Curtis v. Piney Colliery Co.

71 S.E. 207, 68 W. Va. 734
CourtWest Virginia Supreme Court
DecidedFebruary 28, 1911
StatusPublished

This text of 71 S.E. 207 (Curtis v. Piney Colliery Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering West Virginia Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Curtis v. Piney Colliery Co., 71 S.E. 207, 68 W. Va. 734 (W. Va. 1911).

Opinion

Miller, Judge :

In ejectment, after plaintiffs had introduced all tlieir evidence, oral and documentary, defendant offering no evidence, the court below on its motion struck out all the evidence and directed a verdict for defendant, and to the judgment of the circuit court thereon,, that plaintiffs take nothing by their action, they obtained a writ of error from this Court.

The property sued for, as the declaration in three counts alleges, is the “Sewell seam or vein of coal, * * * now also known as and called the ISTo. 5 seam or vein of coal, and which * * * was on the 10th day of December, 1888, and for many years prior” thereto “known as and called the top vein or seam of coal,” and which is in and underlying the tract of land in Raleigh county, described in the declaration, by metes and bounds, as containing 108 1-2 acres, and of which it is alleged plaintiffs were possessed of an estate in fee simple absolute.

Plaintiffs and defendant have a common source of title, and their respective rights to the coal in controversy depend on the construction to be given to the deed from Amos Williams and Susan A., his wife, to II. A. Gray, and others, 'trustees, dated December 10th, 1888, whereby, for the consideration therein expressed, the grantors granted unto the grantees with general warrant}7, “all the coal and other minerals in, upon and under” said tract or parcel of land further described .as “containing by recent survey 108 1-2 acres, and known on the plat of the lands of the C. C. C. L. Association as Mo. 6, and bounded,” as de[736]*736scribed in the declaration. After this grant tire deed contains this exception or reservation: “And said grantors reserve the top vein of coal in hill tops above my dwelling house.” By a subsequent clause in the deed the usual mining rights are also granted to^ said second parties.

Plaintiffs claim the coal excepted or reserved in said deed, by a subsequent deed from said Susan A. Williams, widow, and Elsie W. Williams, sole heir of said Amos Williams, deceased, dated March 10th, 1904, granting unto each of them, with general warranty, a' one-half undivided interest, being all the right, title and interest, both legal and equitable, to the said tract of land, described as in said declaration, excepting therefrom, however, “a part of the coal and other minerals as heretofore conveyed to II. A. Gray,” of record in said Raleigh county, in Deed Book “J”, page 341. Defendants by mesne conveyances have derived title to the coal and mining rights granted to said Gray and others, trustees.

Counsel for plaintiffs have in their brief argued elaborately, with copious citations of authorities, the question of plaintiffs’ remedy by ejectment; also the question whether the clause in ■the deed of December 10th, 1888, reserving “the top vein of coal in hill tops above my dwelling house,” should be construed as an exception or a reservation. Defendants’ counsel concede the remedy, and admit that the so called reservation should be construed as an exception. So we need not trouble ourselves for the purposes of this case with these questions. Indeed, we think, there can be no doubt as to the remedy by ejectment; nor as to the proposition that the reservation in the deed, properly construed, is an exception.

So we have but the one question, what was excepted from the grant? Was it, as plaintiffs claim, the Sewell, or No. 5 seam, described in the declaration, or, as defendants contend, some other vein actually existing or believed by the grantors at the time to exist “in the hill tops above my dwelling house” ?

Plaintiffs’ contention and theory is that on and prior to the date of the deed, in the vicinity of this land, there was but the one seam or vein of coal known and recognized as the top vein or seam, namely, the one now in controversy, from four to five feet in thickness, and that this seam or vein of necessity must have been the one referred to, and excepted in the grant of [737]*7371888. The evidence, however, shows that this seam had then been opened on the William Warden land adjoining the Williams tract on the South, and within about three hundred yards of his South West line, at an elevation of about 123.19 feet, an outcrop thereof also appearing in a little branch or stream of water traversing both tracts from North East to South West, about a hundred yards north of the first opening, at an elevation of about 117.19 feet, and also at one or two other places within a mile or so of the Williams tract as early as the year 1889, and which seam was also referred to by various names, “McNamee Seam”; “Top Seam”; “Upper Seam”; “Warden Seam”; “Bill Warden Coal Bank,” &c. These coal banks had never up to the date of the deed been worked, except in a small way for local and domestic use. The evidence further shows that this seam of coal does not exist in the hill tops back of the dwelling house. The hill tops are there, but the seam of coal is not found present. It was found, however, before the deed, at the bore hoie south of the house, and a little north of Warden’s line at about the depth of thirteen feet, and later at the house, situated two to three thousand feet north of the opening on the William Warden land, at an elevation of 149.34 feet, and at a depth below the house from sixty to seventy feet, and at an increased' depth as you go north and notheast on adjoining lands.

But notwithstanding the existence of these physical facts respecting the location of the Sewell or No. o seam, it is insisted that that seam, must, in the light of the surrounding facts and circumstances, by proper construction, be regarded as the subject matter of the exception in the deed, even 'though to do so requires us to wholly disregard the words of description therein, “in the hill tops above my dwelling house.” Many decisions are cited and relied on, and rules of construction invoked in able and exhaustive briefs of learned counsel pro and con this proposition. Included among the cases cited is our own case of Armstrong v. Ross, 61 W. Va. 38, which plaintiffs’ counsel regard as decisive of the case at bar. But the view we take of the documentary and oral evidence ■ does not require us to here examine the many decisions cited, or to apply all the various rules of construction relied on.

The general rule to be observed in construction of deeds as of all other contracts, and which we think is the only rule we need [738]*738observe in disposing of this case, is that in construing a deed the object is to ascertain the intention of the makers, as gathered from the language used, and the general purpose and scope of the instrument in the light of the surrounding circumstances, and when such intention clearly appears by giving the words their natural and ordinary meaning technical rules of construction will not be invoked to defeat it. Citation of authority for this proposition seems wholly unnecessary, but we cite Uhl v. Railroad Co., 51 W. Va. 107, point 6; McDougal v. Musgrave, 46 W. Va. 509, point 2; 17 Am. & Eng. Ency. Law, (2nd Ed.) 7; Devlin on Deeds, (2nd Ed.) sections 837, 850; Preston v. White, 57 W. Va. 280, 283.

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Related

McDougal v. Musgrave
33 S.E. 281 (West Virginia Supreme Court, 1899)
Preston v. White
50 S.E. 236 (West Virginia Supreme Court, 1905)
Armstrong v. Ross
55 S.E. 895 (West Virginia Supreme Court, 1906)

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Bluebook (online)
71 S.E. 207, 68 W. Va. 734, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/curtis-v-piney-colliery-co-wva-1911.