as the Ninth District Court of Appeals has found, "R.C.
2903.211(A)(1) does not require proof that the offender explicitly threatened the victim."
M.B. v. L.D., 2023-Ohio-3560, ¶ 17 (9th Dist.). "'Instead, the offender's knowledge that
the conduct will result in the victim fearing physical harm or suffering mental distress can
be inferred by the circumstances.'" Id., quoting State v. Smith, 2012-Ohio-335, ¶ 20 (9th
Dist.). Ullom posted his knowledge that C.V. feared him on Facebook. Petitioner's Exhibit
F.
{¶ 45} Ullom also takes issue with the trial court's consideration of the testimony
regarding the 2011 and 2022 incidents as too remote in time. "Because the statute does
not specifically state what constitutes incidents "closely related in time," whether the
incidents in question were "closely related in time" should be resolved by the trier of fact
"considering the evidence in the context of all the circumstances of the case." State v.
Honeycutt, 2002 Ohio 3490, ¶26 (2d District).
{¶ 46} Here, the 2011 and 2022 incidents provided context to the incidents of
summer and late fall of 2023 which were closely related in time. The "context" a court
considers is not limited to the incidents which were "closely related in time." Middletown
v. Jones, 2006-Ohio-3465, ¶ 11 (12th Dist.).
{¶ 47} Finally, Ullom argues the trial court's decision is against the manifest weight
of the evidence. In support of his argument, he points to the testimony of R.C. which he
characterizes as too contradictory to be of any evidentiary value.
{¶ 48} We first note that even on a cold transcript, it is apparent R.C. was evasive
and less than cooperative during the hearing. He did, however, testify he took steps to alert T.D. and C.V. "just to be sure everybody's going to be safe." T. 84. He was therefore
concerned enough by Ullom's statements to take proactive steps.
{¶ 49} Ullom additionally argues R.C. testified he found nothing alarming about
Ullom's statements because he "talks like that all the time." But whether or not R.C. found
Ullom's statements alarming is not relevant to whether C.V. and his wife J.V. experienced
mental distress or feared physical harm based on the same statements as R.C. was not
the party seeking a CSPO.
{¶ 50} Ullom has failed to show the trial court granted the CSPO against the
manifest weight of the evidence. C.V. provided competent, credible evidence that Ullom
engaged in a pattern of conduct which satisfied the requirements of R.C. 2903.211(A)
and 2903.211(D). Accordingly, Ullom's first, third, and fourth assignments of error are
overruled.
{¶ 51} In his second assignment of error, Ullom alleges the magistrate erroneously
admitted hearsay statements which denied him due process and a fair trial. We disagree.
Bench Trial
{¶ 52} We begin by noting Ullom's case was tried to the bench. "We must presume,
in reviewing a bench trial, that the trial court considered nothing but relevant and
competent evidence in reaching its verdict. 'The presumption may be overcome only by
an affirmative showing to the contrary by the appellant.' " State v. Mackey, 2014-Ohio-
2288, ¶ 8 (5th Dist.) citing State v. Wiles, 59 Ohio St.3d 71 (1991). In a bench trial, the
trial court acts as a factfinder and "is presumed to be able to sort out the irrelevant and
prejudicial evidence from that which was probative and admissible." State v. Parker, 2002-Ohio-2688, ¶ 20 (8th Dist.). In fact, during this hearing, after numerous objections
based on hearsay and relevance, the trial court advised counsel for Ullom "Okay, well
look, I know how to take what information is relevant and appropriate. You don't need to
object to everything. . . I also know what's relevant and what's not and will make that
determination when I make my decision." T. 164-165.
Ullom's Hearsay Complaints
{¶ 53} Hearsay is "a statement, other than one made by the declarant while
testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter
asserted." Evid.R. 801(C).
{¶ 54} First, Ullom takes issue with "layers of hearsay" testimony related to how
C.V. learned Ullom had made threats of harm on November 7, 2023. According to Ullom,
neither the responding officers nor the petitioners heard any threats directly from him, and
therefore any testimony regarding his statements was inadmissible hearsay.
{¶ 55} The record reflects that Ullom made his statements to R.C. R.C. then spoke
to both the responding officers and T.D. about Ullom's statements. T. 52, 163. R.C
testified at the CSPO hearing regarding the threats Ullom made and was cross-examined
by counsel for Ullom. Ullom's own statements to R.C. are simply not hearsay. Evid.R.
