Crystal Martin v. Woodlake Oaks Apartments
This text of Crystal Martin v. Woodlake Oaks Apartments (Crystal Martin v. Woodlake Oaks Apartments) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
Opinion issued April 15, 2025
In The
Court of Appeals For The
First District of Texas ———————————— NO. 01-24-00626-CV ——————————— CRYSTAL MARTIN, Appellant V. WOODLAKE OAKS APARTMENTS, Appellee
On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 2 Harris County, Texas Trial Court Case No. 1231165
MEMORANDUM OPINION
In this forcible-detainer action, appellant Crystal Martin appeals from the
county court’s judgment granting possession of certain real property to appellee,
Woodlake Oaks Apartments. We dismiss the appeal as moot. The only issue in a forcible-detainer action is the right to actual possession of
the subject property; “the merits of title shall not be adjudicated.” TEX. R. CIV. P.
510.3(e); see Wilhelm v. Fed. Nat. Mortg. Ass’n, 349 S.W.3d 766, 768 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, no pet.). Therefore, although the failure to supersede a
forcible-detainer judgment does not divest an appellant of the right to appeal, an
appeal from a forcible-detainer action becomes moot if the appellant is no longer in
possession of the property, unless the appellant holds and asserts “a potentially
meritorious claim of right to current, actual possession” of the property. Marshall v.
Housing Authority of the City of San Antonio, 198 S.W.3d 782, 786–87 (Tex. 2006);
see Wilhelm, 349 S.W.3d at 768; Gallien v. Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp., No. 01-
07-00075-CV, 2008 WL 4670465, at *2–4 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Oct. 23,
2008, pet. dism’d w.o.j.) (mem. op.).
The record reflects that appellant did not supersede the judgment and that
appellant no longer has possession of the property at issue in the underlying forcible
detainer action. On March 18, 2025, this Court issued a letter informing appellant
that the record indicated that the appeal is moot because appellee now has possession
of the subject property. We requested that appellant file a response to whether the
appeal was moot. Appellant did not respond, and therefore, has failed to assert a
potentially meritorious claim of right to current, actual possession of the property.
See Marshall, 198 S.W.3d at 787; Wilhelm, 349 S.W.3d at 768; Soza v. Fed. Home
2 Loan Mortg. Corp., No. 01-11-00568-CV, 2013 WL 3148616, at *1 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] June 18, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.) (stating that appellant who
failed to respond to appellee’s motion to dismiss had failed to assert potentially
meritorious claim of right to current, actual possession).
Accordingly, we vacate the trial court’s judgment and dismiss the case as
moot. See Marshall, 198 S.W.3d at 785, 787, 790 (when case becomes moot on
appeal, appellate court must set aside trial court judgment and dismiss case);
Wilhelm, 349 S.W.3d at 769; Bey v. ASD Fin., Inc., No. 05-14-00534-CV, 2014 WL
4180933, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 11, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.) (dismissing
appeal of forcible detainer action as moot because appellant no longer possessed
property at issue); TEX. R. APP. P. 42.3(c). We dismiss all other pending motions as
moot.
PER CURIAM Panel consists of Chief Justice Adams and Justices Gunn and Guiney.
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