Cutler v. United States

180 F. Supp. 360, 148 Ct. Cl. 537, 1960 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 65
CourtUnited States Court of Claims
DecidedJanuary 20, 1960
DocketNo. 463-55
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 180 F. Supp. 360 (Cutler v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Cutler v. United States, 180 F. Supp. 360, 148 Ct. Cl. 537, 1960 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 65 (cc 1960).

Opinion

Whitaker, Judge,

delivered the opinion of the court:

This is a suit for the refund of Federal unemployment taxes previously paid for the tax years 1950 through 1954 pursuant to section 1600 of the Internal Kevenue Code of 1939.1 The plaintiff’s claim rests solely on the ground that he was not an employer within the meaning of the statute. Defendant says that he was. This is the only question to be decided.

The relevant facts show that plaintiff, during the tax years in question, was a bandleader engaged in what is esoterically known as the “club date” or “pick-up” orchestra field. He operated his business under the name “Ben Cutler Music” and maintained an office with a small staff in New York. Plaintiff’s business consisted of furnishing music at country clubs, colleges, hotels, and private residences for dinners, dances, wedding receptions, debutante parties, and other similar social functions. The plaintiff secured engagements for his music by advertisement, through personal con[539]*539tact, and, in some instances, through wedding consultants and others, to whom he paid a commission of 15 percent. The record shows that he personally solicited 75 percent of his business during the years in question.

The contracts for the engagements were generally negotiated by the plaintiff over the telephone. He would discuss with the purchaser of the music the nature of the party, the number of musicians needed, the instruments they were to play, the musicians’ dress, the type of music to be played, and whether the music was to be continuous or noncontinuous. At this time the total price was agreed upon between the parties. In negotiating this price plaintiff took into consideration the minimum rates established by Local 802 of the American Federation of Musicians. Plaintiff also took into consideration the nature of the affair, the class of society from which the prospective purchaser came, and, after a discussion with him, the amount which the purchaser expected to pay. The price agreed upon usually contained an amount as profit for the plaintiff a9 well as payments for the musicians and expenses.

Once the plaintiff and the purchaser had entered into a contract, the plaintiff proceeded to secure the musicians to fulfill the engagement. The musicians hired, for the most part, did not have regular employment, but earned their income by being employed for single engagements such as plaintiff or other persons in the industry might offer them. These musicians were all members of Local 802 and their pay, except for minor instances, was governed by the rules of the Union. Under the Union rules, the plaintiff was primarily responsible for the payment of the musicians’ wages. As a general rule, the purchaser paid the plaintiff the contract price previously agreed upon, and the plaintiff paid the musicians their wages out of this sum.

During the years in question plaintiff used some 437 musicians to fulfill some 1,635 engagements. While 291 musicians never appeared at more than two engagements during any one year, a small number of musicians were used by plaintiff on numerous occasions. The record shows that for the years in question there were an average of 16 men who played 25 or more engagements and received 70 percent [540]*540of the wages paid by plaintiff; 10 men who played between 10 and 24 engagements and received 11 percent of the wages; and 127 men who played 9 or less engagements and received 19 percent of the wages.

Once the musicians were hired, plaintiff in many instances accompanied them to the site of their engagement and acted as their leader. On those occasions when plaintiff did not accompany the musicians, he appointed one of them as leader. In all engagements, he or the leader, whom he appointed, always obeyed the desires of the purchaser of the mufeic which were expressed at the time the contract was made or which might be expressed while the engagement was in progress. The record shows that on occasion the purchaser would ask the musicians to play particular tunes and to stroll among the guests. These requests or orders were always obeyed.

The written contracts between the purchaser and the plaintiff were for the most part executed on contract forms prescribed by the Union, know as “Form B”, “Form B-l” and “Form B-2.” These forms provided that the purchaser of the music would have complete control of the services which the musicians would render under the contracts, and would distribute to the several musicians the amounts shown on the reverse side, which was the Union scale. Although in practice the purchaser, except in rare instances, had nothing to do with the selection of the individual musicians, the contract, nevertheless, provided that the leader had the right to replace any “employee” who was unable to keep his engagement. In the case of steady engagements, Rider A or B were attached to the contract. Rider A provided that the purchaser would be liable for all taxes applicable to services performed under the contract, and, in the event the leader was held liable, the purchaser guaranteed to reimburse him. Rider B provided for a 7 percent increase in the contract price and payment by the leader of all employment taxes. This agreement guaranteed reimbursement of the purchaser if he should be held liable for the tax. The price list of Local 802 also contained the following provision with regard to single engagements:

[541]*541On every single engagement, in all classifications, the Leader shall receive, in addition to his Leader money, a sum equal to seven (7) per cent of the total contract price, if it is at scale.
In the event that the contract price is at least seven (7) percent above scale, the contract will be approved.

The gist of plaintiff’s argument is that the purchaser of the music, not the plaintiff, controlled the musicians’ services, and, therefore, the purchaser was the employer. Plaintiff relies principally on section 1607(i) of the Internal Revenue •Code of 1939, which defines an employee as follows:

Employee. — The term “employee” includes an officer of a corporation, but such term does not include (1) any individual who, under the usual common-law rules applicable in determining the employer-employee relationship, has the status of an independent contractor or (2-) any individual (except an officer of a corporation) who is not an employee under such common-law rules.

Plaintiff says that this language limits the court to the use of the “common law control” test to determine the relationship between the parties.

We do not agree. Although control or the right to control activities is generally indicative of the employer-employee relationship, Edwards v. United States, 144 C. Cls. 158, the final determination of such a relationship is determined only by a realistic consideration of all the factors involved. Bartels v. Birmingham, 332 U.S. 126; Beatty v. Halpin, 267 F. 2d 561; Metropolitan Roofing & Modernizing Co. v. United States, 125 F. Supp. 670; Jagolinzer v. United States, 150 F. Supp. 489.

In this case, it seems obvious that the plaintiff, and not the purchasers of the music, was the employer of the musicians. The purchaser was interested in the leader, not in the individual musicians, except in rare instances. The leader had.

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Bluebook (online)
180 F. Supp. 360, 148 Ct. Cl. 537, 1960 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 65, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/cutler-v-united-states-cc-1960.