801(D)(2)(a).
{¶ 56} Next, as to the testimony of the responding officers, "Ohio courts have long
held that out-of-court statements are admissible to explain the actions of a police officer
during an investigation and are not hearsay." State v. Johnson, 2018-Ohio-1389, ¶ 44
(8th Dist.), citing State v. Davis, 2008-Ohio-2. Both Deputy Buehler and Deputy Riddle
spoke directly to R.C. regarding Ullom's statements indicating he wished to harm himself and "take some neighbors with him." T. 40, 52. Based on these reports, the deputies
eventually located Ullom, and transported him to the Licking Memorial Hospital for
treatment. T. 35-36. Their testimony, therefore, explained the actions of the deputies
based on the reports of R.C. and the petitioners. At worst, the testimony of the responding
deputies and the petitioners regarding the threats was cumulative to R.C.'s testimony.
Even assuming arguendo, the admission of the deputies' testimony was erroneous, "the
erroneous admission or exclusion of hearsay, cumulative to properly admitted testimony,
constitutes harmless error." State v. Hogg, 2011-Ohio-6454, ¶ 46 (10th Dist.).
{¶ 57} Third, Ullom argues the trial court erroneously admitted a police report
replete with inadmissible hearsay into evidence. In support of his argument, Ullom cites
to this court's decision on State v. Granderson, 2008-Ohio-3757 (5th Dist.) wherein we
noted that police reports are generally inadmissible hearsay and should not be submitted
to a jury. Id. at 435, emphasis added. But as discussed above, this was a trial to the
bench. Moreover, we have reviewed the judgment entry granting the CSPO and note that
it contains no mention of the police report as a basis for granting C.V.'s petition.
{¶ 58} Next, Ullom makes a passing reference to hearsay evidence admitted in
violation of his rights under the Confrontation Clause. Ullom fails, however to provide a
clue as to which witnesses this argument applies to. "It is not the duty of this Court to
develop an argument in support of an assignment of error if one exists." State v. Untied,
2007-Ohio-1804, ¶ 141. Consequently, we may disregard arguments if an appellant fails
to identify the relevant portions of the record upon which he bases his argument. See
App.R. 12(A)(2). {¶ 59} Finally, we note counsel for Ullom has made disparaging remarks
throughout his brief against the trial court in this matter including accusing the court of
bias, providing legal advice to pro se parties, crafting its own legal standards, and lacking
in a fundamental understanding of the hearsay rules. Appellant's brief at 20-21, 24, 27.
We would caution counsel against making such comments about any tribunal, particularly
when the misunderstanding here appears to lie with counsel.
{¶ 60} Ullom has failed to overcome the presumption that the trial court considered
only relevant competent evidence in reaching its verdict. Accordingly, Ullom's hearsay
arguments are without merit and the second assignment of error is overruled.
{¶ 61} In his fifth assignment of error, Ullom argues the trial court abused its
discretion in consolidating the C.V. and T.D. cases into one trial. We disagree.
{¶ 62} Civ.R. 42(A)(1)(a) provides that "If actions before the court involve common
questions of law or fact, the court may . . . join for . . . trial any and all matters at issue in
the actions." The decision to consolidate or join cases for trial under Civ.R. 42(A) rests
within the discretion of the trial court, and the trial court's decision will not be reversed on
appeal absent an abuse of discretion. Siuda v. Howard, 2002-Ohio-2292, ¶ 10 (1st Dist.).
When deciding whether to join cases for trial, the trial court "must determine if there is a
sufficient commonality of issues and parties to warrant consolidating the cases for trial.
Id.
{¶ 63} "Abuse of discretion" means an attitude that is unreasonable, arbitrary or
unconscionable. Huffman v. Hair Surgeon, Inc., 19 Ohio St.3d 83, 87 (1985). Most
instances of abuse of discretion will result in decisions that are simply unreasonable, rather than decisions that are unconscionable or arbitrary. AAAA Ent., Inc. v. River Place
Community Urban Redev. Corp., 50 Ohio St.3d 157, 161 (1990). An unreasonable
decision is one backed by no sound reasoning process that would support that decision.
