Curiel v. Long

District Court, D. Nebraska·Decided December 30, 2024·No. 8:24-cv-00493·Unknown

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEBRASKA

BENITO MIGUEL CURIEL,

Plaintiff, 8:24CV493

vs. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER LONG, cpl, Individual and Official capacity; BECKY, Ms., Account/Funds Handler, Individual and Official capacity; UNKNOWN, cpl, Shield Number 97092, Individual and Official capacity; UNKNOWN, sgt, Individual and Official capacity; UNKNOWN, cpl, Shield Number 97051, Individual and Official capacity; UNKNOWN SHERIFF, Sheriff, Individual and Official capacity; BRANDON, Head United States Marshal, Individual and Official capacity; JON, Shield Number 52, Individual and Official capacity; UNKNOWN, Nurse, Individual and Official capacity; UNKNOWN, Doctor, Individual and Official capacity; and UNKNOWN, Capt, Individual and Official capacity;

Defendants.

Before this Court is a motion seeking leave to proceed in forma pauperis (the “IFP Motion”) filed by Plaintiff Benito Miguel Curiel (“Plaintiff”). Filing No. 45. The matter is also before this Court on this Court’s December 23, 2024, Memorandum and Order, to address amendment of Plaintiff’s Complaint following severance from his prior co- plaintiffs. Filing No. 55. For the reasons that follow, the IFP Motion shall be granted, and Plaintiff shall be granted leave to amend his Complaint. I. THE IFP MOTION Prisoner plaintiffs are required to pay the full amount of the Court’s $350.00 filing fee by making monthly payments to the Court, even if the prisoner is proceeding IFP. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b). The Prison Litigation Reform Act “makes prisoners responsible for their filing fees the moment the prisoner brings a civil action or files an appeal.” In re Tyler,

110 F.3d 528, 529–30 (8th Cir. 1997); Jackson v. N.P. Dodge Realty Co., 173 F. Supp. 2d 951 (D. Neb. 2001). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1), a prisoner plaintiff must pay an initial partial filing fee in the amount of 20 percent of the greater of a plaintiff’s average monthly account balance or average monthly deposits for the six months preceding the filing of the Complaint. The Court finds the initial partial filing fee for Plaintiff is $10.19, based on Plaintiff’s average monthly account balance of $50.94. Filing No. 17. Plaintiff must pay his initial partial filing fee within 30 days, or his case will be subject to dismissal. Plaintiff may

request an extension of time if one is needed, but any requests for additional time must be done prior to the payment deadline. In addition to the initial partial filing fee, Plaintiff must “make monthly payments of 20 percent of the preceding month’s income credited to the prisoner’s account.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). The statute places the burden on the prisoner’s institution to collect the additional monthly payments and forward them to the Court as follows: After payment of the initial partial filing fee, the prisoner shall be required to make monthly payments of 20 percent of the preceding month’s income credited to the prisoner’s account. The agency having custody of the prisoner shall forward payments from the prisoner’s account to the clerk of the court each time the amount in the account exceeds $10 until the filing fees are paid. Id. Therefore, after payment in full of the initial partial filing fee, Plaintiff’s institution must collect the remaining installments of the filing fee and forward the payments to the Court. Plaintiff is advised he will remain responsible for the entire filing fee, as long as he is a prisoner, even if the case is dismissed at some later time. See In re Tyler, 110 F.3d at 529–30; Jackson, 173 F. Supp. 2d at 951. II. LEAVE TO AMEND Plaintiff initially filed his Complaint on September 27, 2024, in the Northern District of Iowa, as a joint complaint, along with four other inmate-plaintiffs who were housed at the Dakota County Jail. Filing No. 5. The matter was transferred to this Court on October

1, 2024. Filing No. 6. Upon initial review of the Complaint (and multiple supplements filed by Plaintiff and several other joint plaintiffs), this Court determined that the parties could not proceed as joint-plaintiffs under Rule 20(a)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because it appeared the claims asserted did not arise out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences. Filing No. 55 at 6–8. As a result, this Court determined that each of the joint plaintiffs must proceed individually, severing their claims into separate cases. Id. at 10. The Court also determined that while the Complaint (and the Motions to Supplement) contained claims alleging denial of access to the courts, cruel and unusual punishment, due process violations, deliberate indifference to medical needs, and liberty

violations, the Complaint did not contain sufficient factual allegations to support each claim and/or it was not possible for this Court to determine which factual allegations related to each individual plaintiff. Id. at 8–9. In order for Plaintiff’s claims to proceed, the filing of an amended complaint is necessary. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 requires that every complaint contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief” and that “each allegation . . . be simple, concise, and direct.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), (d)(1). “The essential function of a complaint under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is to give the opposing party ‘fair notice of the nature and basis or grounds for a claim, and a general

indication of the type of litigation involved.’” Topchian v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 760 F.3d 843, 848 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting Hopkins v. Saunders, 199 F.3d 968, 973 (8th Cir. 1999)). While “[a] pro se complaint must be liberally construed, and pro se litigants are held to a lesser pleading standard than other parties,” Id. at 849 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted), pro se plaintiffs must set forth enough factual allegations to “nudge[] their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible,” or “their complaint must be dismissed,” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 569-70 (2007); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“A claim has facial plausibility when the

plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”).

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Related

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
In Re Melvin Leroy Tyler
110 F.3d 528 (Eighth Circuit, 1997)
Jackson v. N.P. Dodge Realty Co.
173 F. Supp. 2d 951 (D. Nebraska, 2001)
Samvel Topchian v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.
760 F.3d 843 (Eighth Circuit, 2014)
Tommy Hopkins v. John Saunders
199 F.3d 968 (Eighth Circuit, 1999)