Cummings v. Cashin

56 N.E.2d 645, 323 Ill. App. 629, 1944 Ill. App. LEXIS 955
CourtAppellate Court of Illinois
DecidedSeptember 19, 1944
DocketGen. No. 9,971
StatusPublished

This text of 56 N.E.2d 645 (Cummings v. Cashin) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Court of Illinois primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Cummings v. Cashin, 56 N.E.2d 645, 323 Ill. App. 629, 1944 Ill. App. LEXIS 955 (Ill. Ct. App. 1944).

Opinion

Mr. Justice Huffman

delivered the opinion of the court.

This suit was filed by appellees, as trustees, in two separate trusts, to terminate said trusts and for decree for distribution thereof. The beneficiaries, or parties interested, are the same in each of the trusts. The trust first in period of time is referred to as the Henebery Trust, and the trust second in period of time is referred to as the Pool Agreement Trust.

The decree is in two parts, that is, one part deals with the termination and distribution of the Henebery Trust, while the second part of the decree deals with termination and distribution of the Pool Agreement Trust.

No appeal has been taken from that part of the decree with respect to the Henebery Trust. However, for the purpose of this opinion, it may be necessary to make reference to such trust because of the fact the parties interested in the two trusts are the same, and the trustees in each instance the same.

•' The duration of each of said trusts was definitely fixed at a certain number of years. The time fixed in each has expired. There appears to be no objections to the termination of the trusts.

The Henebery Trust was established in September 1928. It evidently was productive of large revenues. The beneficiaries under that trust, as individuals and in their individual capacity, made investments in southwest land mortgages. Their respective investments totaled about a quarter of a million dollars. A few of the investments were represented by real estate mortgage bonds, or mortgage notes, which were but a part of a total issue. These are referred to as “split mortgages.”

These investments were proving unsatisfactory. The time had come when something must be done in order to protect them against loss. This situation was productive of the second named trust, referred to herein as the Pool Agreement Trust. This trust came into existence on February 1, 1934, when by written instrument the beneficiaries conveyed their farm mortgage securities to appellee trustees. The mortgages were described as being delinquent in principal, or interest, or both. The parties to the instrument state therein that it was their desire to liquidate the mortgages and convert them into cash. The trustees were given full power to rent, lease, sell, foreclose, and convey such property at whatever price they might deem proper; to make contracts and agreements of any kind or nature concerning the property, that they might deem proper; and with full power to manage and control the same in such manner as they might deem best or desirable. The trustees were also empowered to pay any expenses incurred in connection with the proposed liquidation of the mortgages and lands thereby secured, all court costs, attorneys’ fees, taxes, and any other expense incurred in the handling of the property, or in the foreclosure of the mortgages. It was further provided that the trustees should keep a record with respect to each of the tracts covered by the several mortgages showing the interest, rents, proceeds of sale, and expenses incident thereto. The duration of this trust was fixed at five years.

The term Pool Agreement Trust, as applied by the parties to the instrument herein, is but a term of convenience. It is not so designated by the instrument itself. It was not a business trust for the purpose of operating lands or land investments for profit. To use a harsh term, it was an attempt by the owners of unfortunate investments in southwest land securities to salvage therefrom as much as possible of their original investments. The sole purpose of the instrument was to liquidate such investments in whatever manner the trustees found possible. To accomplish this result they conveyed their securities to the trustees by the liquidation agreement, instead of each party pursuing their own course. The respective parties were far removed from the location of the mortgaged property. The trustees selected were, no doubt, already familiar with the investments, due to the relationship among them with respect to the Henebery Trust.

There is no question but that the trustees set about to accomplish the purpose of the trust and made every effort to achieve the object thereof. Over $108,000 were expended by them in an effort to accomplish the ends sought.

It is conceded by all parties that the purpose of the trust has failed and no objection is made to its termination, or to the acts of the trustees in their attempt to accomplish its purpose. This appeal arises solely with respect to the manner in which the court ordered distribution of the funds and property of the liquidation agreement trust, which by the parties is termed the Pool Agreement Trust.

The trustees bring this suit wherein they set up that the trust instrument by its own terms expired in 1939; that title to some of the mortgaged land has been lost because of nonpayment of taxes; that they have been unable to accomplish the purpose of the trust; and desire to be relieved of further responsibility. They ask that the court take an accounting of the receipts and disbursements with respect to each mortgaged tract, and that they be directed to convey back to the various beneficiaries their proportionate share of the securities, farms and assets on hand, under a judicial determination.

Appellants complain that the decree for distribution of the liquidation trust agreement directs that the trustees shall return all unliquidated securities to the persons depositing same; that they shall convey all unsold farm land acquired by virtue of any mortgage security to the person depositing such security; and that cash received from the liquidation of mortgage securities, or from the sale of lands acquired thereunder, and income derived from said farms, should be distributed pro rata among the parties to the instrument in the ratio that the principal amount of the mortgage securities deposited by each bore toward the aggregate amount of all such securities deposited by the several parties; and that all parties should bear a pro rata share of the cost of acquisition of all lands acquired, and all expenses incurred, under the liquidation agreement.

Appellants object to that part of the decree which deals with the distribution of money from the liquidation of mortgage securities, or from the sale of lands acquired thereunder, or derived from lands so acquired. They also object to the provision of the decree that each party should bear a pro rata share of the cost of acquisition of lands acquired and all expenses incurred by the trustees in and about their effort to accomplish the purpose of the trust.

Among the securities deposited by several of the parties were what is called “split mortgage” securities. These were either mortgage notes or real estate mortgage bonds, issued under a trust deed. In some instances, the trustees proceeded to acquire the balance of the outstanding mortgage securities in order that they might control the situation and bring the title to the securities or to the land mortgaged, into the beneficiary holding such split mortgage notes. In the doing of this, the trustees enhanced the value of such beneficiary’s interest in the mortgaged, premises. For instance, it appears that one of the beneficiaries deposited a $600 bond of a total mortgage bond issue of $3,100. The trustees acquired title to all of the mortgaged premises at a cost of $1,190.42.

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Bluebook (online)
56 N.E.2d 645, 323 Ill. App. 629, 1944 Ill. App. LEXIS 955, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/cummings-v-cashin-illappct-1944.