Cuesta v. New York Office of Court Administration

708 F. Supp. 583, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2546, 49 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 38,891, 1989 WL 23273
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedMarch 16, 1989
DocketNo. 83 Civ. 3714 (PNL)
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 708 F. Supp. 583 (Cuesta v. New York Office of Court Administration) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Cuesta v. New York Office of Court Administration, 708 F. Supp. 583, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2546, 49 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 38,891, 1989 WL 23273 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).

Opinion

OPINION AND ORDER

LEVAL, District Judge.

This is an employment discrimination suit, brought under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000 et seq., challenging the validity of written examinations administered by the New York State Office of Court Administration for the filling of court officer positions.

After a trial by submissions, I held that, although plaintiffs had established a prima facie case, the defendant had successfully defended the validity of all aspects of the tests except for the use of rank-order scoring to determine job priority. I required the parties to submit additional evidence and briefing on the use of rank-order scoring and alternative methods which might be employed to establish hiring priority. I now find that the use of rank-ordered scoring in determining the order of eligibility for hiring did not render the examination illegal.

DISCUSSION

In my earlier opinion 657 F.Supp. 1084 (hereafter “Opinion”), I held that the 1982 exams had been validated by the defendants for use in selecting candidates for permanent UCO and SCO positions. I also upheld the use of a cutting score to set a pass-fail mark on the exams. The sole issue left for decision was how the test results should be used to arrange a preference order of the candidates who passed the exam. This determination is relevant only as to those displaced provisional candidates who passed the exam, but were not rehired because of their low scores.

The Guidelines provide that rank-ordering may be used if the employer can prove that “a higher score ... is likely to result in better job performance.” Guidelines § 14(c)(9). In Guardians Association of the New York City Police Department v. Civil Service Commission of the City of New York, 630 F.2d 79, 104 (1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 940, 101 S.Ct. 3083, 69 L.Ed.2d 954 (1981) (“Guardians IV”), the Court of Appeals strongly counselled against rank-ordering when this was likely to cause arbitrary results. Rank-ordering was found particularly unsatisfactory in that case because two-thirds of the passing scores were bunched within four points. Nonetheless, the Court made clear that rank-ordering is permissible if the employer demonstrates “that rank-ordering is sufficiently justified to be used.” Id., 630 F.2d at 103. The Court noted that a criterion-related study would be helpful. The Court went on to suggest that a job analysis and a high degree of adherence to Guideline requirements could result in a strong showing of content validation. “[T]here must be a substantial demonstration of job relatedness and representativeness____ The test maker can achieve an adequate degree of reliability by careful design of the exam so that the questions will yield a satisfactory degree of consistent results.” Methods were suggested to guard against inconsistency based on extraneous factors — stressing that exam questions “should have significant differentiating power, so that scores are not bunched____” Id., 630 F.2d at 104.

I found in my earlier opinion that OCA had conducted an exhaustive job analysis, pre-tested the examinations thoroughly, and made every deliberate effort to adhere to the principles of the Guidelines. Opinion, 657 F.Supp. at 1087-1093, 1097-1099. I also found that the tests were sufficiently job-related and tested for representative SKAPs. I was nonetheless skeptical of the validity of rank-order scoring. My concerns have been sufficiently answered.

I had expressed concern that only 10.1% of the identified SKAPs were tested on the written exam. Defendants have [585]*585demonstrated, however, that because 61.7% of the SKAPs which were necessary for performing the UCO job were learned either on the job or in training, only 38.3% of the total SKAPs remained to be measured, of which number 5.6% were deemed too trivial for examination. Of the remaining 32.7%, 22.6% were appropriately tested by pass-fail standards because they pertained to meeting minimum qualifications. This left 10.1% to be tested on the graded, written examination. Defendants have made a strong showing that the tested SKAPs were performance-differentiating, that is, helped to measure a candidate’s ability to acquire the SKAPs which would be learned on the job and in training.1 Wagner Aff. p. 11. The written examinations were constructed with the most job-related applicability possible given the job-analysis and pre-testing that had preceded the 1982 exams. The defendants have adequately shown that its tests satisfied the Guardians requirements of job-relatedness and reliability for the use of rank-ordered scoring.

Furthermore, the manner in which the hiring was conducted softened the effect of the rank-ordering, tending in the direction of zoning. After the administration of the 1982 written exams, all of the passing candidates were placed on a list ordered by how they scored on the exam.2 Two lists were created, a preference-eligible list3 and an open-competitive eligible list. As jobs became available, the candidates would be contacted and asked to continue the application process.4 A candidate who was contacted would then schedule and take four separate pass-fail examinations for the remaining identified SKAPs (a medical examination, a test of physical ability, a psychiatric examination, and a background check). There was often a considerable time-period between the initial contact and the appointment to the job. Because of differing times taken by applicants to complete the process, the order of hiring often departed from the rank-order of the scores.

Over the six-year life of the eligible lists, 6,490 candidates were contacted from the open-eligible list in order to make 1,389 permanent appointments. Ferrara Aff. p. 17. Thus only 21.4% of all candidates who passed the exam and scored high enough to be contacted were actually appointed. It appears that during this process, in order to obtain a large enough pool to fill open jobs, OCA contacted broad bands of candidates within a significant scoring range on the same date. When those candidates would be finally appointed depended not on their score on the written examination, but on the speed with which they dispatched the remaining portions of the application process. Ferrara Aff. Exhibit H. Thus the process followed had the practical effect of a modified zone method.

[586]*586Plaintiffs contend that it was the rank-ordering that resulted in the appointment of so few minority candidates. They present charts showing that of the total appointees off the open-eligible list, only 4.8% were black and only 9.4% were hispanic. These numbers are far less than the percentage of the number of blacks and hispanics who actually passed the written examination, which were 30% and 8.1% respectively. Gordon Aff. Table VIII. Thus plaintiffs contend that the majority of minority candidates who passed must have scored below the raw score of 62, under which no appointments were made.5 The argument is not as logical as plaintiffs make it sound. Because only 21.4% of those passing candidates who were contacted received appointments, it is likely that many minority candidates who were contacted either declined or flunked the remaining pass-fail qualifications.

An important aspect of judging the use of rank-ordering is to discover to what extent varying scores meaningfully measure different levels of knowledge or capability.

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Related

Cuesta v. State of New York
888 F.2d 125 (Second Circuit, 1989)

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708 F. Supp. 583, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2546, 49 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 38,891, 1989 WL 23273, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/cuesta-v-new-york-office-of-court-administration-nysd-1989.