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4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 7 8 9 CURTIS AUSTIN, No. 2:25-cv-02966-TLN-SCR 10 Plaintiff, 11 12 v. ORDER 13 JMK INVESTMENTS, INC., et al., 14 15 Defendants. 16 17 Plaintiff is proceeding pro se in this matter, which is referred to the undersigned pursuant 18 to Local Rule 302(c)(21) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Plaintiff has filed a request for leave to 19 proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) and has submitted a declaration including a statement of 20 income and expenses and averring he is unable to pay the costs of this proceeding. ECF No. 2. 21 The motion to proceed IFP will therefore be granted. However, for the reasons provided below, 22 the Court finds Plaintiff’s complaint is legally deficient and will grant Plaintiff leave to file an 23 amended complaint. 24 I. SCREENING 25 A. Legal Standard 26 The federal IFP statute requires federal courts to dismiss a case if the action is legally 27 “frivolous or malicious,” fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks 28 monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). In 1 reviewing the complaint, the Court is guided by the requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil 2 Procedure. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are available online at www.uscourts.gov/rules- 3 policies/current-rules-practice-procedure/federal-rules-civil-procedure. 4 Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the complaint must contain (1) a “short and 5 plain statement” of the basis for federal jurisdiction (that is, the reason the case is filed in this 6 court, rather than in a state court), (2) a short and plain statement showing that plaintiff is entitled 7 to relief (that is, who harmed the plaintiff, and in what way), and (3) a demand for the relief 8 sought. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Plaintiff’s claims must be set forth simply, concisely and directly. 9 Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(1). Forms are available to help pro se plaintiffs organize their complaint in 10 the proper way. They are available at the Clerk’s Office, 501 I Street, 4th Floor (Rm. 4-200), 11 Sacramento, CA 95814, or online at www.uscourts.gov/forms/pro-se-forms. 12 A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. 13 Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). In reviewing a complaint under this standard, the 14 court will (1) accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint, unless they 15 are clearly baseless or fanciful, (2) construe those allegations in the light most favorable to the 16 plaintiff, and (3) resolve all doubts in the plaintiff’s favor. See Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327; Von 17 Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, 592 F.3d 954, 960 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. 18 denied, 564 U.S. 1037 (2011). 19 The court applies the same rules of construction in determining whether the complaint 20 states a claim on which relief can be granted. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (court 21 must accept the allegations as true); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974) (court must 22 construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff). Pro se pleadings are held to a 23 less stringent standard than those drafted by lawyers. Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94. However, the 24 court need not accept as true legal conclusions, even if cast as factual allegations. See Moss v. 25 U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). A formulaic recitation of the elements of 26 a cause of action does not suffice to state a claim. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 27 555-57 (2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 28 ///// 1 To state a claim on which relief may be granted, the plaintiff must allege enough facts “to 2 state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has 3 facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the 4 reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 5 678. A pro se litigant is entitled to notice of the deficiencies in the complaint and an opportunity 6 to amend, unless the complaint’s deficiencies could not be cured by amendment. See Akhtar v. 7 Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1213 (9th Cir. 2012). 8 B. The Complaint 9 Plaintiff has filed a complaint and request for temporary restraining order (TRO). ECF 10 Nos. 1 & 4. Plaintiff’s 15-page complaint includes approximately 25 pages of attachments, which 11 largely appear to be from state court proceedings. The complaint states it is brought pursuant to 12 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and sought to prevent an eviction scheduled for October 15, 2025.1 Plaintiff 13 names two Defendants: 1) JMK Investments, Inc., a California corporation; and 2) JMK 14 Crosswood LLC, a California limited liability company. ECF No. 1 at 3.2 Plaintiff alleges JMK 15 Investments filed the state court unlawful detainer action in March 2025, but lacked standing to 16 do so, and that JMK Crosswood is the actual owner of the property at issue. Id. 17 Plaintiff alleges that JMK Investments obtained a judgment in its favor, despite JMK 18 Crosswood being the record owner of the property. Id. at 3-4. Plaintiff states that JMK 19 Investments lacked standing, and thus the judgment is jurisdictionally void. Id. at 4. Plaintiff 20 alleges he raised this argument “repeatedly” in state court. Id. Plaintiff complains of delays in 21 hearing a motion he filed in state court, and to comments a court clerk allegedly made to him that 22 he felt “discouraged” him from appealing. Id. at 6. Plaintiff also alleges he filed a petition for 23 writ of mandate with the California Supreme Court and also references a “petition for review” 24 and “request for stay” denied by the California Supreme Court. Id. at 7. 25
26 1 Judge Nunley denied Plaintiff’s motion for temporary restraining order on October 14, 2025. ECF No. 4. 27 2 Reference to the complaint are to the page number, as Plaintiff’s complaint does not contain numbered paragraphs. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(b) (“A party must state its claims or defenses in 28 numbered paragraphs, each limited as far as practicable to a single set of circumstances.”). 1 Plaintiff alleges he was denied due process because his property was taken through a 2 judicial proceeding in which JMK Investments lacked standing. Id. at 8-9. Plaintiff alleges that: 3 “Defendants acted under color of state law by invoking state judicial power to obtain the eviction 4 judgment.” Id. at 9.
