16-3995-cv CSX Transp., Inc. v. Island Rail Terminal, Inc. et al
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
August Term 2016
(Argued: September 25, 2017 Decided: January 10, 2018)
Docket No. 16‐3995‐cv
CSX TRANSPORTATION, INC., Plaintiff‐Counter‐Defendant‐Appellee, v.
ISLAND RAIL TERMINAL, INC., MAGGIO SANITATION SERVICE, INC., EASTERN RESOURCE RECYCLING, INC.,
Appellants,
EMJAY ENVIRONMENTAL RECYCLING, LTD., Defendant‐Counter‐Claimant.
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
Before:
LIVINGSTON, LYNCH, and CHIN, Circuit Judges.
Appeal from a judgment and post‐judgment order of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Seybert, J.), directing third‐party garnishees to satisfy a creditorʹs judgment against a judgment debtor as damages for the garnisheesʹ violation of certain restraining notices.
AFFIRMED IN PART AND VACATED AND REMANDED IN PART.
JEFFREY D. COHEN, Keenan Cohen & Merrick P.C., Philadelphia, Pennyslvania, for Plaintiff‐Counter‐ Defendant‐Appellee.
JARRETT M. BEHAR, Sinnreich Kosakoff & Messina LLP, Central Islip, New York, for Appellants.
CHIN, Circuit Judge:
Third‐party garnishees appeal from a judgment of the district court (Seybert, J.) directing them to turn over $1,056,444.15 to a judgment creditor to satisfy a judgment against a judgment debtor. The district court awarded the sum as damages for the garnisheesʹ violation of certain restraining notices. The garnishees also appeal from the district courtʹs post‐judgment order denying their motion to alter the judgment.
On appeal, the garnishees principally argue that (1) plaintiff was required to commence a special proceeding against garnishees under New York
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Civil Practice Law and Rules (ʺC.P.L.R.ʺ) article 52, instead of proceeding by motion; (2) garnishees did not violate the restraining notices under C.P.L.R. § 5222(b); and (3) the district court erred in awarding damages and doing so without holding a hearing.
We affirm in part and vacate and remand in part.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff‐counter‐defendant‐appellee CSX Transportation, Inc.
(ʺCSXʺ) is an interstate rail carrier. Defendant‐counter‐claimant Emjay Environmental Recycling, Ltd. (ʺEmjayʺ) operates a waste transfer station. In 2012, appellant Island Rail Terminal, Inc. (ʺIsland Railʺ) purchased ʺsubstantially allʺ of Emjayʹs assets for $3,572,011.52 pursuant to an Asset Purchase Agreement and Amended Promissory Note. Appellants Maggio Sanitation Services, Inc. (ʺMaggioʺ) and Eastern Resource Recycling, Inc. (ʺEastern Resourceʺ) guaranteed Island Railʹs payment and performance obligations.
On September 25, 2014, the district court entered an amended judgment for CSX and against Emjay in this breach of contract suit for $1,056,444.15. We affirmed the judgment. CSX Transp., Inc. v. Emjay Envtl. Recycling, Ltd., 629 F. Appʹx 147 (2d Cir. 2015) (summary order). By this point, at
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least three other creditors already held judgments against Emjay (based on unrelated claims): Environmental Logistics Services (ʺELSʺ) for $1,238,807.03, Sullivan Gardner for $294,318.82, and Matthew Crescimanni (ʺCrescimanniʺ) for $402,013.83.
On November 12, 2014, CSX served third‐party garnishees Island Rail, Maggio, and Eastern Resource (collectively, ʺGarnisheesʺ) with restraining notices (the ʺRestraining Noticesʺ) to aid its judgment entered in this case below.1 The Restraining Notices prohibited Garnishees from ʺmak[ing] or suffer[ing] any sale, assignment or transfer of, or any interference withʺ and from ʺotherwise dispos[ing] of any [] debtʺ owed to Emjay, except as otherwise provided. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5222(b); see also App. 99, 107, 115 (restraining notices). By this point, at
1 ʺA ʹgarnisheeʹ is a person who owes a debt to a judgment debtor, or a person other than the judgment debtor who has property in his possession or custody in which a judgment debtor has an interest.ʺ N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 105(i). A restraining notice is an enforcement device used in aid of an existing judgment that bears the caption of the underlying action. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5222, cmt. 5222:1 (practice commentary). It may be issued by the judgment creditorʹs attorney against the judgment debtor or a third party. Id. A restraining notice served upon a garnishee ʺserves as a type of injunction prohibiting the transfer of the judgment debtorʹs property.ʺ Aspen Indus., Inc. v. Marine Midland Bank, 52 N.Y.2d 575, 579 (1981); see also N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5222, cmt. 5222:1 (practice commentary) (ʺWith ordinary money judgments, it is usually the attorney who issues the restraining notice, acting as an officer of the court in so doing. In that instance, the restraint results without a court order or any other preliminary judicial authorization. It is a rare example of an injunction, complete with contempt punishment as its sanction, not embodied in a court order or judgment.ʺ).
