Cummings v. Clark

2 F.2d 442, 1924 U.S. App. LEXIS 2070
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit·Decided November 14, 1924·No. No. 3184·Published·Cited by 1 cases

Opinion

BUFFINGTON, Circuit Judge.

In the court below, Walter J. Cummings, a citizen of Illinois and executor of John J. Cummings, brought suit against Edward W. Clark and others, citizens of Pennsylvania, to recover $290,000 alleged to be due the decedent under" his contract with the defendants, dated March 13, 1913. The court below sustained defendants’ demurrer to tho plainíiü’s statement of claim and entered judgment for the defendants. Whereupon this writ of error was sued out.

The ease turns on the meaning of the contract, the third, fourth and eighth clauses of which are quoted in the margin.1 Subsequent to the contract, the state of Illinois, by certain legislation and the procedure thereby created, made it impossible for Cummings to reorganize the railway company on the bond and stock basis provided by the contract, and in lieu thereof he procured the reorganization on a much lower basis, and instead of being able to deliver to the defendants 7,500 shares of capital stock, of the par value of $100 each, he was only able to deliver stock of the par value of $142,000. As this latter sum constituted all of the capital slock of the company he was able to reorganize, Cummings contended that the $750,000 capital stock of the intended reorganization and the $142,000 of tbe actual reorganization equally represented tlie property of the company, and that the delivery of the latter ($142,000) was a compliance with his contract to deliver tho former ($750,000).

After his death, his executor tendered tho $142,000 stock as a fulfillment of the contract, and on the refusal of the defendants to accept he brought this suit. The court below sustained tho defendants’ view, and wo are of opinion, rightly so.

The defendants were not engaged in operating street railways, but in marketing railway securities. By their written contract they agreed to accept stocks based on an agreed upon basis of capitalization. Evidencing that this basis was desired by them, and that no other was contemplated, the contract provided they were to bear “the additional expense caused by the increase of the capital stock and bonds of the reorganized company over and above,” etc., and that, in case of Cnmmings’ inability to reorganize and deliver the stock, “then said parties shall be exonerated from all obligations hereunder, except so far as the same have been completed.” The contingency against which the parties provided, tho legislation of Illinois, prevented Cummings from carrying out his contract, and we agree with the court below that the defendants were not [444]*444bound to accept stock which was on a different capitalization basis from that of the contract. For the law to hold otherwise would practically be for the courts to write and enforce as a contract what the parties had never made their contract.

The judgment below is affirmed.

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Cummings v. Clark, 2 F.2d 442, 1924 U.S. App. LEXIS 2070 (3d Cir. 1924).

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