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4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 7 8 9 CURTIS AUSTIN, No. 2:25-cv-02966-TLN-SCR 10 Plaintiff, 11 12 v. ORDER 13 JMK INVESTMENTS, INC., et al., 14 15 Defendants. 16 17 Plaintiff is proceeding pro se in this matter, which is referred to the undersigned pursuant 18 to Local Rule 302(c)(21) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Plaintiff has filed a request for leave to 19 proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) and has submitted a declaration including a statement of 20 income and expenses and averring he is unable to pay the costs of this proceeding. ECF No. 2. 21 The motion to proceed IFP will therefore be granted. However, for the reasons provided below, 22 the Court finds Plaintiff’s complaint is legally deficient and will grant Plaintiff leave to file an 23 amended complaint. 24 I. SCREENING 25 A. Legal Standard 26 The federal IFP statute requires federal courts to dismiss a case if the action is legally 27 “frivolous or malicious,” fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks 28 monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). In 1 reviewing the complaint, the Court is guided by the requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil 2 Procedure. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are available online at www.uscourts.gov/rules- 3 policies/current-rules-practice-procedure/federal-rules-civil-procedure. 4 Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the complaint must contain (1) a “short and 5 plain statement” of the basis for federal jurisdiction (that is, the reason the case is filed in this 6 court, rather than in a state court), (2) a short and plain statement showing that plaintiff is entitled 7 to relief (that is, who harmed the plaintiff, and in what way), and (3) a demand for the relief 8 sought. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Plaintiff’s claims must be set forth simply, concisely and directly. 9 Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(1). Forms are available to help pro se plaintiffs organize their complaint in 10 the proper way. They are available at the Clerk’s Office, 501 I Street, 4th Floor (Rm. 4-200), 11 Sacramento, CA 95814, or online at www.uscourts.gov/forms/pro-se-forms. 12 A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. 13 Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). In reviewing a complaint under this standard, the 14 court will (1) accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint, unless they 15 are clearly baseless or fanciful, (2) construe those allegations in the light most favorable to the 16 plaintiff, and (3) resolve all doubts in the plaintiff’s favor. See Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327; Von 17 Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, 592 F.3d 954, 960 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. 18 denied, 564 U.S. 1037 (2011). 19 The court applies the same rules of construction in determining whether the complaint 20 states a claim on which relief can be granted. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (court 21 must accept the allegations as true); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974) (court must 22 construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff). Pro se pleadings are held to a 23 less stringent standard than those drafted by lawyers. Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94. However, the 24 court need not accept as true legal conclusions, even if cast as factual allegations. See Moss v. 25 U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). A formulaic recitation of the elements of 26 a cause of action does not suffice to state a claim. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 27 555-57 (2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 28 ///// 1 To state a claim on which relief may be granted, the plaintiff must allege enough facts “to 2 state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has 3 facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the 4 reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 5 678. A pro se litigant is entitled to notice of the deficiencies in the complaint and an opportunity 6 to amend, unless the complaint’s deficiencies could not be cured by amendment. See Akhtar v. 7 Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1213 (9th Cir. 2012). 