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least two creditors, Crescimanni and ELS, had already served writs of execution for their judgments against Emjay.2 Approximately three months later, on February 26, 2015, the New York State Supreme Court, Suffolk County, approved a consolidated $2.2 million settlement (the ʺState Settlement Orderʺ) in two unrelated actions involving Emjay, Garnishees, and several of Emjayʹs other creditors, including ELS, Sullivan Gardner, and Crescimanni.3 CSX, after joining early settlement talks at the invitation of the parties in the state court proceedings, ultimately declined to participate. Under the terms of the settlement, Garnishees settled the claims asserted by Emjay for $2.2 million, which was then distributed to creditors ELS, Sullivan Gardner, and Crescimanni to satisfy their judgments against Emjay. The state court ʺso orderedʺ the settlement. App. 154.
On June 12, 2015, CSX filed a motion for a turnover order to compel Garnishees to satisfy CSXʹs September 25, 2014 amended judgment against
2 Garnishees belatedly corrected the date of ELSʹs writ of execution from March 10, 2015 to November 5, 2014 in a letter motion to alter the judgment. Letter Mot. to Alter J. 1, CSX Transp. v. Island Rail Terminal, Inc., No. 12‐cv‐1865 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 4, 2016), ECF No. 100. As discussed further below, the district court declined in its discretion to consider the new fact. Elec. Order Den. Letter Mot. to Alter J., CSX Transp. v. Island Rail Terminal, Inc., No. 12‐cv‐1865 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 1, 2016). 3 In the first of those actions, Emjay sued Garnishees to recover the $3.5 million purchase price from the asset sale, and Garnishees raised various counter‐claims. In the second, ELS, Sullivan Gardner, and Crescimanni sued Emjay for unpaid judgments.
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Emjay, as entered by the district court in this case. In its motion, CSX also argued, alternatively, that Garnishees were liable to CSX for damages because entering into the state settlement violated the Restraining Notices. While the motion was pending, on June 24, 2015, Garnishees issued a check to CSX for $8,015.03 ‐‐ the ʺremainder of the proceeds of the settlement of the [Garnisheesʹ] debt to Emjay pursuant to theʺ State Settlement Order. App. 230‐31. The remaining settlement payments to ELS, Sullivan Gardner and Crescimanni were paid out before this check was issued, but the dates of these payments do not appear to be included in the record. On or about July 9, 2015, CSX served writs of execution for its judgment.
On February 25, 2016, the district court granted CSXʹs motion for a turnover order and directed Garnishees to turn over $1,056,444.15 to CSX. The district court also held that ʺto the extent that the Garnishees already made disbursements under the [State] Settlement Order, CSX is entitled to damages in the amount of the Judgment: $1,056,444.15.ʺ Sp. App. 12. As to damages, the court explained that the Garnishees ʺacted negligently by ignoring the Restraining Notices because only an order from this Court could alter the Garnisheesʹ obligations.ʺ Sp. App. 13. If Garnishees had not violated the
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Restraining Notices by paying out the $2.2 million state settlement, the district court concluded, the Garnishees would still have had $1,056,444.15 available, the amount of CSXʹs unsatisfied judgment.
On March 2, 2016, CSX moved the court to enter judgment against Garnishees on the ground that Garnishees already disbursed funds pursuant to the state settlement. On March 10, 2016, Garnishees moved for reconsideration of the district courtʹs February 25, 2016 turnover order. In their motion, Garnishees objected to the district courtʹs failure to hold a hearing and also requested oral argument on their motion.
