Cullen Royce Fields v. State of Mississippi

• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
• Decided: October 28, 2021
• Docket: 2020-KA-01317-SCT
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI

NO. 2020-KA-01317-SCT

CULLEN ROYCE FIELDS

v.

STATE OF MISSISSIPPI

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 11/04/2020 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. DEWEY KEY ARTHUR TRIAL COURT ATTORNEYS: KATHRYN LINDSEY NEWMAN HEIDLE CARTER SMITH JOEY WAYNE MAYES ANSELM J. McLAURIN BRENT M. BRUMLEY COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: RANKIN COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: OFFICE OF STATE PUBLIC DEFENDER BY: GEORGE T. HOLMES MOLLIE MARIE McMILLIN ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: BARBARA WAKELAND BYRD DISTRICT ATTORNEY: JOHN K. BRAMLETT, JR. NATURE OF THE CASE: CRIMINAL - FELONY DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 10/28/2021 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED: MANDATE ISSUED:

BEFORE KITCHENS, P.J., BEAM AND ISHEE, JJ.

BEAM, JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT:

¶1. Cullen Fields was convicted of sexual battery after a jury trial in the Rankin County

Circuit Court. Fields claims that the trial court erroneously denied his right to exercise two

of his peremptory strikes during jury selection. We find that the trial court did not err by denying the two peremptory strikes Fields sought to exercise. Accordingly, we affirm

Fields’s conviction.

FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

¶2. After a night of drinking at Fields’s home in Pearl, Mississippi, Fields’s nephew’s

then-fiancée, J.D.,1 fell asleep on the couch from drinking too much. When she woke up,

Fields was on top of her engaging in sexual intercourse. J.D. pushed Fields off of her,

gathered her clothes, and went into the bathroom to get dressed. J.D. went into an adjacent

room and tried to lie down with her young daughter, who was asleep in the bed. Unable to

sleep, J.D. went outside and called her mother. She told her that Fields had raped her, and

her mother told her to call the police.

¶3. J.D. woke her daughter, and the two left Fields’s home. J.D. called the police and met

them at a local gas station. After telling the police what happened, she went to the University

of Mississippi Medical Center, where a sexual-assault examination was conducted.

¶4. Vaginal swabs tested positive for seminal fluid. A DNA analyst found a mixture of

two male DNA profiles on the swabs and later testified that Fields could not be excluded as

a possible contributor to the mixture.

¶5. Fields testified at trial that he had sexual intercourse with J.D., but he said that the

encounter was consensual and that she had initiated the sexual activity.

¶6. During jury selection, the State challenged Fields’s use of peremptory strikes against

four women on the jury panel. After Fields’s fourth peremptory strike, the State objected,

1 Pseudonym initials are used to protect the identity of the alleged victim.

2 alleging, “[i]t’s pretty obvious he is striking these based on their gender.” The trial court

found that all four strikes had been used against females and asked Fields for gender-neutral

reasons for striking the jurors.

¶7. Fields’s first strike, D-1, was used against Juror Number 2. Fields’s trial counsel said

he struck Juror Number 2 because she was a nurse, and nurses often deal with victims. The

State responded that she had not talked about being a nurse in voir dire. The trial court found

that the reason was gender-neutral and allowed the strike to stand.

¶8. Fields used D-2 against Juror Number 11. Counsel explained that he struck Juror

Number 11 because she knew the detective in the case and because her husband worked for

the fire department. The trial court accepted the gender-neutral reason.

¶9. D-3 was used against Juror Number 19. Counsel stated, “I had her in my maybe

category anyway. I was just looking for somebody that I felt was better . . . . That’s the only

reason that I struck her. I just felt like there were some better jurors for him. But I don’t

have any reason other than that.” The trial court asked for a response from counsel for the

State, who said, “I don’t believe that’s a sufficient reason.” The trial court then seated Juror

Number 19 as a juror.

