Cunningham Estate

13 Pa. D. & C.2d 63, 1957 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 58
CourtPennsylvania Orphans' Court, Philadelphia County
DecidedDecember 20, 1957
Docketnos. 187 of 1937 and 3165 of 1940
StatusPublished

This text of 13 Pa. D. & C.2d 63 (Cunningham Estate) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Pennsylvania Orphans' Court, Philadelphia County primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Cunningham Estate, 13 Pa. D. & C.2d 63, 1957 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 58 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1957).

Opinions

Cunningham Estate

Klein, P. J.,

This litigation is just another episode in the interminable conflict between income beneficiaries and remaindermen over the distribution of the earnings of trust estates.

Edith B. Cunningham, testatrix, died in 1933. She provided in her will for payment of income to designated individuals for life, with remainders over to other beneficiaries upon the termination of the trust.

In 1939 Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Company, the trustee, purchased 100 shares of General Electric Company no par common stock, and later, in 1951, an additional 50 shares were purchased. The total cost to the estate of the 150 shares was $6,935.37. The [65]*65aggregate book value of the shares, as of the dates of purchase, was $2,403.50. In 1954 the corporation recapitalized its common stock and issued three new shares in exchange for each old share. This raised the number of shares held by the trust from 150 to 450. In order to supply the capital needed to support the new issue, the company transferred on its books $252,-000,000 from the earned surplus account to the capital stock account.

Trustee also purchased at various times a total of 150 shares of the common stock of Gulf Oil Corporation at a total cost of $8,736.50. The aggregate book value of the shares, as of the dates of purchase, was $8,997.96, which is slightly in excess of cost. In 1951 the corporation issued to each shareholder new shares on the basis of one new share of stock for each then held by the shareholders, increasing to 300 the number of shares held by the trust. This new issue was supported in part by capital surplus and in part by capitalization of $210,000,000 of earned surplus.

The primary question raised by the exceptions is whether such a stock split, supported by capitalization of earned surplus, is an occasion warranting an apportionment.

This precise question has apparently never been decided by our Supreme Court.1 The auditing judge, after a careful and painstaking review of the problem, concluded that the transactions described above of the General Electric Company and the Gulf Oil Corporation constituted apportionable events. We are in accord with this ruling.

[66]*66Counsel for the remainder interests argue strenuously that apportionments must be restricted to situations in which any one of the following four events, enumerated in Jones Estate, 377 Pa. 473 (1954), occur: (1) The distribution by corporation of an extraordinary cash or stock dividend; (2) the liquidation of the corporation; (3) a sale of the stock by the trustee, or (4) the issuance of stock rights. They insist that the transactions in question do not fit into any one of these four categories and hence that apportionment should' not be made.

In our opinion, Jones Estate, supra, is inapposite as the problem in that case arose from the merger of two corporations. The court, relying upon Buist’s Estate, 297 Pa. 537 (1929); King Estate (No. 1), 349 Pa. 27 (1944), and King Estate (No. 2), 355 Pa. 64 (1946), reaffirmed the well-established principle that “accepting shares of stock in a merged company is not tantamount to a distribution or division of assets which call for an apportionment between a life tenant and remainderman”. The court, accordingly, refused to extend the rule of apportionment to cases where a merger occurs, even though surplus and undivided profits are capitalized as part of the merger.

We agree with the conclusion of the auditing judge that an apportionment is to be made whenever, independent of a corporate merger, earnings or earned surplus are capitalized to support, in whole or in part, the issuance of new shares, whether those shares be issued in exchange for outstanding shares or as a dividend on outstanding shares.

This conclusion, in our opinion, cannot be looked upon as an extension of the list of occasions for apportionment enumerated in Jones Estate, supra. Although the transactions in the present case have- not been designated as stock dividends by the General Electric Company and the Gulf Oil Corporation, nevertheless, [67]*67they must be regarded in the nature of stock dividends because earnings have been capitalized and therefore are no longer available for the payment of future dividends.

The next problem confronting the auditing judge was to determine how to ascertain the intact value of the General Electric Company stock, which was purchased by the trustee at a price in excess of its book value, and of the Gulf Oil Corporation 'Stock, which was purchased at less than its book value. In both instances the auditing judge ruled that the price at which the shares were purchased by the trustee must be regarded as the intact value regardless of the book value at the time of purchase. We have no doubt concerning the correctness of this ruling. Any doubt with respect to this question has been conclusively resolved by the Supreme Court in Arrott Estate, 383 Pa. 228 (1955), which controls the instant case, and which definitely decided that the purchase price is the intact value of stock purchased by the trustee in the course of the administration of a trust estate.

Having correctly decided that events warranting apportionment have occurred, and that intact values have not been impaired, the auditing judge ruled that the income beneficiaries are entitled to receive only so much of the earnings of the corporations as (a) were earned subsequent to the acquisition of the stocks by the trustee, (b) have been capitalized to support the issue of the stock dividends and (c) the retention of which by the trustee is not required to preserve intact value.

We concur completely in these conclusions.

Having determined the cash value of retained earnings available for distribution to the income beneficiaries, two additional questions immediately arise where this distribution takes the form of shares of stock of the corporation.

[68]*68First, which date is to be used to determine the valuation of the shares to be retained and those to be distributed? The auditing judge held, and we are all in full agreement, that the apportionment calculations are to be made as of the record dates of the occurrence of the apportionable events and not the dates upon which the distributions of the shares of stock are actually made by the trustee.

The second question, which also appears to be one of first impression in Pennsylvania, is whether the shares which are to be distributed are to be valued on the basis of book value or market value. The auditing judge concluded that the book value, and not the market value, should be used in valuing the shares to be distributed. This is the only ruling in this involved and complicated case with which we disagree. Although there is considerable merit to the auditing-judge’s reasoning in arriving at this decision, we believe it would be preferable to use market value as the yardstick to measure this final apportionment calculation, where trustee purchased shares are involved. But whether book value or market value is to be used for the determination of the arithmetical calculation we are now discussing, is not, of itself, nearly so important, in our opinion, as the adoption of a fixed standard which trust administrators can hereafter use as a dependable guide.2

The auditing judge relied largely on the authority of Arrott Estate, supra, in reaching his conclusion in [69]

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13 Pa. D. & C.2d 63, 1957 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 58, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/cunningham-estate-paorphctphilad-1957.