Curtis Tyrone Williams v. Larmetrice Nunnally-Williams

Tex. App. Ct., 4th Dist. (San Antonio)

Curtis Tyrone Williams v. Larmetrice Nunnally-Williams

Texas Court of Appeals, 4th District (San Antonio)·Decided August 12, 2026·No. 04-25-00505-CV·Published

Opinion

Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

MEMORANDUM OPINION

No. 04-25-00505-CV

Curtis Tyrone WILLIAMS,

Appellant

v.

Larmetrice NUNNALLY-WILLIAMS, Appellees

From the 37th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas Trial Court No. 2015-CI-13598 Honorable Mary Lou Alvarez, Judge Presiding

Opinion by: Velia J. Meza, Justice

Sitting: Irene Rios, Justice Lori I. Valenzuela, Justice Velia J. Meza, Justice

Delivered and Filed: August 12, 2026 AFFIRMED Appellant, Curtis Williams appeals the trial court award of $9,393.10 in favor of Larmetrice Nunnally-Williams. On appeal, Williams asserts that the trial court lacked subject- matter jurisdiction because it was barred by limitations pursuant to section 9.003(a) of the Texas Family Code. Because we conclude that Williams failed to preserve this issue for appeal, we affirm.

BACKGROUND 1

Williams and Nunnally were married on December 29, 2006, and ceased living together on June 21, 2015. On August 18, 2015, Nunnally filed her original petition for divorce. The trial court signed the final decree of divorce on June 21, 2017. As part of the decree, Nunnally was awarded:

[A] portion of Curtis T. Williams’s sums, whether matured or unmatured, accrued or unaccrued, vested or otherwise, together with all increases thereof, the proceeds therefrom, and any other rights related to any profit-sharing plan, thrift-saving plan, retirement plan Keogh plan, pension plan, employee stock option plan, 401 (k) plan, employee saving plan, accrued unpaid bonuses, disability plan, or other benefits existing by reason of Curtis T. Williams’s employment United States’ Army. As of March 19, 2017 that portion being Eight Thousand Four Hundred Seventy dollars and Fifty-Seven cents ($8,470.57) of the related benefits earned during the marriage.

Subsequently, on October 19, 2023, the trial court signed a “Retirement Benefits Court Order,” recognizing Nunnally’s right to $8,470.57—including earnings and losses—from Williams’s Uniformed Services Thrift Savings Plan (TSP) account.

On October 25, 2023, Nunnally received a letter from Williams’s TSP stating that although she was entitled to $9,459.26 of Williams’s vested account balance, only $512.87 was transferred to an account established in her name. As a result, on August 21, 2024—seven years after the final decree of divorce was signed—Nunnally filed an original petition for enforcement of constructive trust and breach of fiduciary duty against Williams. In her petition, Nunnally alleged that (1) Williams withdrew and received the $8,946.39 from his TSP, (2) the funds were the subject of a constructive trust for her benefit pursuant to section 9.011(b) of the Texas Family Code, and (3) Williams’s failure to deliver the funds constituted a breach of his fiduciary obligation.

1 Because the reporter’s record in this case only consists of two non-evidentiary proceedings, our factual background is based on the clerk’s record.

In response, Williams filed a plea to the jurisdiction, arguing that Nunnally’s suit was barred by section 9.003(a)’s two-year statute of limitations.2 After hearing Williams’s motion— which consisted only of argument by counsel—the trial court denied Williams’s plea to the jurisdiction and signed an order to that effect on December 26, 2024. The trial on the merits was subsequently set for April 21, 2025.

At the trial setting, counsel for the parties announced that they reached an agreement and would enter a judgment awarding Nunnally $8,946.39, plus $446.71 in interest, totaling $9,393.10. In exchange, Williams would retain his right to appeal the order denying his plea to the jurisdiction. The trial court signed a final judgment on May 7, 2025. This appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

Williams asserts that because Nunnally’s petition was filed after the two-year statute of limitations provided by section 9.003(a) of the Texas Family Code, the trial court lacked subject- matter jurisdiction and abused its discretion as a matter of law by signing the final judgment. We disagree.

As an initial matter, we address Williams’s characterization of section 9.003 as jurisdictional. “Subject-matter jurisdiction refers to a court’s statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate a case.” In re Guardianship of Fairley, 650 S.W.3d 372, 379 (Tex. 2022). A statute of limitations, on the other hand, does not ordinarily implicate jurisdiction. See Tex. State Univ. v. Tanner, 689 S.W.3d 292, 302 (Tex. 2024) (distinguishing the effect limitations has on subject- matter jurisdiction in ordinary litigation versus litigation involving the government). Instead, limitations is an affirmative defense which the defendant “bears the initial burden to plead, prove,

2 Williams also filed an answer to Nunnally’s petition generally denying the allegations therein. Williams did not plead the affirmative defense of limitations in his answer.

and secure findings to sustain its plea of limitations.” Woods v. William M. Mercer, Inc., 769 S.W.2d 515, 517 (Tex. 1988).