¶10. D-4 was used against Juror Number 22. When the trial court inquired about Juror

Number 22, defense counsel stated, “There again, Your Honor, I’ve got her in my maybe

category. I just felt like there was somebody better.” The trial court then asked defense

counsel if he had any gender-neutral reason to offer for the record, to which defense counsel

3 replied, “No, Your Honor.” In response, counsel for the State said, “that’s not a sufficient

gender-neutral reason.” The trial court said it had no choice but to seat Juror Number 22.

¶11. Fields claims on appeal that the trial court erred by seating the two jurors after he used

peremptory strikes against them. Fields contends that he offered gender-neutral reasons for

striking the two because he wanted to make room for jurors further back in the panel. He

claims that the trial court did not hold the State to its burden of showing that Fields struck

the jurors with a discriminatory intent. Therefore, he urges this Court to reverse his

conviction and remand his case for a new trial.

DISCUSSION

¶12. Use of peremptory challenges to discriminate against potential jurors violates the

excluded juror’s right to equal protection if the strike is used against an otherwise qualified

juror solely because that juror is a member of a cognizable race or gender. J.E.B. v.

Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 145, 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1429-30, 128 L. Ed. 2d 89 (1994) (extending

the prohibition against racial discrimination held in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106

S. Ct. 1712, 90 L. Ed. 2d 69 (1986), to gender-based peremptory challenges). Either party

has standing to challenge the other party’s discriminatory use of peremptory challenges.

Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S 42, 59, 112 S. Ct. 2348, 2359, 120 L. Ed. 2d 33 (1992)

(holding that a prosecutor may object to a defendant’s use of peremptory challenges).

¶13. As with Batson claims, there is a three-step process for evaluating jury-selection

gender-discrimination claims. First, “a party alleging gender discrimination must make a

prima facie showing of intentional discrimination before the party exercising the challenge

4 is required to explain the basis for the strike.” Brawner v. State, 872 So. 2d 1, 10 (Miss.

2004) (citing J.E.B, 511 U.S. at 145). Second, if the requisite showing has been made, the

burden shifts to the striking party to rebut the showing by offering a gender-neutral

explanation or reason for challenging the prospective juror(s). Id. at 9-10 (The explanation

“need not rise to the level of a ‘for[-]cause’ challenge; rather, it merely must be based on a

juror characteristic other than gender, and the proffered explanation may not be pretextual.”

(citing Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 362-63, 111 S. Ct. 1859, 114 L. Ed. 2d 395

(1991) (plurality))). Third, if a reason is given, the trial court must make an on-the-record

determination that the reason proffered is, in fact, gender-neutral. Id. “In other words, the

trial judge must determine whether the reason given is a pretext for discrimination.” Id. at

9-10 (citing Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 363).

¶14. In Hardison v. State, 94 So. 3d 1092, 1100 (Miss. 2012), this Court explained that if,

at the second stage, the trial court properly finds that the exercising party has failed to

provide a gender-neutral reason, “the question of pretext never arises, and the juror is

returned to the jury.”

¶15. This Court affords “great deference” to a trial court’s decision under Batson or J.E.B.,

and this Court will not reverse unless the decision is shown to be “clearly erroneous” on

appeal. Birkhead v. State, 57 So. 3d 1223, 1229 (Miss. 2011) (quoting Berry v. State, 802

So. 3d 1033, 1037 (Miss. 2001)).

¶16. Fields contends that he offered a gender-neutral reason for striking the two jurors in

question: he wanted to make room for jurors further back on the panel. And, he says, the trial

5 court erred by not holding the State to its burden of showing that the proffered reason was

pretext for discrimination. Fields cites Hardison, which held that “when a trial judge

erroneously denies a defendant a peremptory strike by failing to conduct the proper Batson

analysis, prejudice is automatically presumed, and we will find reversible error.” Hardison,

94 So. 3d at 1102.

¶17. At the outset, the record does not show the gender makeup of the venire. Thus, we

cannot determine how the defendant’s strikes compared to the overall composition of the

venire. Id. at 1098 (finding same with the lack of record information as to the racial makeup

of the venire). Accordingly, as was reiterated in Hardison, we cannot say that the trial court

erred by finding a prima facie case of gender discrimination. Id. (“[w]e cannot override the

trial court when this Court does not even know the racial makeup of the venire or the jury.”

