Curves International, Inc. v. Mosbarger

525 F. Supp. 2d 1310, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89906
CourtDistrict Court, M.D. Alabama
DecidedDecember 5, 2007
DocketCivil Action 2:07cv807-MHT
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 525 F. Supp. 2d 1310 (Curves International, Inc. v. Mosbarger) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, M.D. Alabama primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Curves International, Inc. v. Mosbarger, 525 F. Supp. 2d 1310, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89906 (M.D. Ala. 2007).

Opinion

OPINION

MYRON H. THOMPSON, District Judge.

In this lawsuit, plaintiff Curves International, Inc., a fitness-center franchiser, charges one of its former franchisees, defendant Lisa Lewis (formerly Lisa Mos-barger), with, among other things, breach of a non-compete agreement. The diversity-of-citizenship jurisdiction of the court has been invoked pursuant 28 U.S.C. § 1332.

The court now has before it Curves International’s motion for preliminary injunction asking that, among other things, Lewis be enjoined from operating a fitness center pending resolution of this lawsuit. 1 Based on the evidence presented and argument of counsel, the court concludes that the motion should be denied.

I. BACKGROUND

The evidence presented to the court reflected the following:

*1312 April 1999: Curves International and Lewis entered into a franchise agreement that permitted Lewis to open and operate a Curves fitness-facility in Deatsville, Alabama for a period of ten years. The agreement further provided in relevant part: if Lewis abandoned the franchise, she would be deemed in default and Curves International could terminate the franchise; if the agreement were terminated, Lewis would be prohibited from engaging in any similar business within 40 miles of Deatsville for a period of three years; and this non-compete prohibition included serving in any of the following roles for a nearby competitor: “proprietor, partner, investor, shareholder, member, director, officer, employer, employee, principal, agent, adviser, franchiser, franchisee, consultant or in any other individual or representative capacity,” PL Exh. 4, § 9(B). The agreement also provided for one exception to this non-compete prohibition: if Lewis had an ownership-interest in a competitor at the time she entered the franchise agreement, she could continue involvement with that competitor.

April 2006: As a part of a divorce settlement, Lewis was awarded a fitness-facility named “Mike’s Gym.” She renamed the facility “Jordan’s Gym,” after her son, and has operated the facility ever since, either by herself or with someone else. 2

July 2006: Lewis discontinued operation of her Curves fitness facility.

October 2006: Lewis informed Curves International that her Curves facility had closed and would not reopen.

November 16, 2006: Curves International informed Lewis that her franchise rights were officially terminated.

August 27, 2007: Acting on complaints from other Curves franchisees, a Curves official visited Jordan’s Gym and saw that, indeed, it was a fitness-facility within 40 miles of Deatsville; the official also saw Lewis conducting an aerobics class in the gym.

September 7, 2007: Curves International brought this lawsuit against Lewis, charging (1) breach of contract; (2) misappropriation of goodwill; (3) trademark infringement; (4) trademark dilution; and (5) false designation and misrepresentation of origin. On the same day, Curves International filed the pending motion for a preliminary injunction.

II. DISCUSSION

For a preliminary injunction to issue, a moving party must establish the following: (1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (2) a substantial threat of irreparable injury if the preliminary injunction is not granted; (3) that the threatened injury to the movant outweighs the threatened harm that the injunction may cause the opposing party; and (4) that granting preliminary injunctive relief is not adverse to the public interest. Ferrero v. Associated Materials, Inc., 923 F.2d 1441, 1448 (11th Cir.1991); Cate v. Oldham, 707 F.2d 1176, 1185 (11th Cir.1983).

A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits

Curves maintains that it is likely to succeed on at least two of its claims: its breach-of-contract claim and its trademark-infringement claim.

1. Breach-of-Contract Claim

The franchise agreement contains a provision stating that “the relationship, rights, and obligations of the parties of this *1313 Franchise Agreement shall be governed by the internal laws of the state of Texas, except to the extent governed by the United States Trademark Act of 1946....” PI. Ex. 4, § 14(N). Because the choice-of-law issue has not been briefed by both parties at this time, and because the laws of both Texas and Alabama do not differ materially on the issues before the court, the court does not resolve which State’s laws apply.

Under the laws of Alabama and Texas, covenants-not-to-compete are enforceable if certain conditions are met. Gafnea v. Pasquale Food Co., Inc., 454 So.2d 1366 (Ala.1984); Meineke Discount Muffler v. Jaynes, 999 F.2d 120, 123 (5th Cir.1993). Alabama law provides that such a covenant is enforceable if: (1) the party seeking enforcement demonstrates a pro-tectable interest; (2) the restriction is reasonably related to that interest; (3) the scope of the restriction is reasonable; and (4) the restriction does not impose an undue hardship on the other party. Benchmark Med. Holdings, Inc. v. Barnes, 328 F.Supp.2d 1236, 1257 (M.D.Ala.2004) (Albritton, J.). According to Texas law, “a covenant not to compete is enforceable if it is ancillary to or part of an otherwise enforceable agreement at the time the agreement is made to the extent that it contains limitations as to time, geographical area, and scope of activity to be restrained that are reasonable and do not impose a greater restraint than is necessary to protect the goodwill or other business interest of the promisee.” Tex. Bus. & Com.Code Ann. § 15.50(a); see also Alex Sheshunoff Mgmt. Servs., L.P. v. Johnson, 209 S.W.3d 644, 648 (Tex.2006).

Lewis does not dispute, at this stage of the litigation, that the covenant-not-to-compete contained in the franchise agreement is enforceable under both Texas and Alabama law. Therefore, the critical question with regard to this breach-of-contract claim is whether Lewis breached the agreement.

Lewis offers two reasons why she did not violate the covenant-not-to-compete: first, she does not operate or have any financial interest in Jordan’s Gym; and, second, even if she did own and operate Jordan’s Gym, her actions were permissible under the franchise agreement because she already owned that gym at the time she signed the franchise agreement.

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Bluebook (online)
525 F. Supp. 2d 1310, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89906, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/curves-international-inc-v-mosbarger-almd-2007.