06/02/2026
DA 25-0645 Case Number: DA 25-0645
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2026 MT 122N
KEVIN CUATT and HEIDI CUATT,
Petitioners and Appellees,
v.
XENA BENEDETTO,
Respondent and Appellant,
CHRISTIAN BENEDETTO,
Respondent.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eleventh Judicial District, In and For the County of Flathead, Cause No. DV-25-393 Honorable Paul Sullivan, Presiding Judge
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Xena Benedetto, Self-Represented, Jensen Beach, Florida
For Appellees:
Sean S. Frampton, Frampton Purdy Law Firm, Whitefish, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: April 15, 2026
Decided: June 2, 2026
Filed:
__________________________________________ Clerk Justice Laurie McKinnon delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court Internal Operating
Rules, this case is decided by memorandum opinion and shall not be cited and does not
serve as precedent. Its case title, cause number, and disposition shall be included in this
Court’s quarterly list of noncitable cases published in the Pacific Reporter and Montana
Reports.
¶2 Xena Benedetto (Benedetto) appeals from the July 31, 2025 Order of the Eleventh
Judicial District Court, Flathead County, denying her motion to vacate the filing of a
foreign judgment, stay enforcement, and disqualify the petitioner’s attorney. We affirm.
¶3 On March 6, 2025, Kevin and Heidi Cuatt (collectively, Cuatts) filed a notice of
foreign judgment (Notice) entered by a Florida court with the District Court. The foreign
judgment ordered Benedetto and Christian Benedetto (Christian)1 to pay $362,000, with
interest, to the Cuatts. The Cuatts also filed an Affidavit of Filing of Foreign Judgment
(Affidavit) with the District Court. On March 10, the Cuatts sent copies of both the Notice
and Affidavit through certified mail, with return receipt requested, to Benedetto and
Christian at their last known addresses, as well as to their Florida-based counsel. Benedetto
and her Florida attorney signed receipts for the notices, however the mail to Christian was
returned unclaimed.
¶4 On March 28, 2025, Benedetto filed a motion to vacate the filing of a foreign
judgment due to lack of notice, to stay enforcement of the foreign judgment, and to
1 Christian did not appeal and did not sign Benedetto’s brief on appeal. Thus, he is not a party to this appeal. 2 disqualify the Cuatts’ attorney. In support of her motion to vacate, Benedetto claimed she
had not been served or provided with the Notice. Benedetto additionally alleged she did
not sign the certified mail receipt. However, in her accompanying affidavit, she declared
she had reviewed the Notice. As for her motion to stay enforcement, Benedetto asserted
the Florida proceedings were ongoing and subject to appeal. In the alternative, she claims
a lis pendens action involving her Montana properties constitutes security on the judgment.
Regarding her motion to disqualify the Cuatts’ attorney, Benedetto alleged a conflict of
interest because the Cuatts’ Montana attorney’s law firm had previously represented her in
a “similar matter during which [she] shared confidential information regarding [her] legal
affairs.”
¶5 After briefing by both parties, the District Court dismissed Benedetto’s motion
entirely. The court reasoned that Benedetto’s claim of lack of notice was undermined by
her acknowledgment of actual notice in her pleadings. The court found that the Cuatts had
complied with the statutory and constitutional notice requirements of § 25-9-504, MCA.
The court denied her request for a stay of execution of judgment because Benedetto had
not posted any security or otherwise demonstrated compliance with Florida appellate rules
governing stay of execution of judgment. Finally, the court declined to disqualify the
Cuatts’ attorney after determining that the prior representation of Benedetto by the Cuatts’
attorney’s law firm was undertaken by a different attorney with the firm, occurred five
years previously in an unrelated matter in Idaho concerning different legal issues and
parties, and no evidence suggested confidential information obtained in the prior
3 representation would be relevant or used adversely in the instant case. Benedetto now
appeals.
¶6 On appeal, Benedetto raises several issues asserting the District Court erred in
denying her motion. She specifically challenges the authenticity of the certified mail
receipt and whether she received meaningful notice. She claims the registered Florida
judgment was procured by fraud and that a stay was necessary pending an appeal of that
matter. Finally, she maintains that her prior attorney-client relationship merited
disqualification of the Cuatts’ attorney. We address these issues in turn.
Notice of Entry of Foreign Judgment
¶7 With respect to a district court’s conclusions of law, we exercise plenary review and
must determine whether the court’s interpretation of the law is correct. Leichtfuss v.
