Culler v. Adcock
This text of 11 So. 3d 1246 (Culler v. Adcock) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
RICHARD L. CULLER
v.
WILLIAM T. ADCOCK AND STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY
Court of Appeals of Louisiana, First Circuit
WILLIAM BRADLEY, ATTORNEY FOR Plaintiff-Appellant, Richard L. Culler.
JOHN T. ROETHELE Attorney for Defendants-Appellees William T. Adcock and State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company
Before: PARRO, McCLENDON, AND WELCH, JJ.
WELCH, J.
In this action for damages arising out of a motor vehicle accident, the plaintiff, Richard L. Culler, appeals a judgment rendered in favor of the defendants, William T. Adcock and State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, which dismissed the plaintiffs claims against the defendants. We affirm in accordance with Uniform RulesCourts of Appeal, Rule 2-16.1(B).
On October 23, 2004, the plaintiff, while operating a motorcycle, was involved in an accident with Adcock, who was operating a pickup truck on Lower Rome Road[1] just south of its intersection with the Highway 22 service road ("the service road"). The plaintiff had been traveling northbound on Lower Rome Road, while the defendant and his guest passenger, James Larry Cobb, who had just turned from the service road onto the Lower Rome Road, were traveling southbound. No law enforcement agency or ambulance was called to the scene of the accident. On January 31, 2005, the plaintiff filed a petition for damages against Adcock and his insurer, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, and the defendants answered, generally denying the allegations of the plaintiff.
Essentially, the parties dispute who crossed the center line of Lower Rome Road and traveled into the opposite lane of travel, thereby causing the collision. After a bench trial on April 22, 2008, the trial court took the matter under advisement. On May 7, 2008, the trial court rendered and signed a judgment in favor of the defendants and dismissed the plaintiffs claims. In written reasons for judgment, also signed on May 7, 2008, the trial court noted that no testimony was offered by any expert in accident reconstruction and that "the matter was submitted to the [c]ourt on the basis of the conflicting testimony of the parties, photographs of the scene taken by Plaintiffs son the day after the accident, and a paucity of other objective evidence pertaining to the accident." From the May 7, 2008 judgment, the plaintiff has appealed, contending that the trial court's factual findings were manifestly erroneous and the judgment should be reversed.
A court of appeal may not set aside a trial court's finding of fact in the absence of manifest error or unless it is clearly wrong. Rosell v. ESCO, 549 So.2d 840, 844 (La. 1989). The supreme court has announced a two-part test for the reversal of the fact finder's determinations: (1) the appellate court must find from the record that a reasonable basis does not exist for the finding of the trial court, and (2) the appellate court must further determine that the record establishes that the finding is clearly wrong. Stobart v. State, DOTD, 617 So.2d 880, 882 (La. 1993); see also Mart v. Hill, 505 So.2d 1120, 1127 (La. 1987). Thus, the first issue to be resolved by the reviewing court is not whether the trier of fact was right or wrong, but whether the fact finder's conclusion was a reasonable one. Stobart, 617 So.2d at 882. When factual findings are based on determinations regarding the credibility of witnesses, the manifest error-clearly wrong standard demands great deference to the trier of fact's findings. Rosell, 549 So.2d at 844. Thus, where two permissible views of the evidence exist, the fact finder's choice between them cannot be manifestly erroneous or clearly wrong. Stobart, 617 So.2d at 882. Even though an appellate court may feel its own evaluations and inferences are more reasonable than the fact finder's, reasonable evaluations of credibility and reasonable inferences of fact should not be disturbed upon review where conflict exists in the testimony. Rosell, 549 So.2d at 844.
In this case, the trial court was presented with two permissible views concerning how the accident occurred and in whose lane of travel it occurred. The written reasons assigned by the trial court fully and accurately describe the underlying facts, the evidence presented at trial, the applicable burden of proof, the court's analysis of those facts, and the court's conclusions based on those facts. After a thorough review of the record, we find the factual findings made by the trial court in its reasons for judgment are fully supported by the evidence presented at trial, and in our review of the entire record, we find no manifest error in those findings. Therefore, we attach and adopt those written reasons as part of this opinion and affirm the May 7, 2008 judgment of the trial court.
All costs of this appeal are assessed to the plaintiff/appellant, Richard L. Culler.
AFFIRMED.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
This is a suit for personal injuries resulting from a collision between a Harley-Davidson motorcycle operated by Plaintiff and a Chevrolet 3/4 ton pickup truck operated by Defendant. The accident occurred at approximately 10:30 A.M. on a Saturday morning, October 23, 2004.
Following the collision, Plaintiff apparently was disinclined to have police officers summoned to the scene, nor to have an ambulance summoned or to be transported to a local hospital for treatment, all as offered by Defendant. At the same time Defendant, an attorney, also determined not to call in law enforcement to investigate, as a result of which there was no accident investigation evidence presented. Further, no testimony was offered by any expert in accident reconstruction. Therefore, the matter was submitted to the Court on the basis of the conflicting testimony of the parties, photographs of the scene taken by Plaintiffs son the day after the accident, and a paucity of other objective evidence pertaining to the accident.
The accident occurred on Lower Rome's Ferry Road, just South of its intersection with a road referred to by all parties as the Highway 22 service road, which runs generally East and West. Plaintiff, who lives further South on Lower Rome's Ferry Road, was proceeding Northbound on his motorcycle. In this direction, there is a blind curve to his right, followed by a fairly short straight stretch of road, before a "T" intersection with the Highway 22 service road. While there was apparently no stop sign at this intersection on the date of the accident, both parties were familiar with the road, and knew that traffic on Lower Rome's Ferry Road would be required to stop and yield to traffic on the Highway 22 service road..
Defendant and a guest passenger had gone to a hardware store in Springfield, Louisiana, and were returning to the guest passenger's camp. Defendant had been proceeding generally Eastbound on the Highway 22 service road, and had turned right, or South, onto Lower Rome's Ferry Road. The testimony and photographs indicated that this was a rather sharp turn, at an angle somewhat exceeding 90 degrees. Plaintiffs son stated that it was fairly well known in the area that vehicles turning in this direction were likely to encroach over into the oncoming, Northbound lane of Lower Rome's Ferry Road.
Plaintiff testified that he had traversed the blind curve and that as he came out of the curve, he was confronted by Defendant's truck, which he stated was completely in his lane of travel. He stated that he "layed down" his motorcycle, and slid into the front bumper or front end of Defendant's truck, in a position of collision which was somewhat in dispute. Plaintiff stated that there was nothing he could have done to avoid the accident.
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11 So. 3d 1246, 2009 WL 1941568, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/culler-v-adcock-lactapp-2009.