Cudahy Bros. v. Bowles

142 F.2d 468, 1944 U.S. App. LEXIS 3416
CourtEmergency Court of Appeals
DecidedMay 15, 1944
DocketNo. 113
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 142 F.2d 468 (Cudahy Bros. v. Bowles) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Emergency Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Cudahy Bros. v. Bowles, 142 F.2d 468, 1944 U.S. App. LEXIS 3416 (eca 1944).

Opinion

LAWS, Judge.

Complainant is a Wisconsin corporation engaged in slaughtering and dressing hogs and selling pork cuts. Its plant is situated at Cudahy, Milwaukee County, Wisconsin. In an effort to obtain the right to charge ceiling prices higher than those now applicable to certain of its products, 'it brings this suit challenging the validity of Revised Maximum Price Regulation No. 148. This Regulation was issued on October 22, 1942, and became effective No[469]*469vember 2, 1942.1 No objection to its validity was made by complainant until a protest was filed before the Price Administrator on August 20, 1943. Complainant contends that because of conditions in its business which changed after establishment of the Regulation, it acquired the right to charge higher prices permitted to be -charged by its competitors whose plants are situated in a nearby area. Having found that the changes relied upon by complainant did not warrant any amendment of the Regulation, the Administrator denied the protest and complainant thereupon applied to this Court for relief.

Revised Maximum Price Regulation No. 148 provides a nation-wide program for control of prices for dressed hogs and wholesale pork cuts. Incident to its establishment, the Administrator found that prices in the industry were lowest in the central region of the United States known as the corn belt, where hog production is greatest, and that prices elsewhere in creased generally in proportion to the distance of the market from this area. The Administrator therefore selected the corn belt as a zone within which base prices, fixed in terms of dollars and cents, were established as the ceiling prices which might be charged for the various wholesale pork cuts. The zone was designated the Central Price Zone. It includes Iowa and portions of Wisconsin, Minnesota, South Dakota, Nebraska, Kansas, Missouri and Illinois. East of this zone, the Administrator established the Chicago Price Zone, which includes Chicago, St. Louis, the southern half of Wisconsin and that part of Illinois not in the Central Price Zone. In the Chicago Price Zone, where major slaughtering centers account for about 20% of the total hog slaughter of the nation, the maximum price for each wholesale pork cut was established at the base price plus 25$ per cwt. The higher ceiling was permitted because slaughterers in this area were found to obtain their supply of hogs at increased costs from markets which drew upon the more concentrated producing area further west. Maximum prices for delivery outside the Central Price Zone and the Chicago Price Zone were established at the base price plus a specified freight differential.

By the method just described the Regulation established ceiling prices for all wholesale pork cuts.2 Special additions to the ceiling prices thus provided were authorized by the Administrator in limited areas for certain fresh pork cuts delivered for local consumption not later than one marketing day after the initial cutting of the carcass. Schedule 111(b) of Section 1364.-35. These additions were authorized by the establishment of three Regions with a fixed addition permitted in each. In Region 3, which includes Chicago, part of Michigan, Indiana, Ohio, Kentucky, West Virginia and Virginia, the increase allowed is 50 per cwt. In Region 2, comprising western New York and Pennsylvania, the allowance is $1, and in Region 1, consisting of the remaining eastern sections of northeast United States, the allowance is $1.50. These price increases were found necessary in order to preserve extensive slaughtering facilities situated in the Regions. At the time when he issued the Regulation, the Administrator, in accordance with Sec. 2(a) of the Emergency Price Control Act, 50 U.S.C.A.Appendix § 902(a), published a statement of considerations involved in its issuance, and in connection with these provisions the following considerations were stated:

“This area [referring to the three Regions] has substantial slaughtering facilities for which hogs have customarily been secured from the corn belt in the absence of an adequate local supply. Freight rates east on live hogs are high relative to freight rates on dressed meat. In addition, there is a substantial loss in shipment caused by shrinkage and injury to animals. The differential of $1.50 on the northeastern seaboard has been calculated to equalize this loss in order that slaughtering facilities may continue to be utilized. Further west and south the differential has been reduced by successive steps in recognition of the shorter distances involved and to avoid a limit at which the differential would be so great as to create dislocation in the movement of live hogs. The differentials are available only where fresh cuts are delivered promptly for resale fresh to consumers. Economic justification for the premium is lacking where pork is used for processing, and to the extent that the [470]*470premium has prevailed in the industry, it has been dependent upon the higher sales value of freshly dressed meat which is discernible in the fresh cuts.”3

Cudahy concedes that when originally issued, the Regulation, which excluded it from the increased prices allowed to be charged by those in Region 3, was in all respects valid, but it contends that because it must now lobk to the corn belt for a large proportion of its supply of live hogs, its situation has become like that of Chicago slaughterers who are included within Region 3 and therefore the refusal' of the Administrator to include complainant within Region 3 is unjust discrimination.

In any case involving challenge to a regulation established by the Price Administrator, the presumption is ‘in favor of the regulation’s validity and the burden is upon one who challenges it to establish that it is not in accordance with law or is arbitrary or capricious.4 In the case before us we find the program of price control is complex. Like the meat industry itself, it is integrated throughout the country and is sensitive to changes. It was set up after long study and experience with the problems involved. In selecting the Regions where price increases were permitted, the Administrator had the difficult task of establishing definite dividing lines where those in actual practice were not clear. Obviously in determining the boundary lines for the Regions, he was compelled to resolve many close questions and it is apparent his decisions were reached only after consideration of the experience and advice of experts. Here the Court is concerned with a “border line” question, since the circumstances of complainant are said to be like those of slaughterers just within the boundary line of Region 3.5 The problem thus becomes more difficult than it would be if reliance were placed upon a claim of likeness to slaughterers in the heart of Region 3, far from the dividing line. From what has been stated, it is certain that in such a case this Court is not justified in directing changes in the program of control except upon a showing of evidence which is clear and compelling.

There is another consideration concerning the evidence which we feel is pertinent to a determination of this case. As we have indicated, the claim relied upon by complainant is one of discrimination resulting from changed circumstances in its business. In such a case, complainant must be found to have established that its situation has become in all essential respects at least substantially the same as the situation of those claimed to be favored.

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Bluebook (online)
142 F.2d 468, 1944 U.S. App. LEXIS 3416, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/cudahy-bros-v-bowles-eca-1944.