(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Birkhead, 57 So. 3d at 1230)).

¶18. Therefore, the next step is to look at whether Fields provided a gender-neutral reason

for the peremptory strikes. As mentioned, the reason “need not rise to the level of a ‘for[-

]cause’ challenge; rather, it merely must be based on a juror characteristic other than gender,

and the proffered explanation may not be pretextual.” Brawner, 872 So. 2d at 9-10 (citing

Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 363). “The second step of the process does not demand an

explanation that is persuasive, or even plausible.” Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 767-68,

115 S. Ct. 1769, 131 L. Ed. 2d 834 (1995) (per curiam). It does though require at least “‘a

clear and reasonably specific’ explanation of [the striking attorney’s] ‘legitimate reasons’ for

6 exercising the challenge[].” Lockett v. State, 517 So. 2d 1346, 1352 (Miss. 1987) (internal

quotation marks omitted) (quoting Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 n.20).

¶19. Here, we find that defense counsel’s explanations for striking Jurors Numbers 19 and

22 were too vague and unspecific to say that a sufficient gender-neutral reason was given to

rebut a prima facie case of gender discrimination. For both jurors, defense counsel told the

trial court that he had them in his “maybe” category and that he felt like “there were some

better jurors for [the defendant].” Unlike with Jurors Numbers 2 and 11, for whom defense

counsel offered quantifiable assertions for, defense counsel provided nothing for the trial

court to assess with respect to Jurors Number 19 and 22.

¶20. This Court has recognized that a striking attorney may follow his or her “intuition”

in deciding whether to strike a particular juror so long as that judgment does not include the

assumption – or intuitive judgment – that the juror would be partial to the other side because

of the juror’s gender or race. Brewer v. State, 725 So. 2d 106, 123 (Miss. 1998) (stating also

that “[t]he establishment of a race neutral reason is not a difficult task”) (internal quotation

marks omitted) (quoting Stewart v. State, 662 So. 2d 552, 558 (Miss. 1995)).

¶21. In Brewer, for example, this Court found that a prosecutor’s “merely following his

intuition or perception” with regard to “jurors who watched soap operas, and [a] juror who

stated that she loved people” was sufficiently race-neutral to rebut a prima facie case of

purposeful race discrimination. Id. at 123.

¶22. And in Hardison, which Fields relies on in this case, defense counsel sought to strike

a white prospective juror based on the juror’s response during voir dire that he had served

7 on a jury in an armed-robbery case that, due to prosecutorial error, had not reached a verdict.

Hardison, 94 So. 3d at 1097. Defense counsel told the trial court that the juror’s response

suggested to him that the juror “regretted not being able to reach a verdict, so he was more

likely to convict.” Id. The trial court found the reason insufficient and restored the

prospective juror to the jury pool. Id. On appeal, this Court found that defense counsel had

provided a race-neutral reason, which required the trial court to proceed to Batson’s third

step. Id. at 1100.

¶23. In both Brewer and Hardison, counsel offered a reasonably specific explanation for

wanting to strike the prospective juror(s). Here, defense counsel provided no specific

explanation at all for striking Jurors Number 19 and 22.

¶24. Accepting, as we must, the trial court’s ruling that a prima facie case of gender

discrimination existed with respect to prospective Jurors Number 19 and 22, we find that

defense counsel failed to rebut the showing with a gender-neutral explanation. Thus, the trial

court did not err by seating Jurors Number 19 and 22.

CONCLUSION

¶25. For these reasons, we affirm Fields’s conviction.

¶26. AFFIRMED.

RANDOLPH, C.J., KITCHENS AND KING, P.JJ., COLEMAN, CHAMBERLIN, ISHEE AND GRIFFIS, JJ., CONCUR. MAXWELL, J., CONCURS IN RESULT ONLY WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION.