Cuffee v. Cabuay

• Court: District Court, E.D. Kentucky
• Decided: December 27, 2024
• Docket: 5:24-cv-00354
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY CENTRAL DIVISION LEXINGTON

DONNELL J. CUFFEE, ) ) Plaintiff, ) No. 5:24-CV-354-REW ) v. ) ) PUBLIC DEFENDER BEN CABUAY, et ) OPINION AND ORDER al., ) ) Defendants. ) *** *** *** ***

Plaintiff Donnell J. Cuffee has filed a pro se civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See DE 1 (Complaint). The Court has granted Cuffee pauper status. See DE 6 (Order). The Court screens the complaint for claim viability pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). See Hill v. Lappin, 630 F. 3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010). In May 2024, Cuffee was arrested and charged with stealing several vehicles by towing them without the owners’ consent.1 Those charges remain pending. In his complaint, Cuffee contends that: (1) the Lexington Police Department violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment by searching his cell phone without a search warrant; (2) complainant Zephaniah Romans lied to police by telling them that Cuffee had stolen his car; and (3) Ben Cabuay, the public defender assigned to represent Cuffee, is providing poor representation and ignoring Cuffee’s calls. See DE 1 at 2–3. Cuffee requests monetary damages and the dismissal of all charges against him. See id. at 8.

1 See KYeCourts, https://kcoj.kycourts.net/CourtNet/Search/CaseAtAGlance?county=034&court=1&di vision =DI&caseNumber=24-F-01207&caseTypeCode=FE&client_id=0 (accessed Dec. 27, 2024). Were it not for more fundamental defects, Cuffee’s complaint would be subject to dismissal without prejudice. Cuffee cannot seek dismissal of pending state criminal charges in a civil rights proceeding; after exhausting state court remedies, he must seek relief through a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 93 S. Ct. 1827, 1835–38 (1973). And the Court would

be comity-bound to dismiss his claims for damages without prejudice to avoid interference with the pending state criminal proceedings against him. See Younger v. Harris, 91 S. Ct. 746, 750–51 (1971). But the Court must dismiss Cuffee’s claims against the named defendants with prejudice. Cuffee sues the “Lexington Police Department” for asserted Fourth Amendment violations. The Lexington Police Department is merely an administrative department of the Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government; it is not an independent legal entity that can be sued. Cf. Watson v. Gill, 40 F. App’x 88, 89 (6th Cir. 2002) (holding county jail is a “department of the county” and “not a legal entity susceptible to suit”); Marbry v. Corr. Med. Serv., 238 F.3d 422, 2000 WL 1720959, at *2 (6th Cir. Nov. 6, 2000) (citing Rhodes v. McDannel, 945 F.2d 117, 120 (6th Cir.

1991)) (holding that the Shelby County Jail is not subject to suit under § 1983). Further, Cuffee cannot sue complaining witness Romans or public defender Cabuay under Section 1983 for violating his civil rights because neither person allegedly acted under color of state law. See Briscoe v. Lahue, 103 S. Ct. 1108, 1112–13 (1983); Moldowan v. City of Warren, 578 F.3d 351, 399 (6th Cir. 2009) (“Providing information to the police, responding to questions about a crime, and offering witness testimony at a criminal trial does not expose a private individual to liability for actions taken ‘under color of law.’”); see also Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 102 S. Ct. 445, 453 (1981) (“A public defender does not act under color of state law when performing a lawyer’s traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal proceeding.”); Otworth v. Vanderploeg, 61 F. App’x 163, 165 (6th Cir. 2003) (“A lawyer representing a client is not, by virtue of being an officer of the court, a state actor under color of state law within the meaning of § 1983.”). The Court must therefore dismiss the claims against all three of these defendants. Accordingly, the Court ORDERS as follows: 1. The Court DISMISSES DE 1 with prejudice; 2. The Court DIRECTS the Clerk to STRIKE this matter from the active docket; and 3. The Court will enter a separate judgment contemporaneously with this Opinion and Order. This the 27th day of December, 2024. Kes. Signed By: © Robert E. Wier G¥y/ “3 United States District Judge