8 B. The Complaint 9 Plaintiff has filed a complaint and request for temporary restraining order (TRO). ECF 10 Nos. 1 & 4. Plaintiff’s 15-page complaint includes approximately 25 pages of attachments, which 11 largely appear to be from state court proceedings. The complaint states it is brought pursuant to 12 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and sought to prevent an eviction scheduled for October 15, 2025.1 Plaintiff 13 names two Defendants: 1) JMK Investments, Inc., a California corporation; and 2) JMK 14 Crosswood LLC, a California limited liability company. ECF No. 1 at 3.2 Plaintiff alleges JMK 15 Investments filed the state court unlawful detainer action in March 2025, but lacked standing to 16 do so, and that JMK Crosswood is the actual owner of the property at issue. Id. 17 Plaintiff alleges that JMK Investments obtained a judgment in its favor, despite JMK 18 Crosswood being the record owner of the property. Id. at 3-4. Plaintiff states that JMK 19 Investments lacked standing, and thus the judgment is jurisdictionally void. Id. at 4. Plaintiff 20 alleges he raised this argument “repeatedly” in state court. Id. Plaintiff complains of delays in 21 hearing a motion he filed in state court, and to comments a court clerk allegedly made to him that 22 he felt “discouraged” him from appealing. Id. at 6. Plaintiff also alleges he filed a petition for 23 writ of mandate with the California Supreme Court and also references a “petition for review” 24 and “request for stay” denied by the California Supreme Court. Id. at 7. 25
26 1 Judge Nunley denied Plaintiff’s motion for temporary restraining order on October 14, 2025. ECF No. 4. 27 2 Reference to the complaint are to the page number, as Plaintiff’s complaint does not contain numbered paragraphs. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(b) (“A party must state its claims or defenses in 28 numbered paragraphs, each limited as far as practicable to a single set of circumstances.”). 1 Plaintiff alleges he was denied due process because his property was taken through a 2 judicial proceeding in which JMK Investments lacked standing. Id. at 8-9. Plaintiff alleges that: 3 “Defendants acted under color of state law by invoking state judicial power to obtain the eviction 4 judgment.” Id. at 9. In Count II, Plaintiff alleges a violation of equal protection. Id. at 9-10. 5 Plaintiff complains that the state court ruled on JMK Investments’ request for issuance of a writ 6 more quickly than it ruled on his motion. Id. at 10. Plaintiff alleges this “disparate treatment 7 demonstrates systematic bias in favor of landlords and against tenants.” Id. In Count III, Plaintiff 8 alleges denial of access to the courts. This Count complains of the actions of “court actors” and 9 “court staff,” but such individuals are not named defendants in this action. Id. at 11. Plaintiff’s 10 Count IV is entitled “Prosecution of Eviction by Entity Lacking Standing” and Plaintiff 11 references § 1983. Id. at 12. 12 In the request for relief portion of the complaint, Plaintiff sought a TRO preventing his 13 eviction on October 15, 2025. Id. at 13. Plaintiff also seeks to have this Court declare that the 14 state court judgment is void. Id. Plaintiff further seeks compensatory and punitive damages. 15 C. Analysis 16 Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Plaintiff 17 alleges a violation of due process and equal protection concerning the eviction procedure in state 18 court. The elements of a claim under § 1983 are: 1) that the defendants were acting under color 19 of state law; and 2) that defendants deprived plaintiff of rights secured by the Constitution or 20 federal statutes. Benavidez v. County of San Diego, 993 F.3d 1134, 1144 (9th Cir. 2021). 21 Generally, private parties are not acting under color of state law. See Price v. Hawaii, 939 F.2d 22 702, 707–08 (9th Cir. 1991). The two Defendants are identified as a private corporation and an 23 LLC, both apparently involved in real estate and property management. ECF No. 1 at 3. Plaintiff 24 alleges state action in a conclusory manner, and appears to assert that because Defendants filed a 25 state court lawsuit, they are state actors. This is incorrect. See Schucker v. Rockwood, 846 F.2d 26 1202, 1205 (9th Cir. 1988) (“Invoking state legal procedures does not constitute ‘joint 27 participation’ or ‘conspiracy’ with state officials sufficient to satisfy section 1983’s state action 28 requirement.”); Phillips v. Int'l Ass'n of Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Iron Workers, Loc. 118, 1 556 F.2d 939, 940 (9th Cir. 1977) (“The fact that ... resort was had to the courts of the state does 2 not supply the necessary state action.”). 3 In the absence of state action, all of Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims fail. Additionally, as pointed 4 out by Judge Nunley in the order denying Plaintiff’s motion for TRO, Plaintiff’s claims may be 5 barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. It is clear Plaintiff seeks to have this Court invalidate an 6 adverse state court judgment. He previously challenged this judgment in the California appellate 7 courts. See ECF No. 1 at 30-34. If the state court entered an adverse judgment against Plaintiff 8 in the unlawful detainer proceeding, Plaintiff cannot challenge that judgment in federal court. 