Curtis v. Boyd

CourtDistrict Court, M.D. Tennessee
DecidedNovember 16, 2020
Docket3:20-cv-00559
StatusUnknown

This text of Curtis v. Boyd (Curtis v. Boyd) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, M.D. Tennessee primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Curtis v. Boyd, (M.D. Tenn. 2020).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE NASHVILLE DIVISION

DOUGLAS W. CURTIS, ) ) Petitioner, ) ) No. 3:20-cv-00559 v. ) ) JUDGE RICHARDSON BERT C. BOYD, Warden, ) MAGISTRATE JUDGE NEWBERN ) Respondent. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Douglas W. Curtis, an inmate of the Northeast Correctional Complex in Mountain City, Tennessee, filed a pro se petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for a writ of habeas corpus challenging his 2016 conviction for four counts of rape of a child in Lewis County, Tennessee, for which he currently is serving a term of eighty years of imprisonment in the Tennessee Department of Correction. (Doc. No. 1). Subsequent to filing his initial petition, Petitioner filed an amended petition for writ of habeas corpus (Doc. No. 9), which the Court permitted (Doc. No. 12). The Court, in a July 15, 2020 Order, initially directed Respondent to file the state-court record and a response to the petition. (Doc. No. 7, PageID 227-29). The Court later stayed a response to the petition pending a response to Petitioner’s discovery motion. (Doc. 12, PageID 254). Pending before the Court are the following motions by Petitioner: motion for discovery (Doc. No. 2), to which Respondent has filed a response in opposition (Doc. No. 14); a motion to appoint counsel (Doc. No. 17); and a motion to compel Respondent to complete the record (Doc. No. 18). Petitioner also filed a reply to Respondent’s response in opposition to the motion for discovery. (Doc. No. 16). MOTION FOR DISCOVERY Petitioner requests discovery of his “attorney’s client file that contains forensic reports from the defense audio expert, Mr. Tom Owen[,]” a forensic report “that show [sic] the results of” testing completed on a second alleged victim, and the “original recorder device[.]” (Doc. No. 2, PageID 211-14). Respondent contends that discovery should be denied without prejudice because it is premature and Petitioner provides no good cause to justify discovery based on the state-court record. (Doc. No. 14 at PageID 2917). Habeas petitioners do not have an automatic right to discovery. See Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899, 904 (1997) (finding that a “habeas petitioner, unlike the usual civil litigant in federal

court, is not entitled to discovery as a matter of ordinary course.”); Johnson v. Mitchell, 585 F.3d 923, 924 (6th Cir. 2009) (same). Discovery in habeas cases is controlled by Rule 6(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts, which states in pertinent part that “[a] judge may, for good cause, authorize a party to conduct discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and may limit the extent of discovery.” R. 6(a), Rules Gov’g § 2254 Cases. “Good cause” is not demonstrated by “bald assertions” or “conclusory allegations.” Stanford v. Parker, 266 F.3d 442, 460 (6th Cir. 2001). Rather, the requested discovery must be materially related to claims raised in the habeas petition and likely to “resolve any factual disputes that could entitle [the petitioner] to relief.” Williams v. Bagley, 380 F.3d 932, 975 (6th Cir. 2004) (internal

quotations omitted) (citing Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899, 908–09 (1997)). The moving party bears the burden of demonstrating the materiality of the requested information. Id. Rule 6(a) does not “sanction fishing expeditions based on a petitioner’s conclusory allegations.” Id. Rule 7 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts provides that, “[i]f the petition is not dismissed, the judge may direct the parties to expand the record by submitting additional materials relating to the petition.” R. 7(a), R. Gov’g § 2254 Cases. In other words, expansion of the record is not permitted unless the Court does not dismiss the petition using the pleadings and the state court record before it. The ‘purpose [of Rule 7(a)] is to enable the judge to dispose of some habeas petitions not dismissed on the pleadings, without the time and expense required for an evidentiary hearing.” R. 7, R. Gov’g § 2254 Cases advisory

committee’s note. Thus, under Rule 7, the Court should not permit expansion of the record if the pleadings and state court record adequately resolve Petitioner’s claims. Given that Respondent has not yet filed an answer to the petition or the complete, relevant state court record and the Court has not yet considered the petition based on the pleadings and state record before it, Petitioner’s motion to conduct discovery is premature. See Dupree v. Gidley, No. 2:16-cv-12821, 2016 WL 4362931, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 16, 2016) (finding that petitioner’s request to conduct discovery was premature where respondent had not yet filed an answer to the petition or the state court record”); Caudill v. Conover, 871 F. Supp. 2d 639, 645 (E.D. Ky. May 14, 2012) (denying petitioner’s request for discovery because new evidence gained through

discovery “has no bearing on a federal court’s review under § 2254(d)(1)”). Additionally, the Court notes that federal habeas review generally is limited to the record that was before the state court. See Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181 (2011) (holding that habeas review under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) is “limited to the record that was before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits”); Taylor v. Simpson, No. 06-cv-181, 2012 WL 404929, at *2 (E.D. Ky. Feb. 6, 2012) (noting Pinholster’s “alternative bar” to the consideration of new evidence on federal habeas review under Section 2254(d) and denying petitioner’s request for discovery on Batson claim that was decided on the merits in state court). Consequently, the Court will deny Petitioner’s motion for discovery (Doc. No. 2) without prejudice. The Court will keep Petitioner’s motion and detailed reply to Respondent’s response in mind should further development of the record be necessary for the proper resolution of this case.1 MOTION FOR THE APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL

Next, Petitioner seeks the appointment of counsel. (Doc. No. 17). He states that he “is unable to pay the costs for an attorney to represent him throughout these proceedings” and “is in need of counsel to assist him throughout this lawsuit.” (Id. at PageID 2980). The Supreme Court has held that “an indigent’s right to appointed counsel . . . exists only where the litigant may lose his physical liberty if he loses the litigation.” Lassiter v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 25 (1981). Thus, unlike criminal proceedings, there is no constitutional right to an appointed counsel in a civil action, such as this action. Willett v. Wells, 469 F. Supp. 748, 751 (E.D. Tenn. 1977), aff’d, 595 F.2d 1227 (6th Cir. 1979); see Williamson v. Autorama, Inc., No. 91-5759, 947 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1991) (citing Willett favorably). A petitioner has no absolute right to be represented by counsel on federal habeas corpus review. Abdur-Rahman v. Mich. Dep’t

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Related

Murray v. Giarratano
492 U.S. 1 (Supreme Court, 1989)
Bracy v. Gramley
520 U.S. 899 (Supreme Court, 1997)
Henry Lavado, Jr. v. Patrick W. Keohane
992 F.2d 601 (Sixth Circuit, 1993)
Linnell Richmond v. Darren Settles
450 F. App'x 448 (Sixth Circuit, 2011)
Willie Williams, Jr. v. Margaret Bagley, Warden
380 F.3d 932 (Sixth Circuit, 2004)
Van Johnson v. Mitchell
585 F.3d 923 (Sixth Circuit, 2009)
Willett v. Wells
469 F. Supp. 748 (E.D. Tennessee, 1977)
Caudill v. Conover
871 F. Supp. 2d 639 (E.D. Kentucky, 2012)

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Bluebook (online)
Curtis v. Boyd, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/curtis-v-boyd-tnmd-2020.