Williams points to no language in the statute conditioning the trial court’s power to act in compliance with the limitations period. Cf. Tex. Disposal Sys. Landfill, Inc. v. Travis Cent. Appraisal Dist., 694 S.W.3d 752, 759 (Tex. 2024) (noting that Texas courts have “embraced the modern trend of declining to read statutory mandates to be jurisdictional . . . absent clear indication that failure to comply . . . deprives a court of the power to decide the claim”). We discern nothing in section 9.003 that clearly states it is jurisdictional in nature. See In re K.N., --- S.W.3d ----, No. 24-0881, 2026 WL 1614378, at *5 (Tex. June 5, 2026) (describing “clear-statement rule”). We thus conclude section 9.003 is a limitations provision, not a jurisdictional bar. The trial court retained subject-matter jurisdiction over Nunnally’s petition regardless of when it was filed. Because the proper avenue for raising a pretrial challenge based upon a statute of limitations is through a motion for summary judgment—rather than a plea to the jurisdiction—we construe Williams’s motion as one seeking summary judgment. See Villarreal v. Ramirez, 685 S.W.3d 868, 884 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2024, no pet.) (holding that res judicata defense could not “properly be considered in a plea to the jurisdiction,” and should instead “be raised through a motion for summary judgment or proven at trial”) (citation modified); see also TEX. R. CIV. P. 71 (stating that if a party mistakenly designates a plea, “the court, if justice so requires, shall treat the plea . . . as if it had been properly designated”).

Generally, we do not have jurisdiction to review the denial of a motion for summary judgment on appeal. Cullum v. White, 399 S.W.3d 173, 188 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2011, pet. denied). Moreover, denial of a motion for summary judgment does not preserve the issues raised

therein for appeal. Petroleum Workers Union of the Republic of Mex. v. Gomez, 503 S.W.3d 9, 24 n.22 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, no pet.).

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

MEMORANDUM OPINION

No. 04-25-00505-CV

Curtis Tyrone WILLIAMS,

Appellant

v.

Larmetrice NUNNALLY-WILLIAMS, Appellees

From the 37th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas Trial Court No. 2015-CI-13598 Honorable Mary Lou Alvarez, Judge Presiding

Opinion by: Velia J. Meza, Justice

Sitting: Irene Rios, Justice Lori I. Valenzuela, Justice Velia J. Meza, Justice

Delivered and Filed: August 12, 2026 AFFIRMED Appellant, Curtis Williams appeals the trial court award of $9,393.10 in favor of Larmetrice Nunnally-Williams. On appeal, Williams asserts that the trial court lacked subject- matter jurisdiction because it was barred by limitations pursuant to section 9.003(a) of the Texas Family Code. Because we conclude that Williams failed to preserve this issue for appeal, we affirm.

BACKGROUND 1

Williams and Nunnally were married on December 29, 2006, and ceased living together on June 21, 2015. On August 18, 2015, Nunnally filed her original petition for divorce. The trial court signed the final decree of divorce on June 21, 2017. As part of the decree, Nunnally was awarded:

[A] portion of Curtis T. Williams’s sums, whether matured or unmatured, accrued or unaccrued, vested or otherwise, together with all increases thereof, the proceeds therefrom, and any other rights related to any profit-sharing plan, thrift-saving plan, retirement plan Keogh plan, pension plan, employee stock option plan, 401 (k) plan, employee saving plan, accrued unpaid bonuses, disability plan, or other benefits existing by reason of Curtis T. Williams’s employment United States’ Army. As of March 19, 2017 that portion being Eight Thousand Four Hundred Seventy dollars and Fifty-Seven cents ($8,470.57) of the related benefits earned during the marriage.

Subsequently, on October 19, 2023, the trial court signed a “Retirement Benefits Court Order,” recognizing Nunnally’s right to $8,470.57—including earnings and losses—from Williams’s Uniformed Services Thrift Savings Plan (TSP) account.

On October 25, 2023, Nunnally received a letter from Williams’s TSP stating that although she was entitled to $9,459.26 of Williams’s vested account balance, only $512.87 was transferred to an account established in her name. As a result, on August 21, 2024—seven years after the final decree of divorce was signed—Nunnally filed an original petition for enforcement of constructive trust and breach of fiduciary duty against Williams. In her petition, Nunnally alleged that (1) Williams withdrew and received the $8,946.39 from his TSP, (2) the funds were the subject of a constructive trust for her benefit pursuant to section 9.011(b) of the Texas Family Code, and (3) Williams’s failure to deliver the funds constituted a breach of his fiduciary obligation.

1 Because the reporter’s record in this case only consists of two non-evidentiary proceedings, our factual background is based on the clerk’s record.

In response, Williams filed a plea to the jurisdiction, arguing that Nunnally’s suit was barred by section 9.003(a)’s two-year statute of limitations.2 After hearing Williams’s motion— which consisted only of argument by counsel—the trial court denied Williams’s plea to the jurisdiction and signed an order to that effect on December 26, 2024. The trial on the merits was subsequently set for April 21, 2025.

At the trial setting, counsel for the parties announced that they reached an agreement and would enter a judgment awarding Nunnally $8,946.39, plus $446.71 in interest, totaling $9,393.10. In exchange, Williams would retain his right to appeal the order denying his plea to the jurisdiction. The trial court signed a final judgment on May 7, 2025. This appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

Williams asserts that because Nunnally’s petition was filed after the two-year statute of limitations provided by section 9.003(a) of the Texas Family Code, the trial court lacked subject- matter jurisdiction and abused its discretion as a matter of law by signing the final judgment. We disagree.

As an initial matter, we address Williams’s characterization of section 9.003 as jurisdictional. “Subject-matter jurisdiction refers to a court’s statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate a case.” In re Guardianship of Fairley, 650 S.W.3d 372, 379 (Tex. 2022). A statute of limitations, on the other hand, does not ordinarily implicate jurisdiction. See Tex. State Univ. v. Tanner, 689 S.W.3d 292, 302 (Tex. 2024) (distinguishing the effect limitations has on subject- matter jurisdiction in ordinary litigation versus litigation involving the government). Instead, limitations is an affirmative defense which the defendant “bears the initial burden to plead, prove,

2 Williams also filed an answer to Nunnally’s petition generally denying the allegations therein. Williams did not plead the affirmative defense of limitations in his answer.

and secure findings to sustain its plea of limitations.” Woods v. William M. Mercer, Inc., 769 S.W.2d 515, 517 (Tex. 1988).

Williams points to no language in the statute conditioning the trial court’s power to act in compliance with the limitations period. Cf. Tex. Disposal Sys. Landfill, Inc. v. Travis Cent. Appraisal Dist., 694 S.W.3d 752, 759 (Tex. 2024) (noting that Texas courts have “embraced the modern trend of declining to read statutory mandates to be jurisdictional . . . absent clear indication that failure to comply . . . deprives a court of the power to decide the claim”). We discern nothing in section 9.003 that clearly states it is jurisdictional in nature. See In re K.N., --- S.W.3d ----, No. 24-0881, 2026 WL 1614378, at *5 (Tex. June 5, 2026) (describing “clear-statement rule”). We thus conclude section 9.003 is a limitations provision, not a jurisdictional bar. The trial court retained subject-matter jurisdiction over Nunnally’s petition regardless of when it was filed. Because the proper avenue for raising a pretrial challenge based upon a statute of limitations is through a motion for summary judgment—rather than a plea to the jurisdiction—we construe Williams’s motion as one seeking summary judgment. See Villarreal v. Ramirez, 685 S.W.3d 868, 884 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2024, no pet.) (holding that res judicata defense could not “properly be considered in a plea to the jurisdiction,” and should instead “be raised through a motion for summary judgment or proven at trial”) (citation modified); see also TEX. R. CIV. P. 71 (stating that if a party mistakenly designates a plea, “the court, if justice so requires, shall treat the plea . . . as if it had been properly designated”).

Generally, we do not have jurisdiction to review the denial of a motion for summary judgment on appeal. Cullum v. White, 399 S.W.3d 173, 188 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2011, pet. denied). Moreover, denial of a motion for summary judgment does not preserve the issues raised

therein for appeal. Petroleum Workers Union of the Republic of Mex. v. Gomez, 503 S.W.3d 9, 24 n.22 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, no pet.).

However, even if we assume Williams preserved this issue for our review, a defendant moving for summary judgment on an affirmative defense bears the burden of conclusively proving every element of their affirmative defense as a matter of law. Nowak v. DAS Inv. Corp., 110 S.W.3d 677, 680–81 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, no pet.). Williams’s motion argues that Nunnally’s petition is barred by section 9.003(a)’s two-year statute of limitations. However, section 9.003(a) applies to suits seeking to enforce the division of tangible personal property in existence at the time of the decree or divorce. TEX. FAM. CODE § 9.003(a). Although the final divorce decree provides a starting date for the two-year limitations period, Williams failed to conclusively establish whether Nunnally’s suit involved tangible personal property in existence at the time the divorce decree was signed. Furthermore, Williams failed to establish whether section 9.003(a)’s limitation period applied against Nunnally’s breach of fiduciary duty action. Williams thus failed to conclusively show section 9.003 barred Nunnally’s petition. See Nowak, 110 S.W.3d at 680–81. We overrule Williams’s sole issue on appeal.

CONCLUSION

We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Velia J. Meza, Justice

Curtis Tyrone Williams v. Larmetrice Nunnally-Williams, (Tex. Ct. App. 2026).

Pincite

Curtis Tyrone Williams v. Larmetrice Nunnally-Williams (Curtis Tyrone Williams v. Larmetrice Nunnally-Williams) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Opinion

Related