Curtis Lee Lowder v. Jennifer Mcommons, et al.

District Court, E.D. Wisconsin·Decided June 23, 2026·No. 2:26-cv-00135·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN ______________________________________________________________________________ CURTIS LEE LOWDER,

Plaintiff, v. Case No. 26-cv-135-pp

JENNIFER MCOMMONS, et al.,

Defendants. ______________________________________________________________________________

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED WITHOUT PREPAYING FILING FEE (DKT. NO. 2) AND SCREENING COMPLAINT UNDER 28 U.S.C. §1915A ______________________________________________________________________________

Plaintiff Curtis Lee Lowder, who is incarcerated at Green Bay Correctional Institution and is representing himself, filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. §1983, alleging that the defendants violated his constitutional rights. This decision resolves the plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed without prepaying the filing fee, dkt. no. 2, and screens his complaint, dkt. no. 1. I. Motion for Leave to Proceed without Prepaying the Filing Fee (Dkt. No. 2)

The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) applies to this case because the plaintiff was incarcerated when he filed his complaint. See 28 U.S.C. §1915(h). The PLRA lets the court allow an incarcerated plaintiff to proceed with his case without prepaying the civil case filing fee. 28 U.S.C. §1915(a)(2). When funds exist, the plaintiff must pay an initial partial filing fee. 28 U.S.C. §1915(b)(1). He then must pay the balance of the $350 filing fee over time, through deductions from his prisoner account. Id. On February 12, 2026, the court ordered the plaintiff to pay an initial partial filing fee of $11.75. Dkt. No. 6. The court received that fee on February 25, 2026. The court will grant the plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed without prepaying the filing fee and will require him to pay remainder of the filing fee

over time in the manner explained at the end of this order. II. Screening the Complaint A. Federal Screening Standard Under the PLRA, the court must screen complaints brought by incarcerated persons seeking relief from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. §1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint if the incarcerated plaintiff raises claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §1915A(b). In determining whether the complaint states a claim, the court applies the same standard that it applies when considering whether to dismiss a case under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Cesal v. Moats, 851 F.3d 714, 720 (7th Cir. 2017) (citing Booker-El v. Superintendent, Ind. State Prison, 668 F.3d 896, 899 (7th Cir. 2012)). To state a claim, a complaint must include

“a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The complaint must contain enough facts, accepted as true, to “state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows a court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).

To state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. §1983, a plaintiff must allege that someone deprived him of a right secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States, and that whoever deprived him of this right was acting under the color of state law. D.S. v. E. Porter Cnty. Sch. Corp., 799 F.3d 793, 798 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing Buchanan–Moore v. County of Milwaukee, 570 F.3d 824, 827 (7th Cir. 2009)). The court liberally construes complaints filed by plaintiffs who are representing themselves and holds such complaints to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by lawyers. Cesal, 851 F.3d at 720

(citing Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 776 (7th Cir. 2015)). B. The Plaintiff’s Allegations The plaintiff was confined at the Marinette County Jail when he filed the complaint. Dkt. No. 1 at 1. He alleges that the defendants—Dr. Jennifer Mcommons, Bradley J. Klumb and Jennifer Thorsen (who work for Southern Health Partners)—violated his right to receive medical treatment. Id. at 2-3. Thorsen and Mcommons allegedly failed to schedule follow-up appointments

for the plaintiff to see an orthopedic specialist, as recommended by emergency room doctors and nurses multiple times. Id. at 2. The plaintiff states that he believes the defendants acted with deliberate indifference to his medical condition by ignoring emergency room referrals and scheduling appointments after considering when he would be released from the Marinette County Jail. Id. at 4. He says that they did this in an unprofessional manner and that they violated his HIPAA rights by using ulterior forms of communication. Id. This allegedly allowed them to consider the plaintiff’s

medical condition, treatment costs and how they could proceed without the burden of paying for a necessary procedure falling on Marinette County. Id. For relief, the plaintiff seeks compensatory damages. Id. at 5. C. Analysis The court assumes that the plaintiff was a pretrial detainee while he was confined at the Marinette County Jail. A §1983 claim that a state pretrial detainee has received inadequate medical care is predicated on the rights secured by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. James v. Hale,

959 F.3d 307, 318 (7th Cir. 2020) (citing Miranda v. County of Lake, 900 F.3d 335, 346-47 (7th Cir. 2018)). Claims of inadequate medical care while in pretrial detention are subject to an objective reasonableness standard. Id. (citing Miranda, 900 F.3d at 352). The plaintiff bears the burden to demonstrate objective unreasonableness, and he must make a two-part showing. Id. First, he must show that the defendants acted purposefully, knowingly or recklessly when considering the consequences of their response

to the medical condition at issue in the case. Id. (citing McCann v.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Curtis Lee Lowder v. Jennifer Mcommons, et al., (E.D. Wis. 2026).

Curtis Lee Lowder v. Jennifer Mcommons, et al. (Curtis Lee Lowder v. Jennifer Mcommons, et al.) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Related

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Booker-El v. Superintendent, Indiana State Prison
668 F.3d 896 (Seventh Circuit, 2012)
Buchanan-Moore v. County of Milwaukee
570 F.3d 824 (Seventh Circuit, 2009)
United States v. Bek
493 F.3d 790 (Seventh Circuit, 2007)
Miguel Perez v. James Fenoglio
792 F.3d 768 (Seventh Circuit, 2015)
D. S. v. East Porter County School Corp
799 F.3d 793 (Seventh Circuit, 2015)
Alfredo Miranda v. County of Lake
900 F.3d 335 (Seventh Circuit, 2018)
Valerie McCann v. Ogle County, Illinois
909 F.3d 881 (Seventh Circuit, 2018)
Dustin James v. Deborah Hale
959 F.3d 307 (Seventh Circuit, 2020)
Cesal v. Moats
851 F.3d 714 (Seventh Circuit, 2017)
Carpenter v. Phillips
419 F. App'x 658 (Seventh Circuit, 2011)