Cuddy Law Firm, P.L.L.C. v. New York City Department of Education

District Court, S.D. New York·Decided July 2, 2026·No. 1:25-cv-08515·Unknown

Opinion

USDC SDNY DOCUMENT UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT — FILED DOC #: SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK DATE HILED. 7/2/2026 CUDDY LAW FIRM, P.L.L.C., Plaintiff, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION -V- 25-CV-8515 (JMF) (HJR) NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, Defendant.

HENRY J. RICARDO, United States Magistrate Judge. To the Honorable Jesse M. Furman, United States District Judge: Plaintiff, the Cuddy Law Firm (“CLF”), brings this action to recover attorneys’ fees and costs under the fee-shifting provision of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (the “IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. § 1415G)(3). The parties agreed that no discovery was necessary in this case and elected to have this matter decided based on written submissions. See ECF Nos. 15, 16. As agreed, CLF filed a Motion for Attorney Fees, ECF No. 24 (the “Motion”). Defendant, the New York City Department of Education (the “DOE”), opposes the Motion on the basis that the requested fees are unreasonable. For the reasons described below, the undersigned respectfully RECOMMENDS that CLF’s Motion be GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

I. BACKGROUND A. Factual Background H.C. is a student with autism.1 Complaint, ECF No. 1 (“Complaint” or “Compl.”) ¶ 10. H.C.’s biological parent, T.J-L., hired CLF to pursue a claim that the DOE failed to provide H.C. a free appropriate public education (a “FAPE”), which the IDEA requires, for the 2023–2024 school year. See Administrative

Record, ECF No. 23-1 (“AR”) at 5.2 Accordingly, CLF prepared a due process complaint (a “DPC”) to initiate administrative proceedings under the IDEA. Id. at 1. In short, this DPC alleged that the DOE failed to provide a FAPE for H.C. and proposed various options for relief. Id. at 5–9; Compl. ¶¶ 17–18. The Impartial Hearing Officer presiding over the proceeding (the “IHO”) scheduled a pendency hearing (i.e., a hearing to determine H.C.’s then-current

educational placement) on August 17, 2023. Compl. ¶ 22. After the DOE failed to appear at the pendency hearing, the IHO issued a pendency order in favor of T.J-L. AR at 22, 32–35. The IHO then scheduled a hearing to address the merits of the DPC on September 20, 2023. Compl. ¶ 25. At the merits hearing, the DOE made only limited objections and cross- examined one witness. AR at 252–53, 262. On September 26, 2023, the IHO issued a Finding of Fact and Decision concluding that the DOE failed to meet its burden of

1 This Report and Recommendation uses initials to protect the privacy of parent and child. 2 Page numbers cited in court filings refer to the ECF-generated pagination. 2 showing that it offered a FAPE for the 2023–2024 school year and ordering DOE to pay $114,000.00. AR at 292–303. There was no appeal. Compl. ¶ 38. Nearly one year later, on August 14, 2024, CLF made a demand for

$13,815.44 in attorneys’ fees. Id. ¶¶ 40, 49. The DOE later countered with a settlement offer of $10,500 on January 12, 2026. Declaration of Marina Moraru, ECF No. 37 (“Moraru Decl.”), Ex. D at 1. B. Procedural History CLF filed this suit on October 15, 2025, seeking attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in connection with both (1) the administrative proceeding described above and (2) the instant federal suit (the “Fee Action”). See Compl. The DOE answered

the Complaint on January 14, 2026, ECF No. 19, and CLF then filed the Motion on February 28, 2026, ECF No. 24. The Motion seeks an award of $23,475.00 in fees and costs. ECF No. 25 (“Pl. Mem.”) at 33. The DOE opposed the Motion on April 13, 2026, ECF No. 38 (“Def. Mem.”), and CLF filed its Reply Memorandum of Law on April 20, 2026, ECF No. 39. II. LEGAL STANDARDS The IDEA authorizes a “prevailing party” to seek an award of attorneys’ fees.

20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B). This fee-shifting provision requires courts to “first determine whether the party seeking the award is in fact a prevailing party . . . [and] then determine whether, under the appropriate standard, that party should be awarded attorney’s fees.” Mr. L. v. Sloan, 449 F.3d 405, 407 (2d Cir. 2006).

3 “[A] party who receives agency-ordered relief on the merits of their claim is a ‘prevailing party’ for purposes of the IDEA.” C.D. v. Minisink Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., No. 17-CV-7632, 2018 WL 3769972, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 2018) (citing A.R.

ex rel. R.V. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 407 F.3d 65, 75 (2d Cir. 2005)). The Court begins its inquiry by determining the presumptively reasonable fee award. H.A. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., No. 20-CV-10785, 2022 WL 580772, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 2022). The presumptively reasonable fee award, also referred to as the “lodestar,” is determined by taking “the product of a reasonable hourly rate and the reasonable number of hours required by the case.” Millea v. Metro-N. R. Co., 658 F.3d 154, 166 (2d Cir. 2011).

For purposes of a fee application, the reasonable hourly rate is “based on rates prevailing in the community in which the action or proceeding arose for the kind and quality of services furnished.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(C). A court should “consider, among others, the Johnson factors; it should also bear in mind that a reasonable, paying client wishes to spend the minimum necessary to litigate the case effectively.” Arbor Hill Concerned Citizens Neighborhood Ass’n v. Cnty. of

Albany & Albany Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 522 F.3d 182, 190 (2d Cir. 2008). The Johnson factors include: (1) the time and labor required; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions; (3) the level of skill required to perform the legal service properly; (4) the preclusion of employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case; (5) the attorney’s customary hourly rate; (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7) the time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances; (8) the amount involved in the case and the results obtained; (9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys; (10) the ‘undesirability’ of the case; (11) the nature and 4 length of the professional relationship with the client; and (12) awards in similar cases. Id. at 186 n.3 (citing Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717– 19 (5th Cir. 1974)). While courts consider all twelve factors, they do not need to make specific findings as to each of them when setting a fee award. C.D., 2018 WL 3769972, at *4. In determining the reasonable number of hours required to litigate the case,

“[t]he [c]ourt has the discretion to disregard hours viewed as ‘excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary.’” H.A., 2022 WL 580772, at *3 (quoting Bliven v. Hunt, 579 F.3d 204, 213 (2d Cir. 2009)). “To determine the reasonableness of hours spent on a matter, ‘[t]he district court may attempt to identify specific hours that should be eliminated, or it may simply reduce the award’ by a reasonable percentage.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 436–37 (1983)). “[T]rial courts need not, and indeed should not, become green-eyeshade

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