Cuming v. City of Grand Rapids

9 N.W. 141, 46 Mich. 150, 1881 Mich. LEXIS 540
CourtMichigan Supreme Court
DecidedJune 8, 1881
StatusPublished
Cited by9 cases

This text of 9 N.W. 141 (Cuming v. City of Grand Rapids) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Michigan Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Cuming v. City of Grand Rapids, 9 N.W. 141, 46 Mich. 150, 1881 Mich. LEXIS 540 (Mich. 1881).

Opinion

Cooley, J.

This is a bill in equity to enjoin the collection of an assessment for the improvement of certain portions of streets in Grand Bapids, known as Bronson street, Crescent avenue and Bostwick street, under proceedings of the common council which are supposed to be void. The bill was demurred to and dismissed, and complainant appeals. The ground of invalidity chiefly relied upon is that Crescent avenue and parts of two streets were all to be improved in a single proceeding and by a single assessment; which, it is insisted, is unauthorized by law; but there are also various minor objections.

I. It appears by the map accompanying the bill of complaint that Bronson street extends from Canal street easterly, and is intersected by Kent, Division and Prospect streets, which cross it at right angles. About half way between Kent and Prospect streets is Bostwick street, which also intersects Bronson street at right angles. Before reaching Bostwick street, Bronson street, as it extends easterly across Kent and Division, branches or divides into two circular arms, which open out and extend into Bostwick, as shown by the .accompanying diagram, so that the travel along Bronson

street must go around by one of these arms, and along Bostwick street to Bronson street again. These two circular [154]*154aims of Bronson street constitute what is called Orescent street.

From the exhibits attached to the bill of complaint it appeal’s that on February 2, 1880, the common council adopted a resolution “ that the grading, graveling, and paving the gutters of Bronson street from the east side of Kent street to Prospect street, including the two circular arms of said Bronson street between Division street and Bostwick street and known as Orescent avenue in said city of Grand Rapids, including the construction of the necessary bridges, culverts, gutters, cross-walks, man-holes, catch-basins, approaches, and cesspools therein, is a necessary public improvement.” This it will be perceived says nothing about the grading, etc., of Bostwick street, and treats Orescent avenue as a part of Bronson street.

, On February 28, 1880, the council adopted another resolution, apparently to remedy a supposed defect in the one above given, and described therein the street or streets to be improved as “ Bronson street from the east side of Kent street to Prospect street, including the two circular arms of said Bronson street between Division street and Bostwick street known as Crescent avenue in the city of Grand Rapids, and also the space between the east ends of said two circular arms to the center of that part of Bronson street east of Bostwick street and said Bronson street, thence east to Prospect street in said city of Grand Rapids.”

On March 1, 1880, both the foregoing resolutions were rescinded, and a new resolution' adopted of the same purport, but describing the street or streets to be improved as-follows: “Those portions of Bronson street in the city of Grand Rapids included within the following limits, namely : from the east line of Kent street east to the west line of Crescent avenue, and from the west line of Bostwick street to the east line of North Prospect street in said city; ” “ also-Crescent avenue” and “that portion of Bostwick street lying between the north line of the north portion of Crescent avenue produced easterly and the south line of the south portion of Crescent avenue produced easterly.” It was-[155]*155under this last resolution that the work in question was done, and the objection to it is that three or more distinct improvements were provided for by- a single resolution, whereas by law each should have been provided for and made by itself.

One cannot read the three resolutions above given without perceiving that the common council regarded the work they provided for as a single improvement. In the first resolution which apparently was intended to cover all that is embraced in the third, it was not thought necessary to mention Bostwick street at all, and Orescent avenue is treated as a part of Bronson street, as for all practical purposes it is. The second resolution was a little more particular, but the idea is the same, and it is only more fully expressed, apparently from abundant caution, in the third resolution. The “necessary public improvement” intended by each was the improvement of Bronson street from Kent street to Prospect street, including the passage ways around the space embraced by the two arms known as Crescent street. This space we might infer from the map is a little park or other public ground, but the record does not explain.

It was decided in Arnold v. Cambridge, 106 Mass. 352, that it was not competent for the city to order the building of sidewalks on two streets and provide for the expense by a single assessment levied upon the abutting owners. It was found in that case that the statute under which the assessment purported to be made contemplated that each street was to be considered and treated by itself; and that being the case, there was no authority for making a single assessment district and a single assessment for two sidewalks. But in order to make that decision applicable it must appear that there are in fact two improvements, and not a single work only, in what is substantially a single public highway. It sometimes happens that a single street has different names for different parts; but this fact could not preclude the whole being graded or paved under a single resolution and the cost provided for by a single assessment. The unity of the work must determine the right to deal with it as a whole, and not the diversity of names that may be given to its vari[156]*156ous parts. We should impute absurdity to the legislature if we were to conclude that they intended under any circumstances that a single improvement should be taken up and dealt with in divisions.

In one sense the improvement in this case was apparently single. It was the improvement of what was substantially a single avenue from one part of the city to another, but divided at one point into two, where its-two branches passed' around a small piece of ground. The people along the line from end to end must have had a common interest in its improvement; and it is quite possible if not probable that the improvement of that part of the street on which they happened to live would have been of little or no importance except in connection with the improvement of the remainder. We may well suppose the improvement of a part only of JBronson street at the expense of adjacent owners would be grossly unjust when the improvement of the whole together with the connecting arms at their expense would be strictly just as well as highly beneficial. We do not know what the fact was in this case; but the circumstance that a single party only is heard complaining is strongly indicative of the consent of the others.

If one assessment cannot be made to cover this case, then it would seem there must be four: one for each part of Bronson street, one for Bostwick street and one for Crescent avenue. But it seems highly probable that the four assessments would overlap each other, and that what are called Bostwick street and Crescent avenue ought to be improved in part at least by owners of property east and west of them on Bronson street. If this is so the purpose of the statute would be defeated instead of being advanced by the four assessments, and confusion would be created by the subdivision of that which the statute evidently meant should be considered as an entirety.

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Bluebook (online)
9 N.W. 141, 46 Mich. 150, 1881 Mich. LEXIS 540, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/cuming-v-city-of-grand-rapids-mich-1881.