Culbreth v. Taylor-Colquitt Co.

167 S.E. 148, 168 S.C. 153, 1932 S.C. LEXIS 48
Supreme Court of South Carolina·Decided November 29, 1932·No. 13526·Published·Cited by 2 cases

Opinions

The opinion of the Court was delivered by

Mr. Justice StabeEr.

This is an action for damages for personal injuries. The record discloses that the defendant was and is engaged in creosoting timber, cross-ties, etc., and for that purpose maintains and operates a large plant or yard at Sigsbee in Spartanburg County. Nearly all materials to be treated arrive by rail, and are first unloaded and stacked on the yard, near or adjacent to the railroad track, for drying and curing. The cross-ties are shipped in closed box cars, and are unloaded and stacked by laborers working in crews of three. To save space, the stacks are carried to a height above that of the box car roofs. For the purpose of curing, the ties are stacked'with intervening spaces in each layer and between layers; and, to insure drainage, each layer is sloped to the outer edge by the inserting of transverse lines of ties, alternately, at each end of the stack. At the outset, the ties are “skidded” from the car, and, when the stack is built up almost to the level of the car floor, they are carried out along a gangway consisting of two parallel planks, one end. resting on the car floor and” the other end on the stack being built. When a tie is unloaded across the gangway, two members of the crew carry its main weight on a hand stick, and the third carries its rear end.

The plaintiff, who began work on January 20, 1930, was one of a crew made up of himself, his brother Walter, and one Roy Walker. On January 23, this crew was directed to finish unloading a car, which had been partially unloaded by another crew, one of whose members had “given out.” The former crew had progressed to the point where they had *156 placed the gangplanks, and plaintiff’s crew used the same gangway, just as they found it, to carry on the work. In this process, the plaintiff carried one end of the hand stick, one end of the plank on which he walked resting on or near the end of a tie in the stack. For some reason, after he had made several trips over the plank, and while he was crossing it in his position in the crew, it slipped from its resting place on the tie, and he was thrown upon the stack, the tie falling upon him and seriously injuring him.

The complaint alleges that the plaintiff’s injuries were due to the negligence of the defendant in failing to provide him with a reasonably safe place to work and safe means with which to do the work, and in failing to make any inspection of the “set up” already prepared for the plaintiff at the place where he was sent to complete the unloading of the car, and on the safety of which he was entitled to rely. The defenses were a general denial, contributory negligence, and assumption of risk, and, in addition, that plaintiff was an independent contractor, the relationship of master and servant consequently not existing.

At appropriate stages of the trial, defendant moved for a nonsuit and for a directed verdict. These motions were overruled, and the jury found for the plaintiff $10,000. From judgment entered on the verdict, this appeal is taken.

The appellant states twenty-three exceptions, but, under our view of the case, it will not be necessary to discuss them all, as the appeal can be disposed of upon consideration of the question of whether there was any actionable negligence on the part of the defendant, proximately causing plaintiff’s injuries involved in the motion for a directed verdict. What caused the slipping of the plank on which plaintiff was walking from the tie on which it rested ? Appellant contends that it is one of those things that sometimes happen, the explanation of which is purely conjectural and speculative. Counsel for respondent say that “the plaintiff was injured because the gangplank was resting on a slanting tie and ice, *157 or melting ice was concealed under the plank and it slipped off.” With regard to the matter of ice, the evidence, in sum and substance, tends to show that there was ice on the ties in the car being unloaded, but there was no testimony that ice was on the tie on which the plank rested, or that this particular tie was wet; the witnesses disclaiming knowledge as to these matters. Nor could the plaintiff and his witnesses explain the slipping of the plank. Of course, they all agreed that, if the board was resting upon melting ice on the slanting tie, this could have caused it to slip, but further than that they did not go, although they were more fully conversant with the situation than any one else. Furthermore, it was shown by the testimony that the slipping may have been due to causes other than the presence of ice, as, for instance, that the plaintiff may have stepped too much to one side of the plank and caused it to^ jostle or slip downward on the tie and off to the ground.

We think that the testimony shows only speculation and conjecture as to what caused the plank to slip. It is true there is a possibility that there was ice on the tie on which the plank rested, or that there was melting ice under the plank which caused it to slip, or that the tie was wet, but it is equally within the realm of possibility that the slipping was caused in some other way. Because ice was on the ties in the car, we are asked to presume that the tie on which the plank rested was icy or wet, that ice was under the plank resting upon the tie, and that its presence caused the plank to slip and fall, and this in the face of testimony showing that it could just as well have resulted from other causes.

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Culbreth v. Taylor-Colquitt Co., 167 S.E. 148, 168 S.C. 153, 1932 S.C. LEXIS 48 (S.C. 1932).

167 S.E. 148 (Culbreth v. Taylor-Colquitt Co.) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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