IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 24-0362 Filed June 18, 2025
CURTIS CORTEZ JONES, Applicant-Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF IOWA, Respondent-Appellee. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Johnson County, Justin Lightfoot,
Judge.
A postconviction applicant appeals the denial of relief. AFFIRMED.
Kent A. Simmons, Bettendorf, for appellant.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Louis S. Sloven, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee State.
Considered without oral argument by Ahlers, P.J., and Badding and
Buller, JJ. 2
BULLER, Judge.
Curtis Jones appeals from the denial of his application for postconviction
relief. He claims there were disputed material facts regarding whether counsel
was ineffective in developing a record on what he alleges was systematic exclusion
of African American jurors in violation of the Iowa Constitution, based on
information in a remand transcript from another case. We affirm.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
A Polk County jury, on change of venue from Johnson County, found Jones
guilty of first-degree murder. We conditionally affirmed his conviction on direct
appeal and remanded to allow Jones to make additional record on the racial
composition of the jury in light of recent developments in the case law. See State
v. Jones, No. 19-0494, 2020 WL 3264377, at *9–10 (Iowa Ct. App. June 17, 2020).
In addressing Jones’s assertion of his right to “an impartial jury drawn from a fair
cross-section of the community,” we specifically held that to obtain relief on
remand, Jones had to prove “not only a lack of fair and reasonable representation
in the jury pool, but also systematic exclusion.” Id. at *8–9. In doing so, we
referenced the second and third prongs of the test adopted by the United States
Supreme Court in Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979).
On remand, Jones (through counsel) presented testimony from a county
jury clerk. She testified regarding how the master jury list is compiled but could
not offer specifics on information like demographics. The district court denied
Jones’s claim under the Sixth Amendment, finding he did not establish sufficient
variance between the actual and expected number of African American jurors in 3
Jones’s pool to sustain his claim. Jones filed a notice of appeal from the remand
but voluntarily dismissed his appeal before it was briefed.
Jones filed this application for postconviction relief, which ultimately focused
on whether counsel was ineffective when presenting the fair cross-section claim
by not presenting evidence establishing systematic exclusion and not pursuing a
claim under the Iowa Constitution. After some motion practice, Jones submitted
the transcript of the remand hearing in State v. Veal as an evidentiary exhibit,
claiming it supplied a basis to prove systematic exclusion. See 972 N.W.2d 728,
732 (Iowa 2022) (describing testimony about jury management software and
practices). The State moved for summary disposition, which the postconviction
court granted.
The postconviction court reasoned that Jones had not generated a fact
question on systematic exclusion. Specifically, the court found Jones had not
“introduce[d] any evidence about the possible causes of underrepresentation of
African Americans in his jury pool” or alleged any “precise point in the jury selection
process that may plausibly have caused the exclusion of African American jurors.”
The court pointedly noted that the very evidence Jones claimed counsel was
ineffective for not presenting in his own earlier remand was “also missing at this
stage in the [postconviction relief] action, which has now been pending for over
two years.” And the court found that, absent Jones developing facts and evidence
that would support a systematic-exclusion claim, he could not prove breach of
essential duty or the reasonable probability of a different outcome. See Strickland
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). Jones appeals. 4
II. Standard of Review
We review a postconviction summary-disposition ruling for correction of
errors at law. Linn v. State, 929 N.W.2d 717, 729 (Iowa 2019). Summary
disposition is the “put up or shut up moment” in postconviction litigation, when an
applicant “must show what evidence [he] has that would convince a trier of fact to
accept [his] version of the events.” Armstrong v. State, No. 21-1132, 2022
WL 2824750, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. July 20, 2022) (quoting Slaughter v. Des Moines
Univ. Coll. of Osteopathic Med., 925 N.W.2d 793, 808 (Iowa 2019)). To the extent
the underlying merits of any ineffective-assistance claims are before us, we review
de novo. Goode v. State, 920 N.W.2d 520, 523 (Iowa 2018).
III. Discussion
Jones alleges two errors in the postconviction ruling: first, that there were
disputed material facts; and second, that the court erred in assessing the claim
through the lens of ineffective assistance rather than the underlying merits of a
state constitutional claim. We consider each.
First, after careful review of the record and the appellate briefs, we aren’t
sure what material facts Jones thinks are disputed. He admitted all of the material
facts pled by the State. He relied on “[t]he evidence in Veal II” (the remand
transcript) to prove his claim and only alleged he would offer “similar evidence” at
the postconviction trial, as confirmed by his witness list which parenthetically
indicated the Veal remand transcript was the basis for all of the relevant designated 5
witnesses’ testimony on jury composition.1 For its part, the State did not object to
consideration of the Veal remand transcript and even cited it. In other words, both
the State and Jones agreed on the record below and the material facts. All that
was left was for the court to apply the law—the very purpose of summary
disposition. Iowa Code § 822.6(2) (2023).
Second, we discern no error in the postconviction court analyzing the
state-constitution claim through the lens of ineffective assistance. That’s the only
way the claim could be raised in postconviction litigation since error was not
preserved at Jones’s remand hearing or on direct appeal. See id. § 822.8; Berryhill
v. State, 603 N.W.2d 243, 245 (Iowa 1999); Osborn v. State, 573 N.W.2d 917, 921
(Iowa 1998).
It’s unclear whether Jones’s appellate brief really challenges the underlying
merits of whether he was owed relief or instead just whether summary disposition
was appropriate. To the extent the merits were decided below or are before us
now on appeal, we affirm.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 24-0362 Filed June 18, 2025
CURTIS CORTEZ JONES, Applicant-Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF IOWA, Respondent-Appellee. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Johnson County, Justin Lightfoot,
Judge.
A postconviction applicant appeals the denial of relief. AFFIRMED.
Kent A. Simmons, Bettendorf, for appellant.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Louis S. Sloven, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee State.
Considered without oral argument by Ahlers, P.J., and Badding and
Buller, JJ. 2
BULLER, Judge.
Curtis Jones appeals from the denial of his application for postconviction
relief. He claims there were disputed material facts regarding whether counsel
was ineffective in developing a record on what he alleges was systematic exclusion
of African American jurors in violation of the Iowa Constitution, based on
information in a remand transcript from another case. We affirm.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
A Polk County jury, on change of venue from Johnson County, found Jones
guilty of first-degree murder. We conditionally affirmed his conviction on direct
appeal and remanded to allow Jones to make additional record on the racial
composition of the jury in light of recent developments in the case law. See State
v. Jones, No. 19-0494, 2020 WL 3264377, at *9–10 (Iowa Ct. App. June 17, 2020).
In addressing Jones’s assertion of his right to “an impartial jury drawn from a fair
cross-section of the community,” we specifically held that to obtain relief on
remand, Jones had to prove “not only a lack of fair and reasonable representation
in the jury pool, but also systematic exclusion.” Id. at *8–9. In doing so, we
referenced the second and third prongs of the test adopted by the United States
Supreme Court in Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979).
On remand, Jones (through counsel) presented testimony from a county
jury clerk. She testified regarding how the master jury list is compiled but could
not offer specifics on information like demographics. The district court denied
Jones’s claim under the Sixth Amendment, finding he did not establish sufficient
variance between the actual and expected number of African American jurors in 3
Jones’s pool to sustain his claim. Jones filed a notice of appeal from the remand
but voluntarily dismissed his appeal before it was briefed.
Jones filed this application for postconviction relief, which ultimately focused
on whether counsel was ineffective when presenting the fair cross-section claim
by not presenting evidence establishing systematic exclusion and not pursuing a
claim under the Iowa Constitution. After some motion practice, Jones submitted
the transcript of the remand hearing in State v. Veal as an evidentiary exhibit,
claiming it supplied a basis to prove systematic exclusion. See 972 N.W.2d 728,
732 (Iowa 2022) (describing testimony about jury management software and
practices). The State moved for summary disposition, which the postconviction
court granted.
The postconviction court reasoned that Jones had not generated a fact
question on systematic exclusion. Specifically, the court found Jones had not
“introduce[d] any evidence about the possible causes of underrepresentation of
African Americans in his jury pool” or alleged any “precise point in the jury selection
process that may plausibly have caused the exclusion of African American jurors.”
The court pointedly noted that the very evidence Jones claimed counsel was
ineffective for not presenting in his own earlier remand was “also missing at this
stage in the [postconviction relief] action, which has now been pending for over
two years.” And the court found that, absent Jones developing facts and evidence
that would support a systematic-exclusion claim, he could not prove breach of
essential duty or the reasonable probability of a different outcome. See Strickland
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). Jones appeals. 4
II. Standard of Review
We review a postconviction summary-disposition ruling for correction of
errors at law. Linn v. State, 929 N.W.2d 717, 729 (Iowa 2019). Summary
disposition is the “put up or shut up moment” in postconviction litigation, when an
applicant “must show what evidence [he] has that would convince a trier of fact to
accept [his] version of the events.” Armstrong v. State, No. 21-1132, 2022
WL 2824750, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. July 20, 2022) (quoting Slaughter v. Des Moines
Univ. Coll. of Osteopathic Med., 925 N.W.2d 793, 808 (Iowa 2019)). To the extent
the underlying merits of any ineffective-assistance claims are before us, we review
de novo. Goode v. State, 920 N.W.2d 520, 523 (Iowa 2018).