Dabney, 2005 MT 271, ¶ 21, 329 Mont. 129, 122 P.3d 1220 (citing Blackwell v. Lurie, 284
Mont. 351, 355, 943 P.2d 1318, 1321 (1997)).
¶8 Benedetto claims she never received notice of the filing, despite repeatedly
acknowledging actual notice. She also challenges the authenticity of the certified mail
receipt, despite conceding that actual receipt is not required by statute. She does not raise
any challenge to sufficiency of the contents of the Notice and Affidavit.
¶9 “The fundamental requirements of due process are notice and opportunity for
hearing appropriate to the nature of the case.” Kulstad v. Maniaci, 2010 MT 248, ¶ 41,
358 Mont. 230, 244 P.3d 722 (quotation omitted). A judgment creditor seeking the entry
of a foreign judgment must comply with the statutory notice requirements of § 25-9-504,
MCA. Blackwell, 284 Mont. at 358, 943 P.2d at 1323. Section 25-9-504(2), MCA, governs
4 the notice requirements and mandates the judgment creditor “shall mail notice of the filing
of the judgment and affidavit, attaching a copy of each to the notice, to the judgment debtor
and to the judgment debtor’s attorney of record, if any, at each person’s last known address,
by certified mail, return receipt requested.” (Emphasis added.) A judgment creditor must
only comply with the plain language of the statute to afford sufficient notice of the entry
of judgment to the judgment debtor. Blackwell, 284 Mont. at 358, 943 P.2d at 1323. As
Benedetto concedes in her opening brief, § 25-9-504, MCA, contains no requirement of
actual receipt.
¶10 Here, Benedetto acknowledged she received actual notice, thus her challenge that
the Cuatts failed to afford her notice of the entry is without merit. Her challenge to the
authenticity of the certified mail return receipt, belied by her concession that actual receipt
is not a requirement of § 25-9-504, MCA, likewise fails. We further note that Benedetto
meaningfully participated in the proceedings. The District Court correctly concluded that
the Cuatts had complied with the notice requirements of § 25-9-504, MCA. Accordingly,
the court’s denial of Benedetto’s motion to vacate entry of foreign judgment is affirmed.
Stay of Enforcement
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06/02/2026
DA 25-0645 Case Number: DA 25-0645
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2026 MT 122N
KEVIN CUATT and HEIDI CUATT,
Petitioners and Appellees,
v.
XENA BENEDETTO,
Respondent and Appellant,
CHRISTIAN BENEDETTO,
Respondent.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eleventh Judicial District, In and For the County of Flathead, Cause No. DV-25-393 Honorable Paul Sullivan, Presiding Judge
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Xena Benedetto, Self-Represented, Jensen Beach, Florida
For Appellees:
Sean S. Frampton, Frampton Purdy Law Firm, Whitefish, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: April 15, 2026
Decided: June 2, 2026
Filed:
__________________________________________ Clerk Justice Laurie McKinnon delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court Internal Operating
Rules, this case is decided by memorandum opinion and shall not be cited and does not
serve as precedent. Its case title, cause number, and disposition shall be included in this
Court’s quarterly list of noncitable cases published in the Pacific Reporter and Montana
Reports.
¶2 Xena Benedetto (Benedetto) appeals from the July 31, 2025 Order of the Eleventh
Judicial District Court, Flathead County, denying her motion to vacate the filing of a
foreign judgment, stay enforcement, and disqualify the petitioner’s attorney. We affirm.
¶3 On March 6, 2025, Kevin and Heidi Cuatt (collectively, Cuatts) filed a notice of
foreign judgment (Notice) entered by a Florida court with the District Court. The foreign
judgment ordered Benedetto and Christian Benedetto (Christian)1 to pay $362,000, with
interest, to the Cuatts. The Cuatts also filed an Affidavit of Filing of Foreign Judgment
(Affidavit) with the District Court. On March 10, the Cuatts sent copies of both the Notice
and Affidavit through certified mail, with return receipt requested, to Benedetto and
Christian at their last known addresses, as well as to their Florida-based counsel. Benedetto
and her Florida attorney signed receipts for the notices, however the mail to Christian was
returned unclaimed.
