Cunningham v. Fortney

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: June 27, 2025
• Docket: 24-1914
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUN 27 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

BRADLY M. CUNNINGHAM, No. 24-1914 D.C. No. 2:23-cv-01949-BHS-BAT Plaintiff - Appellant,

v. MEMORANDUM*

ADAM FORTNEY, Snohomish County Sheriff; STAN WHITE, Chief of Police, Mill Creek, WA; MIKE REESE, Director of Corrections on behalf of State of Oregon; JANE AND JOHN DOES, 1-50,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington Benjamin H. Settle, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted June 18, 2025**

Before: CANBY, S.R. THOMAS, and SUNG, Circuit Judges.

Bradly M. Cunningham appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment

dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging constitutional violations arising

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). from his criminal proceedings and from actions that occurred in the 1990s. We

have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal under

28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Hamilton v. Brown, 630 F.3d 889, 892 (9th Cir. 2011). We

affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Cunningham’s claims against

defendants Fortney and White as time-barred because Cunningham failed to file

his action within the statute of limitations and he failed to allege circumstances that

justified equitable tolling. See Bagley v. CMC Real Est. Corp., 923 F.2d 758, 760

(9th Cir. 1991) (“[T]he appropriate statute of limitations in a § 1983 action is the

three-year limitation of Wash. Rev. Code § 4.16.080(2).” (citation omitted));

Millay v. Cam, 955 P.2d 791, 797 (Wash. 1998) (“The predicates for equitable

tolling are bad faith, deception, or false assurances by the defendant and the

exercise of diligence by the plaintiff.” (citation omitted)).

The district court properly dismissed Cunningham’s claims against

defendant Reese relating to Cunningham’s criminal conviction because the claims

were duplicative of claims Cunningham brought in 2018 that were dismissed. See

Cunningham v. Washington County, No. 6:18-CV-00049-SI, 2018 WL 11225272,

at *1 (D. Or. Apr. 25, 2018), aff'd, No. 18-35413, 2019 WL 12536621 (9th Cir.

May 28, 2019); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) (allowing district courts to

dismiss prisoner actions that are frivolous or malicious); Cato v. United States, 70

2 24-1914 F.3d 1103, 1105 n. 2 (9th Cir. 1995) (district court can dismiss an action as

frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 where complaint “merely repeats pending or

previously litigated claims”).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Cunningham’s

motion for reconsideration because Cunningham failed to set forth any basis for

relief. See United Nat. Ins. Co. v. Spectrum Worldwide, Inc., 555 F.3d 772, 780

(9th Cir. 2009) (standard of review).

Cunningham’s motion for additional time to pay the filing fee (Docket Entry

No. 4) is denied as moot. All other pending motions are denied.

AFFIRMED.

3 24-1914