On November 2, 2016, without holding oral argument or providing a hearing, the district court denied Garnisheesʹ motion for reconsideration and granted CSXʹs motion to enter judgment against Garnishees, reaffirming that Garnishees would have been able to satisfy CSXʹs judgment of $1,056,444.15 if Garnishees had not violated the Restraining Notices by distributing funds pursuant to the $2.2 million state settlement. Although the courtʹs initial order rested on the mistaken premise that the settlement funds were still available at the time of judgment, the court clarified that its ʺultimate conclusion rested on a damages analysis,ʺ Sp. App. 25, not a turnover analysis, and that Garnishees
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remained liable. As to damages, the court recognized that the Restraining Notices did not grant priority and agreed that priority creditors should be paid first. Based on the information before it, the court concluded that only Crescimanniʹs property execution granted him a superior right over CSX, and that offsetting Crescimanniʹs judgment of $402,013.83 still would have left sufficient funds for Garnishees to satisfy CSXʹs judgment. Finally, the court concluded that Garnishees ʺhave not raised any issues of factʺ and thus it ʺneed not hold a hearing to determine the proper judgment amount.ʺ Sp. App. 33. The Second Amended Judgment was issued on November 8, 2016, and awarded CSX damages in the amount of $1,056,444.15 against Garnishees.
On November 4, 2016, Garnishees moved by letter to alter the judgment on two grounds, which they contended would reduce the judgment to $201,945.11. On December 1, 2016, the district court issued an order electronically denying Garnisheesʹ motion. First, the district court declined to consider new evidence demonstrating that ELS served its property execution several months earlier ‐‐ thereby granting it priority before the State Settlement Order ‐‐ because Garnishees failed to show that they were ʺjustifiably ignorantʺ of the evidence ʺdespite due diligence.ʺ Elec. Order Den. Mot. to Alter J., CSX
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Transp. v. Island Rail Terminal, Inc., No. 12‐cv‐1865 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 1, 2016) (quoting Becnel v. Deutsche Bank AG, 838 F. Supp. 2d 168, 171 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)). Second, the district court concluded that accounting for statutory interest, which it omitted in its initial damages calculations, would not have affected its ultimate conclusion that Garnishees had sufficient funds to satisfy CSXʹs judgment.
This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
We review a district courtʹs ruling on a request for an order of attachment for abuse of discretion. Exp.‐Imp. Bank of the Republic of China v. Grenada, 768 F.3d 75, 84‐85 (2d Cir. 2014). We also review a district courtʹs denial of an evidentiary hearing for abuse of discretion. Zappia Middle E. Constr. Co. v. Emirate of Abu Dhabi, 215 F.3d 247, 253 (2d Cir. 2000). ʺThe district court abuses its discretion if it applies legal standards incorrectly, relies on clearly erroneous findings of fact, or proceeds on the basis of an erroneous view of the applicable law.ʺ Aurelius Capital Partners, LP v. Republic of Argentina, 584 F.3d 120, 129 (2d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). We review de novo a district courtʹs interpretation of questions of New York law. See Tire Engʹg & Distrib. L.L.C. v. Bank of China Ltd., 740 F.3d 108, 113‐14 (2d Cir. 2014).
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Because the district court indicated that its ʺultimate conclusion rested on a damages analysis,ʺ Sp. App. 25, not a turnover analysis, we confine the scope of our review to the damages theory. Three principal issues are presented. First, Garnishees argue that CSX improperly proceeded by motion under Rule 69(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and that, instead, CSX should have instituted a special proceeding against Garnishees pursuant to C.P.L.R. article 52 for the district court to obtain personal jurisdiction. Second, Garnishees argue that they did not violate the Restraining Notices because they transferred funds pursuant to an order of the state court, and C.P.L.R. § 5222(b) permits transfers ʺpursuant to an order of the court.ʺ Third, Garnishees contend that even if they did violate the Restraining Notices, the district court erred in concluding that CSX suffered damages when CSX was the creditor ʺlast in line,ʺ Appellantsʹ Br. 29, and in failing to hold a hearing before fixing the amount of damages.4
4 CSX suggests that Garnisheesʹ appeal is limited to the denial of the motion for reconsideration. But Garnisheesʹ Amended Notice of Appeal identifies the initial turnover order, the order denying their motion for reconsideration, the Second Amended Judgment, as well as the district courtʹs post‐judgment order denying their motion to alter the judgment. CSX offers no argument for limiting the scope of our review to the single order denying the motion for reconsideration. We therefore consider and resolve Garnisheesʹ appeal of all relevant orders in this dispute.
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I. Procedure for Enforcing Money Judgments First, we agree with the district court that CSX was permitted to seek relief from Garnishees by motion under Rule 69(a), rather than by instituting a special proceeding pursuant to New York law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 69(a).
A. Applicable Law A motion to enforce a money judgment is governed by Rule 69(a), which provides that ʺproceedings supplementary to and in aid of judgment or execution . . . must accord with the procedure of the state where the court is located.ʺ Id. In New York, C.P.L.R. article 52 governs the enforcement and collection of money judgments. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. §§ 5201‐5252. Section 5225(b) enables a judgment creditor to commence a ʺspecial proceedingʺ against a third party who ʺis in possession or custody of money or other personal propertyʺ in which the judgment debtor has an interest. Id. § 5225(b).5 Section 5227 allows a judgment creditor to commence a special proceeding against a third party ʺwho
5 Section 5225(b) provides in pertinent part: Upon a special proceeding commenced by the judgment creditor, against a person in possession or custody of money or other personal property in which the judgment debtor has an interest, or against a person who is a transferee of money or other personal property from the judgment debtor, where it is shown that the judgment debtor is entitled to the possession of such property or that the judgment creditorʹs rights to the property are superior to those of the transferee, the court shall require such person to pay the money . . . .
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it is shown is or will become indebted to the judgment debtor.ʺ Id. § 5227.6 Violation of a restraining notice subjects a garnishee to personal liability in a special proceeding under C.P.L.R. article 52 or a separate plenary action. Cruz v. TD Bank, N.A., 22 N.Y.3d 61, 77‐78 (2013). C.P.L.R. article 4 sets forth the procedure for special proceedings. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. §§ 401‐411.
B. Application Although we have assumed in prior cases that parties may seek turnover orders by motion, we have not squarely addressed the issue. See, e.g., Vera v. Republic of Cuba, 802 F.3d 242, 244 n.3 (2d Cir. 2015); HBE Leasing Corp. v. Frank, 48 F.3d 623, 633 & n.7 (2d Cir. 1995).7 We now hold that a party seeking a
6 Section 5227 provides in pertinent part: Upon a special proceeding commenced by the judgment creditor, against any person who it is shown is or will become indebted to the judgment debtor, the court may require such person to pay to the judgment creditor the debt upon maturity, or so much of it as is sufficient to satisfy the judgment, and to execute and deliver any document necessary to effect payment; or it may direct that a judgment be entered against such person in favor of the judgment creditor. 7 District courts in this circuit have also consistently allowed parties to request turnover orders by motion rather than by special proceeding. See, e.g., Bernard v. Lombardo, 2016 WL 7377240, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 23, 2016); Gen. Elec. Capital Corp. v. E. Bus. Sys., 2016 WL 3582061, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. June 28, 2016); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Grafman, 2015 WL 9460131, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 23, 2015); Universitas Educ., LLC v. Nova Grp., Inc., 2014 WL 3883371, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 7, 2014); SEC v. Vuono, 2013 WL 6837568, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 26, 2013); N. Mariana Islands v. Millard, 845 F. Supp. 2d 579, 581‐82 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); JW Oilfield Equip., LLC v. Commerzbank, AG, 764 F. Supp. 2d 587, 591 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); Mitchell v. Lyons Profʹl Servs., Inc., 727 F. Supp. 2d 120, 122‐23 (E.D.N.Y. 2010). But see Wasserman Media Grp., LLC v. Bender, 2012 WL 1506181, at *3
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money judgment against a non‐party garnishee may proceed by motion and need not commence a special proceeding, as long as the court has personal jurisdiction over the garnishee. We reach this conclusion for three reasons.
First, a special proceeding is a procedural vehicle under New York law with no equivalent under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which recognize only ʺone form of action ‐‐ the civil action.ʺ Fed. R. Civ. P. 2; see Mitchell v. Garrison Prot. Servs., Inc., 819 F.3d 636, 640 (2d Cir. 2016) (per curiam). It is therefore ʺunclearʺ how a party in a federal district court in New York could comply with the special proceeding requirements, Mitchell, 819 F.3d at 640, which we have indicated ʺneed not be strictly adhered to as long as there is no prejudice to the opposing party in giving notice of the claims and framing the issues,ʺ Vera, 802 F.3d at 244 n.3.
Second, a special proceeding is more akin to motion practice than a plenary action. See HBE Leasing Corp., 48 F.3d at 633 (summary relief available in a special proceeding under C.P.L.R. article 52); OʹBrien‐Kreitzberg & Assocs. v. K.P., Inc., 630 N.Y.S.2d 76, 76 (1st Depʹt 1995) (action seeking to enforce a money
(S.D.N.Y. 2012) (ʺ[P]etitionerʹs motion for a turnover order in the instant action is procedurally defective . . . . If petitioner seeks a turnover order, it must bring a separate action . . . .ʺ); Runaway Dev. Grp. v. Pentagen Techs. Intʹl Ltd., 396 F. Supp. 2d 471, 473‐74 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (same).
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judgment is ʺmore appropriately obtained in a supplementary special proceeding pursuant to [C.P.L.R.] article 52 rather than a plenary actionʺ (citation omitted)). See generally C.P.L.R. § 401, cmt. 401:1 (practice commentary) (ʺLike an action, [a special proceeding] ends in a judgment [], but the procedure is similar to that on a motion []. Speed, economy and efficiency are the hallmarks of this procedure.ʺ); David D. Siegel, New York Practice § 547 (5th ed. 2017) (ʺA special proceeding is . . . . as plenary as an action, culminating in a judgment, but is brought on with the ease, speed, and economy of a mere motion.ʺ).
Third, New York law explicitly contemplates that proceedings brought as motions may, if necessary, be converted to special proceedings by the court. Under C.P.L.R. § 103(c), ʺ[i]f a court has obtained jurisdiction over the parties, a civil judicial proceeding shall not be dismissed solely because it is not brought in the proper form . . . . If the court finds it appropriate in the interests of justice, it may convert a motion into a special proceeding . . . .ʺ See also Jackson v. Bank of Am., N.A., 53 N.Y.S.3d 71, 74‐75 (2d Depʹt 2017) (citing C.P.L.R. § 103(c) and refusing to dismiss an action for failure to commence a special proceeding under article 52, even where that provision provided the exclusive remedy). The court must, however, have personal jurisdiction over the parties. See N.Y.
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C.P.L.R. § 103(c); Commonwealth of N. Mariana Islands v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, 21 N.Y.3d 55, 64 (2013) (ʺ[P]ersonal jurisdiction is the linchpin of authority under section 5225(b).ʺ).
Accordingly, we conclude that CSX was not required to institute a separate proceeding against Garnishees and could proceed by motion under Rule 69(a), so long as the district court otherwise had personal jurisdiction over Garnishees. Here, personal jurisdiction is clear: Garnishees do not contest that they are New York corporations with their principal places of business in the Eastern District of New York. Although Garnishees contend that no summons was served, the record reflects that CSX complied with Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure by serving the summons on Cathy McByrne, a person authorized to accept service on behalf of Vincent Maggio, Jr., Chief Executive Officer for Garnishees. We therefore conclude that the district court properly allowed CSX to proceed by motion. II. Statutory Construction of C.P.L.R. § 5222 Second, Garnishees argue that they did not violate the Restraining Notices because they transferred the restrained funds pursuant to the state courtʹs settlement order, and C.P.L.R. § 5222(b) authorizes disbursements
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ʺpursuant to an order of the court.ʺ We agree with the district court that the plain meaning of the statute does not support Garnisheesʹ interpretation.
A. Applicable Law Under C.P.L.R. § 5222, an attorney for the judgment creditor may, as an officer of the court, serve a restraining notice on a third party who ʺowes a debt to the judgment debtor or . . . is in the possession or custody of property in which he or she knows or has reason to believe the judgment debtor . . . has an interest.ʺ N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5222(a)‐(b). A party subject to a restraining notice is ʺforbidden to make or suffer any sale, assignment or transfer of, or any interference with, any such property, or pay over or otherwise dispose of any such debt . . . except upon direction of the sheriff or pursuant to an order of the court . . . .ʺ Id. § 5222(b) (emphasis added). A court has broad authority to regulate the use of enforcement devices. Id. § 5240 (ʺThe court may at any time, on its own initiative or the motion of any interested person, and upon such notice as it may require, make an order denying, limiting, conditioning, regulating, extending or modifying the use of any enforcement procedure.ʺ).
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B. Application ʺIn determining the law of the State of New York, ʹwe will consider not only state statutes but also state decisional law.ʹʺ Elliott Assocs., L.P. v. Banco de la Nacion, 194 F.3d 363, 370 (2d Cir. 1999) (citation omitted). Here, the parties have not cited and we are unaware of any New York cases that precisely address the issue before us, so ʺwe will carefully predict how the highest court of the state would resolve the uncertainty or ambiguityʺ by ʺconsider[ing] all of the resources to which the highest court of the state could look.ʺ Id. (citations omitted). We begin by examining the text of the statute to discern whether it has a plain and unambiguous meaning. Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. LY USA, Inc., 676 F.3d 83, 108 (2d Cir. 2012); see also Elliott, 194 F.3d at 371 (noting that we ʺlook first to the plain language of a statute and interpret it by its ordinary, common meaningʺ when interpreting a New York statute (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)). The meaning of a statute can be understood ʺin context with and by reference to the whole statutory scheme, by appreciating how sections relate to one another.ʺ Auburn Hous. Auth. v. Martinez, 277 F.3d 138, 144 (2d Cir. 2002). ʺA statute should be interpreted in a way that avoids absurd
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results.ʺ United States v. Venturella, 391 F.3d 120, 126 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting United States v. Dauray, 215 F.3d 257, 264 (2d Cir. 2000)).
Here, the plain and unambiguous meaning of C.P.L.R. § 5222(b) is that ʺtheʺ court refers to the court out of which the restraining notice issued. The use of the definite article ʺtheʺ indicates a singular court, whereas the indefinite article ʺanyʺ or ʺaʺ denotes multiple courts. See Natʹl Foods, Inc. v. Rubin, 936 F.2d 656, 660 (2d Cir. 1991) (ʺ[a]bsent some reason to conclude otherwise . . . ʹthe courtʹ referred to the second time . . . should be the same one referred to the first time ‐‐ a ʹcourt of competent jurisdictionʹʺ); see also Renz v. Grey Advert., Inc., 135 F.3d 217, 222 (2d Cir. 1997) (ʺPlacing the article ʹtheʹ in front of a word connotes the singularity of the word modified. . . . In contrast, the use of the indefinite article ʹaʹ implies that the modified noun is but one of several of that kind.ʺ).
In addition, as the district court explained, permitting a second court to dissolve a restraining notice issued out of the first court would injure the rights of creditors and threaten the first courtʹs injunctive power. See Nardone v. Long Island Tr. Co., 336 N.Y.S.2d 325, 327 (2d Depʹt 1972) (recognizing that a stay contained in an ex parte order ʺdid not serve to suspend the effectiveness of the restraining noticeʺ; ʺotherwise, any judgment debtor could obtain such an order,
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without notice to the court that a restraining notice had been served, or to the judgment creditor, and recover his property theretofore properly made the subject of the restraining noticeʺ); see also Sumitomo Shoji New York, Inc. v. Chem. Bank N.Y. Tr. Co., 263 N.Y.S.2d 354, 358‐59 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1965), aff’d, 267 N.Y.S.2d 477 (1st Depʹt 1966) (discussing legislative history of C.P.L.R. § 5222 as favorable to judgment creditors in light of governorʹs veto of an amendment that would ʺunnecessarily hamper judgment creditors in the collection of their judgmentsʺ). We therefore agree with the district court that the phrase ʺan order of the courtʺ in C.P.L.R. § 5222(b) refers only to the court out of which the restraining notice issued. Although Garnishees contend that our reading undermines the broad authority conferred on New York courts by C.P.L.R. § 5240, there is no suggestion that the state court, in ʺso orderingʺ the settlement, intended to lift the Restraining Notices issued out of the federal district court. Indeed, the State Settlement Order does not mention CSX, let alone the Restraining Notices. The order therefore did not dissolve Garnisheesʹ obligations under the Restraining Notices.
We also agree with the district court that Garnishees negligently violated the Restraining Notices. The Restraining Notices ʺserve[d] as a type of
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injunction prohibiting the transfer of the judgment debtorʹs property.ʺ Aspen Indus., Inc. v. Marine Midland Bank, 52 N.Y.2d 575, 579 (1981). After Garnishees were served with the Restraining Notices, they were ʺforbidden to make or suffer any sale, assignment or transfer of, or any interference with, any such propertyʺ in which the judgment debtor Emjay is known or believed to have an interest. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5222(b). Garnishees were properly served with the Restraining Notices on November 12, 2014, and the Restraining Noticesʹ injunctive effect was still in place on February 26, 2015, when Garnishees agreed to pay $2.2 million on behalf of Emjay to settle Emjayʹs debts to ELS, Sullivan Gardner, and Crescimanni in the State Settlement Order. The Garnishees do not dispute that Emjay clearly had an interest in the $2.2 million that Garnishees paid on Emjayʹs behalf in that settlement. See Ray v. Jama Prods., Inc., 425 N.Y.S.2d 630, 631 (2d Depʹt 1980) (ʺThe fact that a judgment debtor will directly benefit from the payment [to satisfy the judgment debtorʹs debts] is sufficient to require the party served with the restraining notice to comply with the provisions or be subject to the appropriate legal sanctions.ʺ). In such circumstances, while Garnishees were entitled to contest the validity of the district courtʹs Turnover Order, they were not free to simply ignore the injunctive effect of the Restraining Notices. See
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Sykes v. Bank of Am., 723 F.3d 399, 406 (2d Cir. 2013) (ʺA garnishee has no discretion to ignore a restraining notice that is valid on its face . . . even if it questions the legal foundation on which the notice is based.ʺ). Garnishees plainly violated the Restraining Notices in doing so. III. Damages Third, Garnishees argue that even if they did violate the Restraining Notices, CSX is not entitled to recover because CSX sustained no damages as the creditor ʺlast in lineʺ under New York law on priority of judgments. Appellantsʹ Br. 29. Relatedly, Garnishees contend that the district court erred by failing to hold a hearing, entertain testimony, or receive admissible evidence before holding them liable for CSXʹs unpaid judgment. For the reasons set forth below, we conclude that the district court abused its discretion by failing to hold a hearing to resolve factual issues concerning the relative priorities of judgment creditors ‐‐ a necessary predicate to determining the proper amount of damages, if any, sustained by CSX.
A. Applicable Law A garnishee that violates a restraining notice may be liable to an aggrieved judgment creditor if the creditor establishes that ʺit sustained damages
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as a result of the garnisheeʹs disobedience of the [restraining] notice.ʺ Aspen Indus., 52 N.Y.2d at 581. To establish damages, a creditor must ʺdemonstrate that property of the judgment debtor was available to satisfy the judgment at the time the restraining notice was in effect.ʺ Id.; see also Nardone, 336 N.Y.S.2d at 327 (damages for violating a restraining notice are ʺthe amount of the judgment remaining unsatisfied, but limited to the amount in the account which would have been available to satisfy the judgmentʺ). In Aspen, for instance, a judgment creditor could not establish damages resulting from a garnishee bankʹs violation of restraining notices, because the garnishee bank had a superior right of setoff to any debt owed to it by the judgment debtor based on section 151 of the Debtor and Creditor law. 52 N.Y.2d at 581‐82.
New York has a comprehensive statutory scheme establishing priorities for directing the assets of a judgment debtor to competing judgment creditors. Under C.P.L.R. § 5234, ʺthe order of priority among judgments is to be determined strictly in accordance with the chronological service of execution levies and the filing of orders for turnover.ʺ City of New York v. Panzirer, 259 N.Y.S.2d 284, 286 (1st Depʹt 1965) (citing N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5234(c)). ʺThe mere service of restraining notices under [§] 5222 . . . does not invoke standing in the
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ranking of priorities.ʺ Id.; Aspen Indus., 52 N.Y.2d at 579‐80. Instead, a judgment creditor must take additional steps ‐‐ such as securing a turnover order or an execution levy ‐‐ to prevent intervening parties from attaining higher priority. See Aspen Indus., 52 N.Y.2d at 580.
A court ʺmay grant summary relief where there are no questions of fact, but ʹit must conduct a trial on disputed issues of fact on adverse claims in a turnover matter.ʹʺ HBE Leasing Corp. v. Frank, 48 F.3d 623, 633 (2d Cir. 1995) (quoting General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Norstar Bank of Hudson Valley, 549 N.Y.S.2d 862, 863 (3d Depʹt 1989)); see also Port of New York Auth. v. 62 Cortlandt St. Realty Co., 18 N.Y.2d 250, 255 (1966) (standards of summary judgment apply to special proceedings); Gonzalez v. City of New York, 8 N.Y.S.3d 290, 291 (1st Depʹt 2015) (ʺIt is settled that a special proceeding is subject to the same standards and rules of decision as apply on a motion for summary judgment, requiring the court to decide the matter ʹupon the pleadings, papers and admissions to the extent that no triable issues of fact are raised.ʹʺ (citations omitted)). In general, a hearing is required to fix damages where it is unclear what amount in a garnisheeʹs possession is the property of the judgment debtor and available to satisfy the judgment. See Nardone, 336 N.Y.S.2d at 327. Absent a
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factual issue concerning damages, however, a hearing is not required. See, e.g., Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 549 N.Y.S.2d at 863 (ʺAlthough a court may grant summary relief where there are no questions of fact in a special proceeding, it must conduct a trial on disputed issues of fact on adverse claims in a turnover matter.ʺ (citing N.Y. C.P.L.R. §§ 409(b), 5225(b), 5239)); Michigan Assocs. v. Emigrant Sav. Bank, 345 N.Y.S.2d 329, 336 (Civ. Ct. 1973) (determining damages without any hearing because ʺthere is no issue of fact concerning damagesʺ).
B. Application To recover damages for Garnisheesʹ violation of the Restraining Notices, CSX had to demonstrate that the ʺproperty of the judgment debtor [Emjay] was available to satisfy the judgment at the time the restraining notice was in effect.ʺ Aspen Indus., 52 N.Y.2d at 581. In other words, CSX had to demonstrate that Garnisheesʹ debt to Emjay was available to satisfy CSXʹs judgment. Garnisheesʹ debt to Emjay, in turn, had to be assessed in light of the priority of Emjayʹs various creditors pursuant to C.P.L.R. § 5234 ‐‐ because if other creditors had superior claims to the restrained funds before Garnishees violated the Restraining Notices, then CSX did not suffer damages.
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Here, the district court recognized that the Restraining Notices did not confer priority and that priority creditors were entitled to be paid first. After reviewing the timeline of judgments and executions, the district court concluded that only Crescimanni served an execution before the state courtʹs February 26, 2015 settlement order that ʺgrant[ed] him a superior right.ʺ Sp. App. 28. Therefore, the district court found, ʺeven if the Court preserved the $2.2 million settlement figure and offset Crescimanniʹs $402,013.83 judgment, the Garnishees would have had $1,797,986.17 left over to satisfy CSXʹs $1,056,444.15 judgment.ʺ Sp. App. 27. The district court concluded that ʺGarnishees have not raised any issues of factʺ and that it ʺneed not hold a hearing to determine the proper judgment amount.ʺ Sp. App. 33. The district court subsequently declined in its discretion to recognize new evidence from Garnishees demonstrating that ELS had actually served its execution on November 5, 2014 ‐‐ not March 10, 2015 ‐‐ thereby also granting ELS higher priority.
We conclude that, at a minimum, the partiesʹ submissions and the record demonstrate a lack of clarity as to the order of priority of judgment creditors, precluding the district courtʹs grant of summary relief to CSX.
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At the time of judgment, the order of priority was unclear. The record shows that, during state court proceedings on February 24, 2015, the participating judgment creditors ‐‐ including Crescimanni, ELS and Sullivan Gardner ‐‐ indicated that they believed, ʺ[w]ithout fixing the priorities in any way between us, we all had a higher priority than CSX.ʺ App. 190. CSXʹs counsel was informed of the competing judgment creditorsʹ views as to priority. Id. at 191. On June 26, 2015, Garnishees alleged in their opposition to CSXʹs turnover motion that ʺother than serving its Restraining Notices, CSX did nothing to enforce its judgment and, unlike Emjayʹs other creditors whose claims have a priority position, took no steps whatsoever to create or perfect an enforceable lien.ʺ Id. at 125. On the other hand, CSX never asserted that it had a higher priority than any of the other creditors, and in fact even now suggests that priority is not relevant to damages. We reject CSXʹs argument because, as noted above, damages cannot be assessed without delineating the relative priority of judgment creditors.
The district court did not consider priorities when it invited CSX to apply for a judgment for damages in its initial turnover order. It did correctly recognize the importance of priority in its subsequent order denying Garnisheesʹ
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motion for reconsideration. But the district courtʹs final reasoning suggests that, had it possessed a complete picture of the relevant players and priorities before judgment, it might have reached a different outcome. And while the district court rejected as untimely Garnisheesʹ submission regarding the correct date of ELSʹs execution, a hearing would have given Garnishees the opportunity to present this evidence.
Failure to resolve these factual issues before summarily awarding damages to CSX was an abuse of discretion. Therefore, we vacate that portion of the district courtʹs judgment and orders holding CSX liable for $1,056,444.15 in damages, and remand with instructions for the district court to hold a hearing to resolve factual issues concerning damages including, but not limited to, the order of priority of judgment creditors. During the hearing, the district court should, at minimum, revisit the two factual issues that Garnishees raised in their letter motion to alter the judgment.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, we AFFIRM IN PART, VACATE IN PART, and REMAND the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.