Id. "It is not enough that the reviewing court, were it deciding the issue de novo, would
not have found that reasoning process to be persuasive, perhaps in view of countervailing
reasoning processes that would support a contrary result." Id.
{¶ 64} In the instant matter, the facts of the two cases were nearly identical, each
required the same witnesses, and the questions of law in each matter were identical.
While Ullom argues the consolidation deprived him of a fair opportunity to prepare and
respond, he does not explain how. Indeed, due to the parallel facts and witnesses of each
matter, if counsel for Ullom was prepared for one case, he was prepared for both. He
further alleges consolidation created confusion as to what evidence could be considered
in each matter. But once again, this was a trial to the bench and it is therefore presumed
that the trial court was able to sort out the irrelevant and prejudicial evidence from that
which was probative and admissible in each case. State v. Parker, 2002-Ohio-2688, ¶ 20
(8th Dist.).
{¶ 65} The fifth assignment of error is overruled.
VI
{¶ 66} In his final assignment of error, Ullom argues the trial court abused its
discretion when it granted petitioner C.V.'s request for a continuance. We disagree.
{¶ 67} The grant or denial of a continuance rests within the trial court's sound
discretion. State v. Unger, 67 Ohio St.2d 65, 67 (1981). In determining whether a trial
court abused its discretion in denying a motion for a continuance, an appellate court should consider the following factors: (1) the length of the delay requested; (2) whether
other continuances have been requested and received; (3) the inconvenience to
witnesses, opposing counsel, and the court; (4) whether there is a legitimate reason for
the continuance; (5) whether the defendant contributed to the circumstances giving rise
to the need for the continuance, and other relevant factors, depending on the unique facts
of each case. Unger, supra, at 67-68, 423 N.E.2d 1078. The reviewing court must also
weigh the potential prejudice to the movant against the trial court's right to control its own
docket. In re Barnick, 2007-Ohio-1720, ¶ 10 (8th Dist.), citing Unger.
{¶ 68} Here, C.V. testified in his own case first. When he began discussing what
he was told by officers on November 7, 2023, Ullom objected based on hearsay. T. 12.
C.V. who was proceeding pro se, indicated he had issued subpoenas before the originally
scheduled hearing for the law enforcement officers involved to be present for the hearing
and he assumed they were therefore present that day. However, Ullom twice requested
and was granted continuances. C.V. stated he was under the impression that subpoenas
automatically reissued when a continuance was granted. T. 14. When the trial court
advised C.V. his assumption was incorrect, he requested a continuance in order to
reissue the subpoenas and the trial court granted the same. Ullom objected stating "the
witness has already been sworn in and we're here prepared to proceed." T. 15.
{¶ 69} Here on appeal, Ullom argues the trial court provided C.V. with "legal
advice" which allowed C.V. to prepare admissible hearsay evidence. Brief of Appellant at
27. First, we have already found Ullom's hearsay arguments groundless. Second, we
disagree with Ullom's characterization that the trial court provided legal advice to C.V. Rather, in response to Ullom's hearsay objection, and after determining that C.V. did not
reissue his subpoenas, the following conversation took place:
The Court: Okay, so you can't testify then to anything that a deputy
stated that's – or anybody that's not here to testify to that statement.
So that deputy would need to be here to testify. So, I'll sustain the
objection based on hearsay in terms of what somebody told you.
[C.V.]: Okay.
The Court: But you can continue with your testimony, just you can't
state what someone else told you.
[C.V.]: Okay, so I have to rethink my thoughts for just one second.
The Court: Okay.
[C.V]: I do have one quick question. I am assuming since this is
already started, there is no way to postpone this hearing until we can
reissue the subpoenas, right? Because I was not aware. We kind of
– we thought they would be reissued since we got the new dates, we
thought they would get the new dates also.
{¶ 70} T. 14-15.
{¶ 71} We find this conversation does not amount to "legal advice." Rather, the
trial court made an evidentiary ruling. Moreover, the trial court never encouraged C.V. to
seek a continuance. The record reflects Ullom requested and was granted two continuances. We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's decision to grant C.V.'s
motion for a single continuance so that he could reissue subpoenas.
{¶ 72} The final assignment of error is overruled.
{¶ 73} For the reasons stated in our accompanying Opinion, the judgment of the
Licking County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
{¶ 74} Costs to Appellant.
By: King, P.J.
Hoffman, J. and
Gormley, J. concur.