Cite as 2026 Ark. 27 SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS No. CR-25-173
Opinion Delivered: February 12, 2026 CURTIS DORSEY APPELLANT PRO SE APPEAL FROM THE PULASKI COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, SEVENTH DIVISION V. [NO. 60CR-17-3259]
STATE OF ARKANSAS HONORABLE KAREN D. APPELLEE WHATLEY, JUDGE
AFFIRMED.
BARBARA W. WEBB, Justice
Appellant Curtis Dorsey appeals from the denial of his petition for postconviction
relief filed pursuant to Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 37.1 (2024). Dorsey was
convicted of first-degree murder by a Pulaski County jury and sentenced to a term of life
imprisonment plus fifteen years for a firearm enhancement. Dorsey’s conviction and
sentences were affirmed on direct appeal. Dorsey v. State, 2020 Ark. 316, 607 S.W.3d 485.
Dorsey filed his first Rule 37.1 petition pro se but subsequently hired counsel and
filed an amended Rule 37.1 petition. In his amended petition, Dorsey alleged five
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims. A hearing was held on the petition wherein
Dorsey’s trial counsel and an independent investigator hired by Dorsey testified. The trial
court entered a detailed order that considered the evidence presented at the postconviction
hearing, addressed Dorsey’s five ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims, and concluded that
Dorsey failed to demonstrate that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness such that the outcome of the trial would have been different but for
counsel’s conduct. We affirm.
This court will not reverse the trial court’s decision granting or denying
postconviction relief unless it is clearly erroneous. Kemp v. State, 347 Ark. 52, 60 S.W.3d
404 (2001). A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it,
the appellate court after reviewing the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been made. Id.
The standard for ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims is the two-prong analysis set
forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Neal v. State, 2025 Ark. 151, 720
S.W.3d 858. Under Strickland, to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the
petitioner must show that (1) counsel’s performance was deficient and (2) the deficient
performance prejudiced petitioner’s defense. Id. Unless a petitioner makes both showings,
the allegations do not meet the benchmark on review for granting relief on a claim of
ineffective assistance. Id. Counsel is presumed effective, and allegations without factual
substantiation are insufficient to overcome that presumption. Id. A petitioner has the burden
of overcoming this presumption by identifying specific acts and omissions that, when viewed
from counsel’s perspective at the time of trial, could not have been the result of reasonable
professional judgment. Id.
A court need not address both components of the Strickland inquiry if the petitioner
makes an insufficient showing on one. Id. To demonstrate prejudice, the petitioner must
show there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the fact-finder would
have had a reasonable doubt respecting guilt. Id. A reasonable probability is one that is
2 sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial. Id. Conclusory statements
that counsel was ineffective cannot be the basis for postconviction relief. Id.
The evidence adduced at trial demonstrated that on September 5, 2016, Dorsey’s
business partner, Sharniece Hughes, was fatally shot outside her home. Dorsey, 2020 Ark.
316, 607 S.W.3d 485. Dorsey and Hughes operated a food-truck business together, and on
the day of the murder, Dorsey was at Hughes’s home, returning the food trailer that was
hitched to a black Toyota Tundra pickup truck owned by Hughes. Id.
At trial, five eyewitnesses including Hughes’s daughter, mother, and neighbors
testified to the events surrounding Hughes’s murder. Id. Hughes’s daughter testified that
shortly before hearing gunshots, she saw Dorsey outside in the black pickup truck. Hughes’s
mother testified that Dorsey was at the house that morning unloading the trailer from the
black pickup truck. Id. Juan Antonio Reyes stated that he stepped outside after hearing
gunshots and saw an individual driving off in a black truck. Reyes further stated that he
recognized this man as the individual who would pick up and drop off the food trailer at
Hughes’s home. Id. Shannon Branham testified that she heard several gunshots and opened
her door and saw Hughes lying on the ground and a black truck turning off the street.
Lakierra Madden testified that she overhead two individuals conversing outside Hughes’s
home, heard gunshots, looked out her window, and saw a man shoot a woman multiple
times and then drive off in a black truck. Id.
Evidence further demonstrated that following the shooting, Dorsey abandoned his
food-truck business and his job as a mental-health technician. Id. He was not located until
October 16, 2016, when police stopped him in El Paso, Texas. Id. Dorsey was pulled over
3 driving the same black truck that was last seen leaving the site of the murder. When police
ordered him to exit the vehicle, Dorsey drove off, and a chase ensued, reaching speeds in
excess of one hundred miles an hour. Id. Dorsey ultimately evaded El Paso police by driving
across the border into Mexico. Dorsey was finally apprehended on July 13, 2017, in
Clarksburg, West Virginia, where Dorsey attempted to evade apprehension by jumping out
of a third-story window, breaking his leg while doing so. Id.