9 Federal district courts do not have jurisdiction to review final state court judgments. See Rooker 10 v. Fid. Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923). The Rooker-Feldman doctrine prevents “a party losing in 11 state court … from seeking what in substance would be appellate review of the state judgment in 12 a United States district court.” Henrich v. Valley View Dev., 474 F.3d 609, 611 (9th Cir. 2009); 13 see also Busch v. Torres, 905 F.Supp. 766 (C.D. Cal. 1995) (finding plaintiff’s challenge to state 14 court unlawful detainer judgment and its subsequent enforcement through writ of possession was 15 precluded by Rooker-Feldman). 16 The Court finds the complaint fails to state a claim under § 1983 because Plaintiff has 17 sued two private entities and does not adequately allege state action. This Court may also lack 18 subject matter jurisdiction to review this action under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Under 19 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), the Court “shall dismiss the case at any time” if it fails to state a claim on 20 which relief may be granted. However, Plaintiff is proceeding pro se and a pro se litigant should 21 be given leave to amend unless it is absolutely clear that the deficiencies cannot be cured by 22 amendment. See Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212 (9th Cir. 2012). Rather than 23 recommending dismissal of the action, the undersigned will provide Plaintiff an opportunity to 24 amend the complaint to address the deficiencies set forth herein. 25 II. AMENDING THE COMPLAINT 26 If plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, the amended complaint must contain a short 27 and plain statement of Plaintiff’s claims. The amended complaint must clearly set forth the relief 28 requested. The allegations of the complaint must be set forth in sequentially numbered 1 paragraphs, with each paragraph number being one greater than the one before, each paragraph 2 having its own number, and no paragraph number being repeated anywhere in the complaint. 3 Each paragraph should be limited “to a single set of circumstances” where possible. Rule 10(b). 4 As noted above, forms are available to help plaintiffs organize their complaint in the proper way. 5 They are available at the Clerk’s Office, 501 I Street, 4th Floor (Rm. 4-200), Sacramento, CA 6 95814, or online at www.uscourts.gov/forms/pro-se-forms. 7 The amended complaint must not force the Court or the Defendants to guess at what is 8 being alleged against whom. See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1177-80 (9th Cir. 1996) 9 (affirming dismissal of a complaint where the district court was “literally guessing as to what 10 facts support the legal claims being asserted against certain defendants”). The amended 11 complaint should contain specific allegations as to the actions of each named defendant rather 12 than making allegations that the defendants collectively violated plaintiff’s rights. 13 Also, the amended complaint must not refer to a prior pleading in order to make plaintiff’s 14 amended complaint complete. An amended complaint must be complete in itself without 15 reference to any prior pleading. Local Rule 220. This is because, as a general rule, an amended 16 complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Pacific Bell Tel. Co. v. Linkline 17 Communications, Inc., 555 U.S. 438, 456 n.4 (2009) (“[n]ormally, an amended complaint 18 supersedes the original complaint”) (citing 6 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice & 19 Procedure § 1476, pp. 556-57 (2d ed. 1990)). Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an 20 original complaint, each claim and the involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently 21 alleged. 22 Plaintiff’s amended complaint must address the issues set forth herein. Plaintiff must 23 adequately allege state action in support of his claims under § 1983, and allege sufficient factual 24 content in support of his claims to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. 25 III. CONCLUSION 26 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 27 1. Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 2) is GRANTED. 28 ///// 1 2. Plaintiff shall have 30 days from the date of this order to file an amended complaint 2 that addresses the defects set forth above. If Plaintiff fails to timely comply with this 3 order, the undersigned may recommend that this action be dismissed. 4 3. Alternatively, if Plaintiff no longer wishes to pursue this action, Plaintiff may file a notice 5 of voluntary dismissal of this action pursuant to Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Civil 6 Procedure. 7 | SOORDERED. 8 | DATED: March 11, 2026
10 SEAN C. RIORDAN UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28