Cutrell S. Varnado a/k/a Cutrell Smith Varnado a/k/a Cutrell S. Varnado v. State of Mississippi

• Court: Court of Appeals of Mississippi
• Decided: February 24, 2026
• Docket: 2024-CP-01093-COA
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI

NO. 2024-CP-01093-COA

CUTRELL S. VARNADO A/K/A CUTRELL APPELLANT SMITH VARNADO A/K/A CUTRELL S. VARNADO

v.

STATE OF MISSISSIPPI APPELLEE

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 04/02/2024 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. STANLEY ALEX SOREY COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: SIMPSON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: CURTRELL VARNADO (PRO SE) ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: SCOTT STUART NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - POST-CONVICTION RELIEF DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 02/24/2026 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:

BEFORE CARLTON, P.J., WESTBROOKS AND LASSITTER ST. PÉ, JJ.

LASSITTER ST. PÉ, J., FOR THE COURT:

¶1. In 2024, the Circuit Court of Simpson County denied Cutrell Varnado’s second

motion for post-conviction collateral relief (PCR). We find no error and affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2. In 2016, Varnado entered a plea of guilty to first-degree murder in the Circuit Court

of Simpson County. Varnado was sentenced to life imprisonment in the custody of the

Mississippi Department of Corrections (MDOC) and advised that he would not be eligible

for parole or early release until he attained the age of sixty-five. In September 2018, Varnado

filed his first pro se PCR motion, claiming that his guilty plea was involuntary, that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, and that his conviction and sentence were the

result of prosecutorial misconduct. He also claimed that he had been misinformed about his

eligibility for parole. However, the circuit court found that Varnado “knowingly,

intelligently, understandingly, freely, and voluntarily entered a guilty plea to the charge of

first-degree murder.” Additionally, the court reasoned that Varnado had not been

misinformed about his eligibility for parole. The circuit court thus denied Varnado’s PCR

motion. This Court affirmed the circuit court’s order in June 2023.1

¶3. In 2024, Varnado filed a second PCR motion pursuant to Mississippi Code Annotated

section 99-39-5(2) (Rev. 2020).2 In his second PCR motion, Varnado again argued that his

plea was involuntary, that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, and that he was

misled about his parole eligibility. However, the circuit court denied the relief requested. In

the order denying Varnado’s second PCR motion, the court noted that “the record indicates

that [Varnado] was not displeased with his counsel’s performance, nor was [Varnado]

threatened or forced to enter a guilty plea.” The court also found that Varnado was orally

interrogated by the court at the plea hearing and concluded that Varnado was “thoroughly

informed as to the nature and consequences of his guilty plea.” The order denying Varnado’s

second PCR motion was entered on April 2, 2024, and he filed the instant appeal on

1 Varnado v. State, 362 So. 3d 127 (Miss. Ct. App. 2023). 2 Although Varnado entitled his motion as a “Motion to vacate, set aside, and resentence,” the circuit court properly treated it as a PCR motion.

2 September 13, 2024.3

¶4. On appeal, Varnado repeats the arguments he previously made in his PCR motions.

Specifically, he claims that his due process rights were violated, his guilty plea was

involuntary, and that his sentence is illegal. However, we find Varnado’s claims are time-

barred, successive, and not subject to any statutory exceptions.

ANALYSIS

¶5. We begin by noting that “[w]e review a circuit court’s dismissal or denial of a PCR

motion for abuse of discretion and decline to reverse unless the circuit court’s decision is

clearly erroneous.” Hamilton v. State, 367 So. 3d 1039, 1041 (¶5) (Miss. Ct. App. 2023)

(quotation marks omitted). However, “[w]e review questions of law de novo.” Id.

¶6. Under Mississippi’s Uniform Post-Conviction Collateral Relief Act (UPCCRA), “a

PCR motion must be filed within three years of the judgment of conviction following a guilty

plea.” Id. at 1041-42 (¶6) (citing Miss. Code Ann.§ 99-39-5(2) (Rev. 2020)). In Howell v.

State, 358 So. 3d 613, 615 (¶¶8-9) (Miss. Ct. App. 2023), this Court held that the three-year

statute of limitations was “inflexible.”

3 Although Varnado’s notice of appeal was filed beyond the thirty-day limit provided in Rule 4 of the Mississippi Rules of Appellate Procedure, “this Court has the ability to suspend the requirements of appellate rules in the interest of justice.” Agee v. State, 374 So. 3d 629, 631 (¶9) (Miss. Ct. App. 2023); M.R.A.P. 2(c). We also note that the circuit court’s docket contains a note from the clerk on June 6, 2024, indicating that Varnado did not receive the circuit court’s April 2 order and that the clerk was sending him another copy of the order. Varnado’s notice of appeal is still untimely but not as significantly as it seems at first blush.

3 ¶7. Additionally, “any order denying or dismissing a PCR motion is a bar to a second or

successive PCR motion.” Bradley v. State, 395 So. 3d 1015, 1019 (¶12) (Miss. Ct. App.

2024). Stated differently, any order that “grants relief, denies relief, or dismisses a PCR

motion bars any second or successive motion.” Hamilton, 367 So. 3d at 1042 (¶7) (citing

Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-23(6) (Rev. 2020)).

¶8. For a claim to survive the UPCCRA’s three-year time-bar and successive-motions bar,

the petitioner must demonstrate that a statutory exception to the UPCCRA applies. There are

five exceptions to the bars listed in the statute, yet Varnado fails to argue that any are

applicable.4 See Bell v. State, 207 So. 3d 705, 707 (¶6) (Miss. Ct. App. 2016).

¶9. Varnado’s second PCR motion, the subject of this appeal, was filed outside the three-

year statute of limitations. The circuit court accepted Varnado’s guilty plea in 2016, but

Varnado filed the PCR motion at issue in this case in 2024, well past the expiration of the

three-year statute of limitations. As previously stated, “a PCR motion must be filed within

three years of the judgment of conviction following a guilty plea.” Hamilton, 367 So. 3d at

1041 (¶6) (citing Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-5(2)). Since Varnado’s second PCR motion was

not filed within three years of the judgment of conviction, it was time-barred, and the circuit

court made no reversible error by denying relief. See Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-5(2).

¶10. Moreover, Varnado’s 2024 PCR motion was barred as successive. Varnado filed his

first PCR motion in 2018, but the court concluded that his claims “lacked merit” and denied

4 See Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-5(2)(a)-(b).

4 his PCR motion. Varnado then filed his second PCR motion in 2024, which was barred based

on the first PCR’s denial. As explained supra, “any order denying . . . a PCR motion is a bar

to a second or successive PCR motion.” Bradley, 395 So. 3d at 1019 (¶12). Since there was

already an order denying Varnado’s PCR motion, his 2024 PCR motion was barred as

successive. See Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-23(6).

CONCLUSION

¶11. In accordance with the UPCCRA, Varnado’s second PCR motion was both time-

barred and successive. Therefore, we affirm the circuit court’s order denying his PCR

motion.

¶12. AFFIRMED.

BARNES, C.J., CARLTON AND WILSON, P.JJ., WESTBROOKS, McDONALD, LAWRENCE, McCARTY, EMFINGER AND WEDDLE, JJ., CONCUR.