¶4 On March 28, 2025, Benedetto filed a motion to vacate the filing of a foreign
judgment due to lack of notice, to stay enforcement of the foreign judgment, and to
1 Christian did not appeal and did not sign Benedetto’s brief on appeal. Thus, he is not a party to this appeal. 2 disqualify the Cuatts’ attorney. In support of her motion to vacate, Benedetto claimed she
had not been served or provided with the Notice. Benedetto additionally alleged she did
not sign the certified mail receipt. However, in her accompanying affidavit, she declared
she had reviewed the Notice. As for her motion to stay enforcement, Benedetto asserted
the Florida proceedings were ongoing and subject to appeal. In the alternative, she claims
a lis pendens action involving her Montana properties constitutes security on the judgment.
Regarding her motion to disqualify the Cuatts’ attorney, Benedetto alleged a conflict of
interest because the Cuatts’ Montana attorney’s law firm had previously represented her in
a “similar matter during which [she] shared confidential information regarding [her] legal
affairs.”
¶5 After briefing by both parties, the District Court dismissed Benedetto’s motion
entirely. The court reasoned that Benedetto’s claim of lack of notice was undermined by
her acknowledgment of actual notice in her pleadings. The court found that the Cuatts had
complied with the statutory and constitutional notice requirements of § 25-9-504, MCA.
The court denied her request for a stay of execution of judgment because Benedetto had
not posted any security or otherwise demonstrated compliance with Florida appellate rules
governing stay of execution of judgment. Finally, the court declined to disqualify the
Cuatts’ attorney after determining that the prior representation of Benedetto by the Cuatts’
attorney’s law firm was undertaken by a different attorney with the firm, occurred five
years previously in an unrelated matter in Idaho concerning different legal issues and
parties, and no evidence suggested confidential information obtained in the prior
3 representation would be relevant or used adversely in the instant case. Benedetto now
appeals.
¶6 On appeal, Benedetto raises several issues asserting the District Court erred in
denying her motion. She specifically challenges the authenticity of the certified mail
receipt and whether she received meaningful notice. She claims the registered Florida
judgment was procured by fraud and that a stay was necessary pending an appeal of that
matter. Finally, she maintains that her prior attorney-client relationship merited
disqualification of the Cuatts’ attorney. We address these issues in turn.
Notice of Entry of Foreign Judgment
¶7 With respect to a district court’s conclusions of law, we exercise plenary review and
must determine whether the court’s interpretation of the law is correct. Leichtfuss v.
Dabney, 2005 MT 271, ¶ 21, 329 Mont. 129, 122 P.3d 1220 (citing Blackwell v. Lurie, 284
Mont. 351, 355, 943 P.2d 1318, 1321 (1997)).
¶8 Benedetto claims she never received notice of the filing, despite repeatedly
acknowledging actual notice. She also challenges the authenticity of the certified mail
receipt, despite conceding that actual receipt is not required by statute. She does not raise
any challenge to sufficiency of the contents of the Notice and Affidavit.
¶9 “The fundamental requirements of due process are notice and opportunity for
hearing appropriate to the nature of the case.” Kulstad v. Maniaci, 2010 MT 248, ¶ 41,
358 Mont. 230, 244 P.3d 722 (quotation omitted). A judgment creditor seeking the entry
of a foreign judgment must comply with the statutory notice requirements of § 25-9-504,
MCA. Blackwell, 284 Mont. at 358, 943 P.2d at 1323. Section 25-9-504(2), MCA, governs
4 the notice requirements and mandates the judgment creditor “shall mail notice of the filing
of the judgment and affidavit, attaching a copy of each to the notice, to the judgment debtor
and to the judgment debtor’s attorney of record, if any, at each person’s last known address,
by certified mail, return receipt requested.” (Emphasis added.) A judgment creditor must
only comply with the plain language of the statute to afford sufficient notice of the entry
of judgment to the judgment debtor. Blackwell, 284 Mont. at 358, 943 P.2d at 1323. As
Benedetto concedes in her opening brief, § 25-9-504, MCA, contains no requirement of
actual receipt.
¶10 Here, Benedetto acknowledged she received actual notice, thus her challenge that
the Cuatts failed to afford her notice of the entry is without merit. Her challenge to the
authenticity of the certified mail return receipt, belied by her concession that actual receipt
is not a requirement of § 25-9-504, MCA, likewise fails. We further note that Benedetto
meaningfully participated in the proceedings. The District Court correctly concluded that
the Cuatts had complied with the notice requirements of § 25-9-504, MCA. Accordingly,
the court’s denial of Benedetto’s motion to vacate entry of foreign judgment is affirmed.
