Cuevas v. Westlake Financial Services

CourtDistrict Court, D. Arizona
DecidedDecember 16, 2022
Docket2:22-cv-01918
StatusUnknown

This text of Cuevas v. Westlake Financial Services (Cuevas v. Westlake Financial Services) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Arizona primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Cuevas v. Westlake Financial Services, (D. Ariz. 2022).

Opinion

1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

9 Antonio-Nikolas Cuevas, No. CV-22-01918-PHX-DWL

10 Plaintiff, ORDER

11 v.

12 Westlake Financial Services, et al.,

13 Defendants. 14 15 Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s Application for Leave to Proceed In Forma 16 Pauperis (Doc. 2), which the Court grants. The Court will screen Plaintiff’s complaint 17 (Doc. 1) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)1 before it is allowed to be served. Pursuant 18 to that screening, the complaint will be dismissed with leave to amend. 19 I. Legal Standard 20 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), a complaint is subject to dismissal if it contains 21 claims that are “frivolous or malicious,” that “fail[] to state a claim upon which relief 22 may be granted,” or that “seek[] monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from 23 such relief.” Id. Additionally, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a pleading 24 must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled 25 to relief.” Id. Although Rule 8 does not demand detailed factual allegations, “it demands 26 more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. 27 1 Although section 1915 largely concerns prisoner litigation, section 1915(e) applies 28 to all in forma pauperis proceedings. Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845, 845 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) are not limited to prisoners.”). 1 Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of 2 action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. 3 “[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a 4 claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 5 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual 6 content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable 7 for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible 8 claim for relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw 9 on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. Thus, although a plaintiff’s 10 specific factual allegations may be consistent with a constitutional claim, a court must 11 assess whether there are other “more likely explanations” for a defendant’s conduct. Id. 12 at 681. 13 The Ninth Circuit has instructed that courts must “construe pro se filings 14 liberally.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010). A “complaint [filed by a 15 pro se litigant] ‘must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by 16 lawyers.’” Id. (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam)). 17 Conclusory and vague allegations, however, will not support a cause of action. Ivey v. 18 Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). A liberal 19 interpretation may not supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially pled. 20 Id. 21 II. Analysis 22 The statement of claim, in its entirety, is as follows:

23 September 08, 2020 me [sic] the natural person and consumer entered into a consumer credit transaction with Def. No. 2 Autosany of Gilbert. They 24 deceived me and misused my credit. Within the contra [sic] it states I am giving security interest. Also there is a finance charge but Autosany 25 insisted it was mandatory to get insurance which thats [sic] included in the finance charge. They also were [sic] gave me my recission forms. 26 Defendant 1 and 2 mislead [sic] me and Def 1 continued to attempt to collect an alleged debt although its [sic] clear the amount financed covers 27 the finance charge. They used misleading terms and without my permissible purpose shared my personal information with a 3rd party debt 28 collector that garnished and sold my property. This damage affected my mental health and ability to take my disabled brother to his appointments. 1 (Doc. 1 at 4.) 2 In the “Relief” portion of the pro se complaint, Plaintiff wrote:

3 As I sent in and got affidavits notarized exercising my right to rescind I stated how it would be impracticable and inequitable due to the fact that I 4 use the car to take my brother whom [sic] is disabled to and from his appointments. Its [sic] affected and damaged our mental health as he is 5 bipolar and has caused family arguments and my ability to make income being self employed. The amount of damages to be paid for them ruining 6 my reputation in my neighborhood and all the other damages I demand $150,000 for the [ . . . ].2 7 8 (Id.) 9 The complaint cannot be served in its current state. Far from being a “short and 10 plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” Fed R. Civ. P. 11 8(a)(2), the statement of the claim is a combination of factual allegations that lack clarity 12 and context (for example, “there is a finance charge but Autosany insisted it was 13 mandatory to get insurance which thats [sic] included in the finance charge”) and 14 conclusory statements without a factual basis (for example, stating that a Defendant 15 “deceived” Plaintiff and “misused” his credit). In short, it is impossible to discern what 16 happened. There is no way to determine what causes of action are being raised, against 17 which defendants, for what conduct. Rule 8 requires “simplicity, directness, and clarity,” 18 such that each defendant should easily be able to determine “what he is being sued for.” 19 McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 1996). 20 The Court will dismiss the complaint with leave to amend. “Dismissal of a pro se 21 complaint without leave to amend is proper only if it is absolutely clear that the 22 deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by amendment.” Schucker v. Rockwood, 23 846 F.2d 1202, 1203-04 (9th Cir. 1988) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 24 Plaintiff’s amended complaint must adhere to all portions of Rule 7.1 of the Local 25 Rules of Civil Procedure (“LRCiv”). Additionally, Plaintiff is advised that the amended 26 complaint must satisfy the pleading requirements of Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil 27 Procedure. Specifically, the amended complaint shall contain a short and plain statement

28 2 The last few words of the final sentence appear to have been cut off when the handwritten document was scanned. 1 of the grounds upon which the Court’s jurisdiction depends, a short and plain statement 2 of each specific claim asserted against each Defendant, and a good faith demand for the 3 relief sought. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1)-(3).

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Related

Erickson v. Pardus
551 U.S. 89 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Hebbe v. Pliler
627 F.3d 338 (Ninth Circuit, 2010)
Ivey v. Board of Regents of University of Alaska
673 F.2d 266 (Second Circuit, 1982)
Michael Henry Ferdik v. Joe Bonzelet, Sheriff
963 F.2d 1258 (Ninth Circuit, 1992)
Jesse J. Calhoun v. Donald N. Stahl James Brazelton
254 F.3d 845 (Ninth Circuit, 2001)
Marshall v. Lovell
11 F.2d 632 (Third Circuit, 1926)
McHenry v. Renne
84 F.3d 1172 (Ninth Circuit, 1996)

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Cuevas v. Westlake Financial Services, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/cuevas-v-westlake-financial-services-azd-2022.