III. Discussion
Jones alleges two errors in the postconviction ruling: first, that there were
disputed material facts; and second, that the court erred in assessing the claim
through the lens of ineffective assistance rather than the underlying merits of a
state constitutional claim. We consider each.
First, after careful review of the record and the appellate briefs, we aren’t
sure what material facts Jones thinks are disputed. He admitted all of the material
facts pled by the State. He relied on “[t]he evidence in Veal II” (the remand
transcript) to prove his claim and only alleged he would offer “similar evidence” at
the postconviction trial, as confirmed by his witness list which parenthetically
indicated the Veal remand transcript was the basis for all of the relevant designated 5
witnesses’ testimony on jury composition.1 For its part, the State did not object to
consideration of the Veal remand transcript and even cited it. In other words, both
the State and Jones agreed on the record below and the material facts. All that
was left was for the court to apply the law—the very purpose of summary
disposition. Iowa Code § 822.6(2) (2023).
Second, we discern no error in the postconviction court analyzing the
state-constitution claim through the lens of ineffective assistance. That’s the only
way the claim could be raised in postconviction litigation since error was not
preserved at Jones’s remand hearing or on direct appeal. See id. § 822.8; Berryhill
v. State, 603 N.W.2d 243, 245 (Iowa 1999); Osborn v. State, 573 N.W.2d 917, 921
(Iowa 1998).
It’s unclear whether Jones’s appellate brief really challenges the underlying
merits of whether he was owed relief or instead just whether summary disposition
was appropriate. To the extent the merits were decided below or are before us
now on appeal, we affirm. Jones admits that he planned to offer “almost all of the
same witnesses” and evidence from the Veal transcript at his postconviction trial.
He nonetheless suggests the evidence was sufficient to prove counsel breached
an essential duty by not raising an Iowa Constitution claim and that there was a
reasonable probability of a different outcome. We cannot agree. As a threshold
matter, the Veal remand concerned jury-composition practices from before
December 2018, while Jones was tried in January 2019, after substantial changes
1 The only other witnesses were Jones himself, his attorneys, and the new state
court administrator. The previous state court administrator left the post after the Veal remand, and he was listed as a witness with the parenthetical. 6
were made. See Veal, 972 N.W.2d at 732 (noting these changes based on the
previous court administrator’s testimony). So, even if there was systematic
exclusion in selection of the jury at Veal’s trial, this would not prove systematic
exclusion in Jones’s trial. See id. at 734–36 (declining to address Veal’s
systematic-exclusion claim because he had not proved the second prong—that
representation in the jury pool was not fair and reasonable). Moreover, this record
lacks meaningful information about Polk County jury practices, which would be
necessary for Jones to prove up a state-constitution claim.
Last, we highlight this passage from the State’s appellate brief, which points
out the deficiencies it perceives in the facts as agreed to by Jones and the State,
and how there is not enough factual development to meaningfully engage in a
systematic-exclusion analysis:
The State would respond to Jones’s allegation of systematic exclusion with more specificity, if it could. But Jones has never identified a particular theory of systematic exclusion that the Veal transcript would help him prove. Jones has never said which feature of the juror selection process is causing exclusion and underrepresentation of African-Americans. Even now, he only says that evidence from Veal would prove “that the system by which his jury had been summoned was flawed and that its flaws ‘systematically excluded’ distinct groups.” But, flawed how? Jones never says. The district court was correct to refuse to overlook that total absence of both allegation and proof on this sine qua non element of prong #3. Summary disposition was his “put up or shut up” moment, and Jones offered neither a specific allegation of systematic exclusion nor proof of any facts that could support one. So the [postconviction relief] court was correct to find that, as a matter of law, Jones had not created a triable issue on systematic exclusion under [State v.] Lilly[, 930 N.W.2d 293 (Iowa 2019)].
(Citations omitted.) We largely agree with these observations, as we are unable
to comprehensively review the merits for many of the same reasons. On this
particular record, the postconviction court correctly found there were no disputed 7
issues of material fact and that Jones failed to prove counsel was ineffective for
not pursuing a claim under the Iowa Constitution at the remand hearing. In short,
it matters not that the Iowa Constitution may permit a systematic-exclusion claim
based on routine practices when Jones has not offered any evidence of systematic
exclusion.2 See Lilly, 930 N.W.2d at 307–08.
AFFIRMED.
2 The State’s brief includes a lot of math and invites us to also reject Jones’s claim
under the second prong of Duren based on absolute disparity. We decline the invitation to delve into unnecessary calculations involving disputed population percentages.