Stay of Enforcement
¶11 We review a district court’s orders related to trial administration, such as a stay of
enforcement, for an abuse of discretion. In re Crow Water Compact, 2015 MT 217, ¶ 20,
380 Mont. 168, 354 P.3d 1217. A district court abuses its discretion if it acted arbitrarily
without the employment of conscientious judgment or exceeded the bounds of reason,
resulting in substantial injustice. Rysewyk v. Mont. Opticom, LLC., 2023 MT 111, ¶ 15,
412 Mont. 420, 530 P.3d 839.
5 ¶12 Benedetto asserts separate, pending proceedings involving properties she owns in
Montana secures the judgment.
¶13 A judgment debtor seeking a stay of execution of a foreign judgment must provide
proof of a pending appeal of the foreign judgment, that the foreign court has issued a stay
of execution, and that the judgment debtor “has furnished the security for the satisfaction
of the judgment required by the state in which it was rendered.” Section 25-9-505(1),
MCA. Florida law requires a party appealing a money judgment post “a good and sufficient
bond equal to the principal amount of judgment plus twice the statutory rate of interest on
judgments on a total amount on which the party has an obligation to pay interest.”
Fla. R. App. P. 9.310(b).
¶14 Here, Benedetto has not proffered any evidence she had posted a sufficient bond in
Florida. Her contention that separate proceedings secure the bond likewise fail because,
as the District Court noted, while these proceedings may restrict the alienation of those
assets, the lis perdens filed in that case does not constitute a bond or security against the
Florida judgment as required by § 25-9-505(1), MCA. Accordingly, the District Court did
not abuse its discretion in denying Benedetto’s motion for stay of enforcement of the
foreign judgment.
Disqualification of Cuatts’ Attorney
¶15 We review a district court’s denial of a motion to disqualify an attorney for an abuse
of discretion. Rysewyk, ¶ 15. A district court abuses its discretion if it acted arbitrarily
without the employment of conscientious judgment or exceeded the bounds of reason,
resulting in substantial injustice. Rysewyk, ¶ 15.
6 ¶16 Benedetto maintains that the Cuatts’ attorney should have been disqualified because
another member of his law firm had represented her in a previously unrelated matter and
was privy to confidential legal information.
¶17 The Montana Rules of Professional Conduct, as relevant here, state that a conflict
of interest exists if “the representation of one client will be directly adverse to another
client” or the representation of one or more clients “will be materially limited by the
lawyer’s responsibilities to another client, a former client or a third person[.]”
M. R. Pro. Cond. 1.7(b)(1)-(2). The rules further prohibit an attorney “who has formerly
represented a client in a matter” from subsequently “representing another person in the
same or a substantially related matter in which that person’s interests are materially adverse
to the interests of the former client” absent the informed, written consent of the former
client. M. R. Pro. Cond. 1.9(a). While lawyers are associated with a firm, none shall
“knowingly represent a client when any one of them practicing alone would be prohibited
from doing so by Rules 1.7 or 1.9[.]” M. R. Pro. Cond. 1.10(a). The district court must
evaluate if the party moving for the disqualification “has offered sufficient proof that
continued representation of one party by the attorney or firm will prejudice or adversely
impact the rights of another party in the matter pending before the court.” Rysewyk, ¶ 17.
¶18 Here, the District Court made the requisite findings and concluded that the prior
representation of Benedetto involving a member of the Cuatts’ attorney’s law firm
concerned an unrelated regulatory issue in Idaho five years previously, that the parties were
unrelated, and no confidential information from that representation would be relevant to or
adversely used in the instant case. Benedetto offered no evidence in support of her
7 argument. Accordingly, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying
Benedetto’s motion to disqualify the Cuatts’ attorney.
¶19 The District Court correctly determined the Cuatts had complied with the notice
requirements of § 25-9-504, MCA, when it denied Benedetto’s motion to vacate the filing
of the foreign judgment. Further, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying
her motion to stay the enforcement of that judgment or her motion to disqualify the Cuatts’
attorney.
¶20 We have determined to decide this case pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c) of our
Internal Operating Rules, which provides for memorandum opinions. In the opinion of the
Court, the case presents a question controlled by settled law or by the clear application of
applicable standards of review.
¶21 Affirmed.
/S/ LAURIE McKINNON
We Concur:
/S/ JAMES JEREMIAH SHEA /S/ KATHERINE M. BIDEGARAY /S/ INGRID GUSTAFSON /S/ JIM RICE