Cushman v. Waddell

6 F. Cas. 1077

• Court: U.S. Circuit Court for the District of New Jersey
• Decided: April 15, 1830
• Status: Published

Opinion

BY THE COUBT.

We cannot go into evidence of the circumstances attending the correction of the defendant’s son by the plaintiff, as it would be neither a justification, nor mitigation of damages in this action, however aggravated the case may have been on the part of the plaintiff. We therefore reject the evidence offered, so far as it respects the nature of the infliction on the boy: but we think evidence admissible to show the situation of the son, after the transaction; the account he gave of it on his father’s first seeing him; and the conduct and declarations of the latter, from that time to the attack on the plaintiff; otherwise the jury cannot decide whether the defendant acted under the influence of the sudden excitement produced by the situation and story of his son, or a disposition to inflict a wanton injury or disgrace upon the plaintiff.

The evidence was admitted. The only question for the jury was the amouni oí uan...g^s. THE OOUBT laid down the following as the rule of law by which they ought to be guided:

That whether the defendant acted wantonly and maliciously, or under the excitement of the occasion, the plaintiff was entitled to such damages as would compensate him for any injury he may have sustained in his person, or his occupation, and all expenses incurred in consequence of the injury. That no provocation, however great or immediate, could excuse the defendant from making full compensation for all the plaintiff had suffered by the unlawful attack on his person; nor could any provocation, so remote in point of time from the infliction of the injury to his son as to allow the excitement to subside and leave the defendant to act coolly and deliberately, be any mitigation of damages. But if the jury were satisfied that he acted in the heat of passion caused by the appearance and account of his son, without any previous malice towards the plaintiff, or any deliberate design to injure him in person or the estimation of the public, it was a circumstance which ought to operate powerfully to reduce the damages to such as would be compensatory. If death had ensued from the blows inflicted by the defendant, his offence would have been murder or manslaughter, according to the degree of excitement or deliberation with which it was committed. The same rule is applicable to actions for personal injuries, whenever a plaintiff claims damages beyond those which afford him remuneration for all injuries he has sustained.

The jury found a verdict for $1,500. A motion was made for a new trial, on account of excessive damages, but before any decision of the court, the case was compromised.