On appeal from the denial of his postconviction petition, Dorsey raises three claims
of ineffective assistance of counsel that were raised in the trial court: (1) trial counsel failed
to adequately cross-examine witnesses Reyes and Branham by pointing out conflicts and
inconsistencies in their testimony in that both Reyes and Branham stated that they were
first to witness the murder; (2) trial counsel failed to hire an investigator to photograph and
survey the neighborhood where the crime took place for the purpose of calculating the
distance between Reyes’s house and Hughes’s house;1 (3) trial counsel failed to obtain the
dashcam video of the traffic stop and ensuing car chase that took place in El Paso, Texas, to
demonstrate that Dorsey was not the individual who fled in the black truck.
Dorsey’s first claim that trial counsel failed to aggressively cross-examine Reyes and
Branham is not borne out by the direct-appeal record. 2 The transcript reveals that both
witnesses were thoroughly cross-examined on the inconsistencies between their pretrial
1 Dorsey’s Rule 37.1 counsel hired an investigator, Roy Spann, who measured the distance between Reyes’s house and Hughes’s house and presented his findings at the hearing. 2 This court may take judicial notice in postconviction proceedings of the record on direct appeal without need to supplement the record. Williams v. State, 2019 Ark. 289, 586 S.W.3d 148.
4 statements and trial testimony as well as contradictions between each one’s trial testimony.
Dorsey has therefore failed to overcome the presumption that his trial counsel provided
effective representation. Neal, 2025 Ark. 151, 720 S.W.3d 858.
In support of his second claim that trial counsel failed to cast doubt on Reyes’s
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Cite as 2026 Ark. 27 SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS No. CR-25-173
Opinion Delivered: February 12, 2026 CURTIS DORSEY APPELLANT PRO SE APPEAL FROM THE PULASKI COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, SEVENTH DIVISION V. [NO. 60CR-17-3259]
STATE OF ARKANSAS HONORABLE KAREN D. APPELLEE WHATLEY, JUDGE
AFFIRMED.
BARBARA W. WEBB, Justice
Appellant Curtis Dorsey appeals from the denial of his petition for postconviction
relief filed pursuant to Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 37.1 (2024). Dorsey was
convicted of first-degree murder by a Pulaski County jury and sentenced to a term of life
imprisonment plus fifteen years for a firearm enhancement. Dorsey’s conviction and
sentences were affirmed on direct appeal. Dorsey v. State, 2020 Ark. 316, 607 S.W.3d 485.
Dorsey filed his first Rule 37.1 petition pro se but subsequently hired counsel and
filed an amended Rule 37.1 petition. In his amended petition, Dorsey alleged five
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims. A hearing was held on the petition wherein
Dorsey’s trial counsel and an independent investigator hired by Dorsey testified. The trial
court entered a detailed order that considered the evidence presented at the postconviction
hearing, addressed Dorsey’s five ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims, and concluded that
Dorsey failed to demonstrate that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness such that the outcome of the trial would have been different but for
counsel’s conduct. We affirm.
This court will not reverse the trial court’s decision granting or denying
postconviction relief unless it is clearly erroneous. Kemp v. State, 347 Ark. 52, 60 S.W.3d
404 (2001). A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it,
the appellate court after reviewing the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been made. Id.
The standard for ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims is the two-prong analysis set
forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Neal v. State, 2025 Ark. 151, 720
S.W.3d 858. Under Strickland, to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the
petitioner must show that (1) counsel’s performance was deficient and (2) the deficient
performance prejudiced petitioner’s defense. Id. Unless a petitioner makes both showings,
the allegations do not meet the benchmark on review for granting relief on a claim of
ineffective assistance. Id. Counsel is presumed effective, and allegations without factual
substantiation are insufficient to overcome that presumption. Id. A petitioner has the burden
of overcoming this presumption by identifying specific acts and omissions that, when viewed
from counsel’s perspective at the time of trial, could not have been the result of reasonable
professional judgment. Id.
A court need not address both components of the Strickland inquiry if the petitioner
makes an insufficient showing on one. Id. To demonstrate prejudice, the petitioner must
show there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the fact-finder would
have had a reasonable doubt respecting guilt. Id. A reasonable probability is one that is
2 sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial. Id. Conclusory statements
that counsel was ineffective cannot be the basis for postconviction relief. Id.
The evidence adduced at trial demonstrated that on September 5, 2016, Dorsey’s
business partner, Sharniece Hughes, was fatally shot outside her home. Dorsey, 2020 Ark.
316, 607 S.W.3d 485. Dorsey and Hughes operated a food-truck business together, and on
the day of the murder, Dorsey was at Hughes’s home, returning the food trailer that was
hitched to a black Toyota Tundra pickup truck owned by Hughes. Id.
At trial, five eyewitnesses including Hughes’s daughter, mother, and neighbors
testified to the events surrounding Hughes’s murder. Id. Hughes’s daughter testified that
shortly before hearing gunshots, she saw Dorsey outside in the black pickup truck. Hughes’s
mother testified that Dorsey was at the house that morning unloading the trailer from the
black pickup truck. Id. Juan Antonio Reyes stated that he stepped outside after hearing
gunshots and saw an individual driving off in a black truck. Reyes further stated that he
recognized this man as the individual who would pick up and drop off the food trailer at
Hughes’s home. Id. Shannon Branham testified that she heard several gunshots and opened
her door and saw Hughes lying on the ground and a black truck turning off the street.
Lakierra Madden testified that she overhead two individuals conversing outside Hughes’s
home, heard gunshots, looked out her window, and saw a man shoot a woman multiple
times and then drive off in a black truck. Id.
Evidence further demonstrated that following the shooting, Dorsey abandoned his
food-truck business and his job as a mental-health technician. Id. He was not located until
October 16, 2016, when police stopped him in El Paso, Texas. Id. Dorsey was pulled over
3 driving the same black truck that was last seen leaving the site of the murder. When police
ordered him to exit the vehicle, Dorsey drove off, and a chase ensued, reaching speeds in
excess of one hundred miles an hour. Id. Dorsey ultimately evaded El Paso police by driving
across the border into Mexico. Dorsey was finally apprehended on July 13, 2017, in
Clarksburg, West Virginia, where Dorsey attempted to evade apprehension by jumping out
of a third-story window, breaking his leg while doing so. Id.
On appeal from the denial of his postconviction petition, Dorsey raises three claims
of ineffective assistance of counsel that were raised in the trial court: (1) trial counsel failed
to adequately cross-examine witnesses Reyes and Branham by pointing out conflicts and
inconsistencies in their testimony in that both Reyes and Branham stated that they were
first to witness the murder; (2) trial counsel failed to hire an investigator to photograph and
survey the neighborhood where the crime took place for the purpose of calculating the
distance between Reyes’s house and Hughes’s house;1 (3) trial counsel failed to obtain the
dashcam video of the traffic stop and ensuing car chase that took place in El Paso, Texas, to
demonstrate that Dorsey was not the individual who fled in the black truck.
Dorsey’s first claim that trial counsel failed to aggressively cross-examine Reyes and
Branham is not borne out by the direct-appeal record. 2 The transcript reveals that both
witnesses were thoroughly cross-examined on the inconsistencies between their pretrial
1 Dorsey’s Rule 37.1 counsel hired an investigator, Roy Spann, who measured the distance between Reyes’s house and Hughes’s house and presented his findings at the hearing. 2 This court may take judicial notice in postconviction proceedings of the record on direct appeal without need to supplement the record. Williams v. State, 2019 Ark. 289, 586 S.W.3d 148.
4 statements and trial testimony as well as contradictions between each one’s trial testimony.
Dorsey has therefore failed to overcome the presumption that his trial counsel provided
effective representation. Neal, 2025 Ark. 151, 720 S.W.3d 858.
In support of his second claim that trial counsel failed to cast doubt on Reyes’s
identification of him as the perpetrator, Dorsey hired an investigator to determine the
distance between Reyes’s house and Hughes’s house. Dorsey’s efforts in this regard failed to
establish a viable claim under the Strickland standard. Trial counsel’s testimony at the
postconviction hearing and the transcript of the direct appeal demonstrate that the jury was
made aware of the area surrounding the crime scene and the proximity of the witnesses’
houses to that of Hughes’s house.
Dorsey’s third claim that trial counsel failed to obtain the dashcam video connected
to the flight from police that took place in El Paso, Texas, does not establish that counsel
was ineffective. As we observed in our opinion affirming Dorsey’s conviction, evidence of
flight is admissible to show consciousness of guilt, even if the flight was not immediately
after the alleged commission of the crime. Dorsey, 2020 Ark. 316, 607 S.W.3d 485. Here,
evidence established that in addition to fleeing from police in El Paso, Texas, Dorsey fled
the state of Arkansas following Hughes’s murder and jumped out of a third-story window
in an attempt to avoid capture in West Virginia. The trial court did not clearly err when it
rejected Dorsey’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims.
Special Justice MILTON FINE joins.
BRONNI, J., not participating.
5 Curtis Dorsey, pro se appellant.
Tim Griffin, Att’y Gen., by: Walker K. Hawkins, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee.