Rel: June 12, 2026
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published in Southern Reporter.
ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS OCTOBER TERM, 2025-2026 _________________________
CL-2025-1038 _________________________
A.Q.
v.
Cullman County Department of Human Resources _________________________
CL-2025-1060 _________________________
C.S.Q.
Cullman County Department of Human Resources
Appeals from Cullman Juvenile Court (JU-24-344.02) CL-2025-1038 and CL-2025-1060
FRIDY, Judge.
A.Q. ("the mother") and C.S.Q. ("the father") appeal from a
judgment of the Cullman Juvenile Court ("the juvenile court")
terminating their parental rights to their child, C.Q. ("the child"). For the
reasons set forth herein, we reverse the judgment.
Background
The Cullman County Department of Human Resources ("DHR")
filed in the juvenile court a petition seeking the termination of the
mother's and the father's parental rights on September 19, 2025, more
than sixteen months after it took custody of the child. The juvenile court
scheduled a trial on the petition for December 3, 2025. On December 2,
2025, the father filed a motion asking the juvenile court to order his
transport from the Cullman County detention facility so that he could
attend the December 3, 2025, trial. As grounds for his request, the father
argued that the termination of parental rights is "one of the most serious
matters a parent can face" and that his "right to be present at the trial
should not be compromised." There is no written order pertaining to the
father's motion to transport, but, at the outset of the trial, the juvenile
court noted for the record that it had denied that motion. The father was
2 CL-2025-1038 and CL-2025-1060
not present for the trial; however, he was represented by counsel at the
trial.
Kindal Beach, a DHR investigation supervisor, testified at the trial
that DHR first became involved with the family when the child was born
in November 2022 because the mother tested positive for THC. Beach
said that DHR did not intervene then, however, because the mother
reported that she was using delta-8, a psychoactive cannabinoid; the
hospital staff did not have any concerns about the parents' behavior at
the hospital; and the child's drug screen was negative.
In April 2024, about sixteen months after the child was born, DHR
received a report from Hanceville law-enforcement officials that a female
was heard screaming in the parents' apartment complex. Once officials
were able to open the door to the parents' apartment, they saw that the
mother had red marks around her neck and throat. Beach testified that
the parents gave several explanations for the red marks, saying that they
were the result of a sexual encounter, that the mother made the marks
herself, and that the father made the marks while he was trying to calm
the mother during a "mental-health episode." Law-enforcement officials
arrested the father and charged him with domestic violence; DHR took
3 CL-2025-1038 and CL-2025-1060
the child into its care pursuant to a safety plan. That evening, Beach said,
the person caring for the child under the safety plan noticed an abnormal
amount of bruising on the child and notified DHR. The child was returned
to DHR the next morning, Beach said, because his caretakers said that
he had cried all night and they could not handle him. After a shelter-care
hearing, the child was placed in foster care. Beach said that, when the
child first entered foster care, DHR workers were concerned because of
the mother's mental-health issues. The mother reported that she was
using marijuana to help her sleep and that she was not treating her
bipolar disorder.
Stephanie Tate, a DHR foster-care worker, testified that she
worked with the parents from April 2024 until July 2025 to try to reunify
them with the child, who was three years old at the time of the trial. She
said that DHR tried to assist the parents with sobriety, attempted to have
them participate in drug screens, located services that it believed could
benefit the parents, and provided psychological evaluations and
supervised visitation to the parents. While Tate was working with them,
the parents participated in the psychological evaluations but did not
avail themselves of the other services DHR offered. They did participate
4 CL-2025-1038 and CL-2025-1060
in visitation, however, and Tate said that, after she had had a few
conversations with the parents, they began bringing appropriate foods
for the child. During the visits, Tate said, the parents struggled with the
child's temper. She said that she knew that they loved the child, but, she
said, when the child had a "meltdown," the father especially would start
using loud language and cuss. On one occasion in April 2025, Tate said,
the foster parent had to intervene to calm the child down because both
parents were frustrated.
Tate said that, toward the end of her time working with the parents,
her communication with them was limited. She said that the parents took
only two or three drug screens while she worked with them and that, in
April 2025, they refused the last drug screen she asked them to take. Of
the drug screens the parents took, Tate said, all of them were positive for
THC and methamphetamine "at higher levels," and the father also tested
positive for morphine, suboxone, and other drugs. Tate testified that, in
August 2025, she told the mother that the mother had failed a drug
screen and that the mother initially told her that it was because she used
hemp shampoo. The mother then told Tate that, on the night the child
was removed from her care, she and a neighbor had smoked marijuana
5 CL-2025-1038 and CL-2025-1060
and that that was probably why she had had a positive drug screen. The
father was open with Tate about his drug use.
Tate said that, after working with the parents for about fifteen
months, they had not shown any improvement toward resolving their
issues with drug use, unstable housing, and unstable employment and
could not maintain reliable transportation. Therefore, she said, DHR
believed that the child was at an increased risk of neglect and harm. After
April 2025, Tate said, she did not hear anything more from the parents.
She said that the parents' telephones "were on and off," that there was
no home address where DHR could send letters to them, and that the
parents did not communicate with DHR.
The mother testified that, when DHR had become involved with the
family, they were being evicted "due to poor choices and a lousy husband."
Tate said that, when she started working with the family, they were
homeless; they moved into a hotel in August 2024 and lived there until
December 2024, when they were evicted for nonpayment and once again
became homeless. After December 2024, Tate said, the mother and the
father lived with two individuals who DHR knew had a history of drug
6 CL-2025-1038 and CL-2025-1060
use. She said that March 2025 was the last time that she had "decent
communication" with the parents.
Tate said that the mother, who had a history of mental illness, was
not caring for her mental-health needs and was not seeking any
psychiatric care or treatment. She said that the mother had told her that
she had attempted to obtain disability benefits for her mental-health
issues but had been denied. Tate said that she told the mother that if she
had been denied several times, she could perhaps obtain employment
that would allow her to have some stability and, toward that end,
suggested employment options within walking distance of the hotel
where the mother and the father lived. Because the mother and the
father had been evicted twice, Tate said, they had difficulty in securing
appropriate housing.
Tate said that the primary concerns DHR had with the parents
when she first began working with them were their instability, domestic-
violence and anger-management issues, and lack of protective capacity.
The parents took an anger-management course; however, Tate said, she
and a court-appointed special advocate each had completed the course in
six minutes by paying a fee and printing out a certificate. DHR asked the
7 CL-2025-1038 and CL-2025-1060
parents to take an anger-management course through DHR, but, Tate
said, they told her they had completed an eight-hour course, and the
father told her that " '[he] moved the mouse. ' " Apparently, the program
shut off if the participant did not move the computer mouse, Tate said.
The father was honest about having anger problems, Tate said, but he
told her that the mother caused most of his anger. Tate said that the
father told her that he did not believe that he needed to treat his anger
issues and that his anger with the mother and with his former wife "were
simply their faults." She said that the father also became frustrated with
the child for little things like his inability to figure out a safety belt. Tate
said that, at the time of the trial, aside from the services that the parents
had not participated in, she did not know of any other services that DHR
could offer to the parents to help them with reunification efforts.
Tate testified that, when the child entered foster care, he was
behind developmentally, socially, and emotionally. For example, she said,
the child was not very mobile and was unable to communicate. The
parents had provided the child with "food pouches" instead of actual food,
Tate said, so he had difficulty swallowing at first. DHR placed the child
in early intervention and occupational therapy; he also participated in a
8 CL-2025-1038 and CL-2025-1060
speech evaluation, and, in February 2025, he began play therapy. By the
December 5, 2025, trial, she said, the child had finished physical therapy
and occupational therapy, had learned how to eat, and had made progress
in his speech and his ability to play. Melissa Welch, the DHR social
worker who began working with the family in July 2025, when Tate
stopped working with them, testified that the child did not have any
emotional or physical limitations that would prevent him from being
adoptable.
Dr. Barry Wood, a clinical psychologist, performed psychological
evaluations on the mother and the father in January 2025. He said that
his evaluation of the father indicated that he was "subject to features" of
antisocial personality disorder and narcissistic personality disorder,
which, he said, are resistant to treatment. He also noted that the father
admitted to having a history of substance abuse. Dr. Wood testified that
his immediate concern regarding the father was his use of cannabis and
that his long-term concern was the personality disorder. Those concerns,
he said, gave him pause about the father's ability to safely care for a
young child. Dr. Wood said that he recommended that the father comply
with mandates DHR imposed, which, he said, the father told him
9 CL-2025-1038 and CL-2025-1060
included an evaluation by mental-health professionals, participating in
random drug screens, and maintaining adequate housing and
employment. Dr. Wood also recommended that the father complete, at
the least, an outpatient substance-abuse program. Tate said that the
father did not follow through with DHR on Dr. Wood's recommendations.
Dr. Wood said that the mother reported a history of depression and
anxiety as well as bipolar disorder and that she attempted to self-
medicate by smoking marijuana. He recommended that she stop
marijuana use and seek psychiatric help. He also said that, in addition
to her substance use and bipolar disorder, he could not rule out the
possibility that she suffered from a personality disorder. He diagnosed
her with cannabis-use disorder, bipolar disorder, and an unspecified
personality disorder. He said that he recommended that the mother
comply with DHR's mandates, including compliance with random drug
screens, completion of anger-management training and parenting
training, and participation in a substance-abuse evaluation and a
psychotropic-medication evaluation. He also recommended that the
mother be told that if she continued to have issues related to substance
10 CL-2025-1038 and CL-2025-1060
abuse, such as a positive drug screen or other problems, she would be
required to complete a substance-abuse-treatment program.
Welch testified that, at the mother's most recent drug screen in
September 2025, the mother had tested positive for marijuana,
amphetamine, and methamphetamine; the levels for amphetamine and
methamphetamine were both relatively high, she said. Welch said that,
at an individualized-service-plan ("ISP") meeting, the mother explained
to DHR that she had smoked marijuana with a friend and that "they
must have laced the marijuana."
Welch testified that, after she began working with the parents, the
mother had initially refused to take a drug screen, but, when Welch asked
her again, she agreed to submit to the screen, which came back positive
for drug use. Welch also said that the parents had not offered any
financial or material assistance toward the child's care since he entered
foster care. According to Welch, the father had been incarcerated
awaiting the outcome of criminal charges against him, and he had not
been involved in services or visits with the child since she had been
involved with the case. She said that the child needed permanency and
11 CL-2025-1038 and CL-2025-1060
stability and that, because of the amount of time the case had been open,
DHR was advocating for the termination of the parents' parental rights.
Welch testified that the mother was admitted to Bradford Health
Services ("Bradford") at the end of September 2025, the day after the last
ISP meeting, and completed a substance-abuse program there at the end
of October 2025. Tumika Noblett, a DHR employee, testified that, in
November 2025, the month before the trial, she had reached out to the
mother to obtain a records-release form from her so that DHR could
obtain her treatment records from Bradford. Welch said that, although
the mother had told her that she had put Noblett's name on the release
forms, neither she nor Noblett had received any documents from
Bradford as of the day of the trial. The mother testified that she had
talked with Bradford daily to try to get the paperwork that she needed to
complete to have her records released to DHR.
Noblett said that the mother had provided her with a new address
in Shelby County and had told her that she had applied to work as a
delivery driver for Amazon, an online retailer. Welch testified that the
mother told her that she was staying with her former husband in
Alabaster, but Welch stated that she had not been to that residence.
12 CL-2025-1038 and CL-2025-1060
Later in November, Noblett said, the mother contacted her to tell her that
she had gotten the job with Amazon, so she would be unable to participate
in future ISP meetings and in color-code drug testing. The mother told
Noblett that if DHR needed drug screens, it could get them from Amazon.
The mother testified that, in the three months leading up to the
trial, she had voluntarily entered rehabilitation at Bradford, which was
also treating her for bipolar disorder. Three weeks before the trial, the
mother said, she began working ten to twelve hours a day, five or six days
a week, delivering packages for Amazon; however, she later testified that
she worked twenty to thirty-five hours a week because she was still in
training. Digital pay information indicated that the mother earned
$20.50 an hour. After the first of the year, the mother said, she would
work as a dispatcher for the delivery trucks. The mother said that, in the
three months leading to the trial, she had abstained from alcohol and
drugs, had taken a drug screen for Amazon that had produced a negative
result, and had recently quit smoking cigarettes. The day of the trial was
her sixty-first day of sobriety, she said. The mother also testified that she
had a meeting scheduled in January 2026 with a lawyer to commence
divorce proceedings against the father, who, she said, had been a
13 CL-2025-1038 and CL-2025-1060
negative influence in her life. She said that "drugs and stupidity" caused
her to delay getting the help that she needed.
The mother said that, at the time of the trial, she lived with her
former husband and their nine-year-old child, whom they coparented.1
Her former husband testified that he was prepared to let the mother and
the child live with him for "an unlimited amount of time." The mother
said that she and her former husband divorced in June 2022, that, by
agreement, the former husband had "custodial guardianship" of their
child so that he could enroll her in school, and that they shared "joint
custody," although, she said, there was no court order involved and no
child support had been ordered. Her former mother-in-law, who had had
a stroke, also lived with the former husband. The mother said that she
had needed to move away from Cullman County because that was where
she would get high and where she had connections.
The mother testified that she believed that it was in the child's best
interest to be with her and the child's half sibling and to be surrounded
1The mother testified that her birthdate was April 25, 1999, and
that she was thirty-four years old. If that birthdate is correct, then, on December 3, 2025, the day of the trial, the mother would have been twenty-six years old. 14 CL-2025-1038 and CL-2025-1060
by family. She said that she stays in a room in the former husband's
house that is away from the family so that she and the child can reconnect
and she can parent the child without her former husband's involvement.
She said that she could provide for the child, and, when asked whether
she had heard that the child had some "delay issues," the mother
responded by describing the day-care facility where the child would
attend, noting that the child's older half sibling had gone there and was
in an advanced class for math and engineering.
When the child was first taken into foster care, Beach said, the
mother provided DHR with her sister's name as a possible relative
placement. However, a DHR worker recognized the sister from a previous
report, and DHR determined that the sister was not an appropriate
placement for the child. The mother did not provide DHR with any other
names of relatives at that time, Beach said. Tate testified that, when she
worked with the family, she sought out family resources for the child,
and, although she believed that she had identified some that were
appropriate, they had declined to serve in January 2025. The child's
maternal grandmother had a history with DHR, Tate said, and the
mother advised her that the maternal grandmother used drugs. The
15 CL-2025-1038 and CL-2025-1060
mother did not want the child placed with the maternal grandmother.
The mother also identified her former husband, J.C., as a possible
resource. When she contacted J.C., Tate said, he told her he was an
amputee and was unable to manage a toddler.
Tate said that the child's paternal grandmother was in poor health
and unable to care for the child and that she had a history with her own
children with DHR. The father's eighteen-year-old son was identified as
a relative resource, but he was denied because, Tate said, it was not
appropriate for an eighteen-year-old to take on caring for a two-year-old.
Additionally, Tate said, the father's eighteen-year-old son lived with his
own mother, who was the father's ex-wife, and she said that she did not
want the child in her home. The father's two siblings were appropriate,
Tate said, but one of the siblings reported that the father had threatened
to kill her in January 2025, and both siblings told DHR that they did not
feel safe bringing the child into their homes.
On cross-examination, Tate was asked whether the mother's
possible biological father, who lived in Kentucky, or her legal father had
been explored as possible relative resources. Tate said that she had not
seen any information regarding those two men. Welch testified that the
16 CL-2025-1038 and CL-2025-1060
mother had told her that she did not know whether the man in Kentucky
actually was her biological father, so, the mother said, they were going to
have a DNA test performed and she would notify Welch of the results.
Welch said that she could not reach out to the mother's possible biological
father until DHR had verified that he was a relative. The line of
questioning ended without Welch confirming whether the man in
Kentucky was, in fact, the mother's biological father. Welch said that the
mother had not told her about her legal father. The mother testified that
her possible biological father and his wife were willing to take in the child
and had purchased bedroom furniture for him.
On December 5, 2025, the juvenile court entered a judgment finding
that the mother and the father had failed to comply with DHR's
recommendations and had been unable to make improvements to their
situation. It also found that the child was in need of permanency and
stability. It found that clear and convincing evidence demonstrated that
the mother and the father were unable or unwilling to discharge their
responsibilities to and for the child and that their conduct or conditions
were unlikely to change in the foreseeable future. Finally, the juvenile
court found that there were no relative resources available who were
17 CL-2025-1038 and CL-2025-1060
appropriate for the child for either temporary or permanent placement.
Based on its findings, the juvenile court terminated the parental rights
of both the mother and the father and ordered that the child was freed
for adoption.
The mother and the father filed separate motions to alter, amend,
or vacate the judgment, which the juvenile court denied. They appealed
separately, and, on December 19, 2025, this court entered an order
consolidating the appeals.
Standard of Review
In reviewing a juvenile court's judgment terminating a parent's
parental rights, this court must determine whether the record contains
clear and convincing evidence to support the judgment. See J.H. v. Bibb
Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 261 So. 3d 1229, 1232 (Ala. Civ. App. 2018).
Clear and convincing evidence is " '[e]vidence that, when weighed against
evidence in opposition, will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm
conviction as to each essential element of the claim and a high probability
as to the correctness of the conclusion. ' " L.M. v. D.D.F., 840 So. 2d 171,
179 (Ala. Civ. App. 2002) (quoting § 6-11-20(b)(4), Ala. Code 1975). See
also Ex parte McInish, 47 So. 3d 767, 776 (Ala. 2008).
18 CL-2025-1038 and CL-2025-1060
Our task in reviewing a judgment terminating parental rights is
not to reevaluate the evidence but rather "to specifically consider
whether the juvenile court could have reasonably reached the conclusion
that it did." Ex parte Bodie, 377 So. 3d 1051, 1060 (Ala. 2022) (emphasis
omitted). When the juvenile court's findings are based upon ore tenus
evidence, we presume that those findings are correct unless they are
plainly and palpably wrong. See C.S.B. v. State Dep't of Hum. Res., 26
So. 3d 426, 429 (Ala. Civ. App. 2009); Ex parte T.V., 971 So. 2d 1, 9 (Ala.
2007). We review a juvenile court's conclusions of law de novo. See J.W.
v. C.B., 68 So. 3d 878, 879 (Ala. Civ. App. 2011).
Analysis
The mother first contends that the record does not contain clear and
convincing evidence that grounds for terminating her parental rights
existed or that her current conditions warranted the termination of her
parental rights. Instead, she argues, the evidence indicated that, at the
time of the trial, she had demonstrated "significant efforts" to adjust her
circumstances to resolve her substance-abuse problems and to be a
suitable custodian for the child. The father does not challenge the
juvenile court's finding that grounds existed for the termination of his
19 CL-2025-1038 and CL-2025-1060
parental rights; therefore, our analysis regarding this issue pertains only
to the mother.
A juvenile court may terminate a parent's parental rights if the
party seeking the termination proves, by clear and convincing evidence,
that (1) one of the grounds for termination specified in § 12-15-319(a),
Ala. Code 1975, exists and (2) no viable alternative to terminating the
parent's parental rights exists. See J.C.L. v. J.B.L., 370 So. 3d 254, 262
(Ala. Civ. App. 2022). Under § 12-15-319(a), grounds for terminating
parental rights exist if clear and convincing evidence supports a finding
that the parents "are unable or unwilling to discharge their
responsibilities to and for the child, or that the conduct or condition of
the parents renders them unable to properly care for the child and that
the conduct or condition is unlikely to change in the foreseeable future."
The statute provides a list of thirteen nonexhaustive factors a court
should consider in determining whether grounds exist for terminating
parental rights. Among those factors are evidence of a parent's mental
illness or "excessive use of alcohol or controlled substances, of a duration
or nature as to render the parent unable to care for the needs of the child,"
§ 12-15-319(a)(2); that reasonable efforts by DHR to assist the parent
20 CL-2025-1038 and CL-2025-1060
toward reunification with the child have failed, § 12-15-319(a)(7); that
the parent has failed to provide for the material needs of the child, § 12-
15-319(a)(9); and that a parent has demonstrated a lack of effort to adjust
his or her circumstances to meet the needs of the child, § 12-15-
319(a)(12). From a timing standpoint, "the existence of evidence of
current conditions or conduct relating to a parent's inability or
unwillingness to care for his or her children is implicit in the requirement
that termination of parental rights be based on clear and convincing
evidence." D.O. v. Calhoun Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 859 So. 2d 439, 444
(Ala. Civ. App. 2003) (emphasis omitted).
The evidence, as previously outlined, indicates that the mother has
a history of mental illness that she was failing to treat, a history of
substance abuse, and a history of an inability to maintain steady housing
and employment. She also failed to provide any material support for the
child while the child was in foster care. However, as the mother points
out, in the three months leading up to the trial, she finally took the steps
toward reunification that DHR had been asking her to take since the
child was first taken into custody at least a year and a half earlier. She
had been employed for three weeks, had made plans to divorce the father,
21 CL-2025-1038 and CL-2025-1060
on whom she blamed a lot of her problems, and had moved in with her
former husband, who had custody of his and the mother's child. After the
last ISP meeting in September 2025, the mother sought treatment at
Bradford for her drug abuse, and, she said, she was also receiving
treatment for her mental illness through Bradford.
However, the evidence also indicated that she had abused illegal
drugs throughout the vast majority of the child's life; the mother used
drugs while she was pregnant with the child, and the results of her drug
screens while the child was in DHR's care indicated that she had
continued to take illegal drugs throughout the proceedings. She had been
sober only sixty-one days at the time of the trial, and that period included
the time that she was at Bradford. The juvenile court could have been
clearly convinced that, given the mother's history of drug use, sixty-one
days was not a sufficient time to ensure that the mother could remain
sober and successfully parent the child. Indeed, the juvenile court was
entitled to consider the mother's late attempts to cooperate with DHR "to
be merely unpersuasive, last-minute efforts intended only to forestall
termination rather than legitimate efforts by the mother to change her
circumstances." K.H. v. Madison Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 384 So. 3d
22 CL-2025-1038 and CL-2025-1060
641, 655 (Ala. Civ. App. 2023). See also A.M.F. v. Tuscaloosa Cnty. Dep't
of Hum. Res., 75 So. 3d 1206, 1213 (Ala. Civ. App. 2011); K.J. v. Pike
Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 275 So. 3d 1135, 1145 (Ala. Civ. App. 2018).
Based on the totality of the evidence, we cannot conclude that the juvenile
court's determination that grounds existed for the termination of the
mother's parental rights was plainly and palpably wrong.
The mother also contends that clear and convincing evidence does
not support the juvenile court's conclusion that the second prong
necessary to terminate her parental rights was met, that is, whether
clear and convincing evidence supported the juvenile court's
determination that no viable alternative to termination existed and that
termination would serve the best interests of the child.2 The mother more
2In its responsive brief, DHR contends that this issue was not preserved for appellate review. In its judgment, the juvenile court made limited factual findings, including that there were no viable alternatives to the termination of the parents' parental rights and that DHR had explored relative resources but had not found any that were appropriate. The mother filed a motion to alter, amend, or vacate in which she set forth a number of factual assertions. Although she never explicitly challenged the sufficiency of the evidence, she ended her motion with the statement that the judgment "should be reconsidered." Although this case presents a close question as to whether the issue was preserved, see New Props., L.L.C. v. Stewart, 905 So. 2d 797, 801-02 (Ala. 2004), we conclude that it was. 23 CL-2025-1038 and CL-2025-1060
specifically argues that, because DHR allegedly failed to present evidence
regarding whether an adoptive resource had been identified for the child
or whether the child was adoptable, the juvenile court erred in
terminating her parental rights. She contends that permanency through
adoption is an "essential element of DHR's case that must be proved"
before the juvenile court could properly terminate her parental rights.
The mother's brief at 27.
When DHR seeks to terminate a parent's parental rights, the
juvenile court must consider "whether the termination the government
seeks furthers a compelling governmental interest." M.P. v. DeKalb Cnty.
Dep't of Hum. Res., 394 So. 3d 1080, 1086 (Ala. Civ. App. 2023). "Such
compelling interests may include, for example, protecting children from
abuse and neglect and establishing stable and permanent home
environments for at-risk children." Id. Assuming the existence of a
compelling governmental interest, the question a court must answer next
is whether terminating the parent's parental rights is necessary to
advance that compelling interest, or, put another way, a court "must
consider whether the government seeks to advance its interest in a
24 CL-2025-1038 and CL-2025-1060
manner that infringes the parent's parental rights in the narrowest
manner possible." Id.
Here, the child's placement in foster care has protected him from
abuse and neglect at the hands of his parents, so the question that arises
is whether termination is necessary to support a different governmental
interest, such as establishing a stable and permanent home environment
for the child. Termination could be the narrowest way possible to advance
that interest if, by terminating the parents' parental rights, the state
could provide the child with a stable and permanent home environment
through adoption. However, if the evidence provides no basis for believing
that the child will not simply remain in foster care regardless of the
termination of the parents' parental rights, there would be no basis on
which to conclude that the government, by that termination, has
advanced a compelling interest. That appears to be the case here.
This case is similar to D.M. v. Dale County Department of Human
Resources, 413 So. 3d 750, 755-56 (Ala. Civ. App. 2024), in which this
court reversed judgments terminating the parents' parental rights after
determining that the Dale County Department of Human Resources ("the
Dale County DHR") had not demonstrated that the termination would
25 CL-2025-1038 and CL-2025-1060
lead to the permanency and stability that it was intended to achieve. In
D.M., the children at issue had special needs -- one child had asthma and
autism that affected his behavior and speech and the other child had been
diagnosed with anxiety -- which, we said, impeded their adoption
prospects. D.M., 413 So. 3d at 754. Additionally, the children's foster
mother testified that the children should be kept together because one of
them thrived when he was with his sibling. Id. In terminating the
parents' parental rights, the juvenile court in that case found, among
other things, that "it would be in the best interests of the children to
terminate the parental rights of the mother and the father so that the
children could be freed for adoption." Id.
In analyzing whether termination of the parents' parental rights
were in the children's best interests, we quoted from our opinion in J.A.
v. S.L., 406 So. 3d 129 (Ala. Civ. App. 2024), in which we wrote that, to
properly terminate a parent's parental rights, " ' at a minimum ' " the
juvenile court was to " ' f ocus on whether termination of the legal
relationship between the child and the parent will protect the welfare of
the child and promote the stability and permanency of the child.' " D.M.,
413 So. 3d at 755 (quoting J.A., 406 So. 3d at 140). We pointed out that
26 CL-2025-1038 and CL-2025-1060
the foster parents had not testified that they intended to adopt the
children and that the Dale County DHR had not presented evidence
indicating that it had identified any other adoptive resource or that the
children would likely be adopted. Id. Under those circumstances, we held,
"the juvenile court could not have reasonably determined that adoption
was a likely outcome for the children or that their permanency interests
would be advanced by termination of the mother's and the father's
parental rights." Id. at 756.
In this case, the juvenile court did not make a specific finding that
termination of the parents' parental rights would be in the best interests
of the child. It also made no specific finding that the child was adoptable.
In terminating the parents' parental rights, the juvenile court granted
DHR the authority to proceed with permanent plans and placement for
the child. However, our review of the record indicates that DHR failed to
present any evidence, including any ISPs, establishing a permanency
plan for the child. The child's foster parents did not testify, and no one
from DHR indicated that the foster parents intended to adopt the child
or that any other adoptive resource had been identified for the child.
27 CL-2025-1038 and CL-2025-1060
T.W. v. Calhoun County Department of Human Resources, 391 So.
3d 306 (Ala. Civ. App. 2023), involved the termination of parental rights
of the parents of one child who had been diagnosed with ADHD and
required medication for that disorder, as well as educational assistance,
and of a second child who had a speech impediment who required
biweekly therapy sessions. We found that, under the Department of
Human Resources regulations, the children qualified as special-needs
children, and the juvenile court in that case was required to consider
whether the children would likely achieve permanency through adoption.
Id. at 316 (citing Ala. Admin. Code (Dep't of Hum. Res.), r. 660-5-22-.06
(defining a special-needs child, for the purposes of subsidized adoption,
as, among other things, a child who is over five years of age; who is in a
group of two or more siblings seeking joint adoption; who has a physical
disability; or who is receiving ongoing medical treatment for an emotional
or behavioral issue)). We held that, under the circumstances, "it was
incumbent upon [the Calhoun County Department of Human Resources]
to present clear and convincing evidence of the viability of adoption so
that the juvenile court could make an informed evaluation and decision."
Id.
28 CL-2025-1038 and CL-2025-1060
In this case, at the time of the trial, the child had not completed
speech therapy and was still attending play therapy; thus, he may have
qualified as a child with special needs under Department of Human
Resources regulation 660-5-22-.06(2)(a)2.(ii) (describing a special-needs
child as a child who "has a known emotional disturbance/behavioral issue
that requires on-going treatment and that has been documented by a
mental health professional"). At the very least, the evidence
demonstrates that the child has an ongoing need for services. Welch
testified that the child was adoptable; however, she offered no basis for
her belief despite the undisputed evidence regarding the child's speech
limitations and his continued involvement in play therapy. In short, her
unsupported statement is merely conclusory, which does not rise to the
level of clear and convincing evidence. See Reid v. Jefferson Cnty., 672
So. 2d 1285, 1290 (Ala. 1995) (holding that statement in an affidavit that
a bridge hampered ingress to and egress from party's property was
conclusory and did not constitute substantial evidence). The lack of
evidence demonstrating the viability of adoption for the child, coupled
with the lack of the identification of an adoptive resource or even a
permanency plan for the child, leads us to conclude that the juvenile court
29 CL-2025-1038 and CL-2025-1060
did not have sufficient evidence from which to conclude that the child was
likely to achieve the permanency and stability that termination of the
mother's parental rights was intended to achieve, and, therefore, it could
not properly terminate those rights.
In his appellate brief, the father also challenged the juvenile court's
determination that there were no viable alternatives to the termination
of his parental rights, albeit on the general ground that DHR did not
perform due diligence in determining whether there existed a less
restrictive means than termination of his parental rights and his
contention that DHR workers were unaware whether certain relative
resources existed. In W.A. v. Calhoun County Department of Human
Resources, 211 So. 3d 849 (Ala. Civ. App. 2016), a juvenile court
terminated both the mother's and the father's parental rights. This court
reversed the portion of the judgment terminating the father's parental
rights after determining that the Calhoun County Department of Human
Resources ("the Calhoun County DHR") had failed to make reasonable
efforts to reunite the father and the child. Regarding the judgment
terminating the mother's parental rights, we observed that the Calhoun
County DHR was not under a duty to make reasonable efforts to reunite
30 CL-2025-1038 and CL-2025-1060
the mother and the child, which was apparently the issue the mother
raised on appeal. Id. at 853. However, because we had reversed the
judgment terminating the father's parental rights, we also reversed the
judgment terminating the mother's parental rights, explaining that "the
father may prove to be a suitable custodian who could supervise
visitation of the mother and the child, which would be a viable alternative
to terminating the mother's parental rights." Id. Here, if the mother's
circumstances continue to improve and she can later demonstrate the
stability DHR requests of her, she, too, may one day be a suitable
custodian for the child who could supervise visitation with the father.
Accordingly, the judgment terminating the parental rights of the
mother and the father must be reversed. Because we are reversing the
judgment, we pretermit discussion of the remaining issues the parents
assert in their respective briefs.
Conclusion
The record lacks sufficient evidence from which the juvenile court
could determine that the termination of the parents' parental rights was
likely to achieve the permanent and stable home for the child that the
termination was intended to achieve or that the termination was in the
31 CL-2025-1038 and CL-2025-1060
child's best interests. Therefore, we reverse the judgment terminating
the parents' parental rights, and we remand the case to that court to take
further action consistent with this opinion.
CL-2025-1038 -- REVERSED AND REMANDED.
CL-2025-1060 -- REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Moore, P.J., and Edwards and Hanson, JJ., concur.
Bowden, J., concurs in the result, without opinion.