Currier v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, NA

• Court: District Court, S.D. California
• Decided: February 10, 2020
• Docket: 3:20-cv-00227
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 RICHARD SCOTT CURRIER Case No.: 20cv227-LAB (JLB)

12 Plaintiff, ORDER REQUIRING PLAINTIFF 13 v. TO FILE AMENDED COMPLAINT 14 JP MORGAN CHASE BANK, NA,

et al. 15 Defendants. 16 17 18 19 Defendants removed this action from state court on the basis of federal 20 question jurisdiction. They point out that Plaintiff Richard Currier, pro se, is bringing 21 a claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) that appears to concern 22 his service dog in one of JP Morgan Chase Bank’s branches. Although Currier’s 23 business at the bank involved social security benefits in his account, and he 24 accuses the bank of impeding his attempt to withdraw the funds and falsely 25 accusing him of loitering, it does not appear Currier is raising a claim under any 26 federal social security laws. 27 In federal court, complaints must meet the pleading standard of Fed. R. Civ. 28 P. 8, as discussed in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) and 1 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). Among other things, a complaint must 2 contain a short and plain statement of the grounds for the Court’s jurisdiction, and 3 a short and plain statement of the claim, showing that the plaintiff is entitled to 4 relief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1) and (2). 5 Defendants removed this action on the basis of federal question jurisdiction. 6 The Court’s jurisdiction therefore depends on the presence of a substantial federal 7 question. See Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 8 308, 312 (2005). It is clear Currier is trying to raise a claim under the Americans 9 with Disabilities Act based on his allegations that the bank insisted on proof that 10 his dog was in fact a service animal and accused him of allowing the dog to wander 11 around the bank. But the complaint does not allege any facts showing that Currier 12 is disabled. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (defining disability). Nor does it allege facts 13 showing that his dog is a service animal within the meaning of the ADA. See 28 14 C.F.R. § 36.104 (“Service animal means any dog that is individually trained to do 15 work or perform tasks for the benefit of an individual with a disability . . . .”) Nor 16 does he allege what work his dog performs for him. See id. (“The work or tasks 17 performed by a service animal must be directly related to the individual's 18 disability.”) To meet the pleading standard, the complaint must allege enough 19 factual allegations that, if accepted as true, would state a claim for relief that is 20 plausible on its face. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 21 The complaint makes clear that bank personnel had some reason to doubt 22 whether Currier’s dog was a service animal. It was elderly and in poor health; it 23 was eleven years old, had had a 12-pound tumor removed from its stomach; had 24 had its spleen removed; and had arthritis. Currier also says they falsely said his 25 dog was wandering around the bank, although he does not say why this was false. 26 In light of this, Currier should plead facts plausibly showing how his dog could have 27 been working as his service animal, and why bank personnel would have reason 28 to accept his explanation about the dog. He should also plead facts showing 1 whether his dog was on a leash or similarly restrained or was otherwise under his 2 control. 3 It is understandable that Currier’s complaint would not comply with federal 4 pleading standards, because he filed it in state court and did not know it would be 5 removed. But now that it is in federal court, the complaint must be amended to 6 meet federal pleading standards — and in particular, to confirm that the Court has 7 jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 81(c). Because the Court’s jurisdiction depends on 8 the presence of a substantial federal claim, the Court is required to confirm its own 9 jurisdiction, even if the parties do not raise the issue. See Mt. Healthy City Sch. 10 Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 278 (1977). 11 This order has only focused on the one federal claim, but the amended 12 complaint should also satisfy federal pleading standards as to other claims as well. 13 And it should comply with Fed. R. Civ. P. 10, and Civil Local Rule 5.1. 14 The complaint’s heading identifies Currier as an attorney proceeding pro se. 15 Apparently what Currier means is that he is serving as his own attorney, not that 16 he is a licensed attorney. If this is incorrect and Currier is in fact a licensed attorney, 17 his amended complaint should say so. But if he is not a licensed attorney, his 18 amended complaint should leave out any reference to him as attorney. 19 By March 10, 2020, Currier may file an amended complaint that complies 20 with federal pleading standards. In particular, he must plead facts showing he is 21 disabled, and what his disability is; that his dog is a service animal within the 22 meaning of the ADA; and what assistance his dog is trained to provide. Ordinarily 23 a public accommodation is not permitted to require documentation of a dog’s status 24 as a service animal, but it is permitted to make inquiries about whether the dog is 25 required because of a disability, and what work or task the dog has been trained 26 to perform. 28 C.F.R. 36.302(c)(6). The amended complaint therefore should plead 27 facts showing what the bank’s personnel said to Currier, and how his dog was 28 behaving in the bank. 1 Although the complaint was amended once already in state court, the 2 ||amended complaint Currier files in response to this order should be designated 3 || First Amended Complaint. 4 Although Defendants contend the existence of a federal question was first 5 ||apparent when Currier amended his complaint, it may have been present in his 6 || original complaint as well. The Court will not remand this case sua sponte on the 7 ||basis of untimely removal. See Maniar v. F.D.I.C., 979 F.2d 782, 784-85 (9" Cir. 8 || 1992). But if Currier intends to move for remand on the basis of untimely removal, 9 should do so promptly. See 28 U.S.C. §1447. If he decides to do this, he must 10 |/file a noticed motion, obtaining a hearing date from Judge Burns’ chambers, and 11 should give this higher priority than amending his complaint. 12 If Currier requires more time to prepare and file his first amended complaint, 13 either because he is preparing a motion or for some other reason, he should file 14 ex parte motion (or a joint motion with all Defendants). The ex parte or joint 15 ||motion should why he needs more time and estimating how much more time he 16 ||needs. No hearing date is needed for an ex parte or joint motion. 17 If Currier does not amend within the time permitted, his complaint may 18 ||be dismissed in whole or in part for failure to prosecute and failure to obey 19 ||the Court’s order. 20 21 IT IS SO ORDERED. 22 ||Dated: February 10, 2020 23 laud Ae (Buywy 24 Honorable Larry AlanBurns 25 Chief United States District Judge 26 27 28