Crystal Biton v. United States

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
• Decided: May 5, 2026
• Docket: 25-3055
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

DLD-118 NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ___________

No. 25-3055 ___________

CRYSTAL BITON; DANIELLE BITON, Appellants

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE; INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE; UNITED AIRLINES; UNITED CONTINENTAL AIRLINES; HSBC; MORGAN MELHUISH & ABRUTYN; EASTBANK; NEW YORK & NEW JERSEY PORT AUTHORITY; KEVIN MCKIRGAN; KATHLEEN CARLA ALEXANDER; ELIZABETH HARRIS; BANK OF AMERICA; CHASE JPMORGAN; NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT; NORTH MIAMI POLICE; BURGER KING; MCDONALDS CORP.; CHICAGO INSURANCE CO. ____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey (D.C. Civil Action No. 2:24-cv-11458) District Judge: Honorable Claire C. Cecchi ____________________________________

Submitted for Possible Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 April 23, 2026 Before: RESTREPO, PORTER, and MONTGOMERY-REEVES, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: May 5, 2026) _________

OPINION* _________

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. PER CURIAM

Crystal and Danielle Biton, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, appeal from

the District Court’s order dismissing their complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Because this appeal does not present a substantial question, we will

summarily affirm.

In December 2024, the Appellants filed a complaint in the District Court against

various governmental and private entities and individuals, including, inter alia, the

Department of Justice, the Internal Revenue Service, United Airlines, Bank of America,

The New York Police Department, and McDonald’s. They invoked federal-question

jurisdiction, citing the Bill of Rights, the Sarbanes Oxley Act, and “disability human

rights” and purported to assert claims for identity theft; due process violations; denial of

medical care; theft of property; stalking; “illegal[] attack by two Police lawyers,” causing

“serious physical injuries”; exposure to “harmful chemicals;” and deprivation of

“healthcare, employment, Bill of Rights, FDIC, SOX, [and] Americans Disability

Rights.” Compl. 2–4; ECF No. 1.

The District Court, having granted Appellants permission to proceed in forma

pauperis, screened the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and concluded

that they had not stated a plausible claim for relief. Therefore, the District Court

dismissed it. Appellants appealed.

2 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.1 We review de novo an order

dismissing a complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). See Allah v. Seiverling, 229

F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000). In order to survive dismissal, “a complaint must contain

sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its

face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).

We may summarily affirm if an appeal fails to present a substantial question. See 3d Cir.

L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.

The District Court properly dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim

under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). While pro se pleadings should be liberally construed and held

to less stringent standards than those prepared by attorneys, see Estelle v. Gamble, 429

U.S. 97, 106 (1976), pro se litigants “still must allege sufficient facts in their complaints

to support a claim,” Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013).

Even liberally construed, Appellants’ complaint does not contain enough facts to show

that their claims are plausible. For example, as the District Court explained, although

they seek the return of their property, they do not mention what property was seized,

when it was seized, or by whom. Similarly, although they assert that they were victims

of identity theft, they do not state how they were victimized or identify which defendants

1 By filing a notice of appeal rather than amending within the sixty-day period the District Court provided, Appellants stood on their complaint. We therefore have appellate jurisdiction. See Berke v. Bloch, 242 F.3d 131, 135–36 (3d Cir. 2001); Batoff v. State Farm Ins. Co., 977 F.2d 848, 851 n.5 (3d Cir. 1992); Borelli v. City of Reading, 532 F.2d 950, 952 (3d Cir. 1976) (per curiam).

3 are responsible. Because the complaint did not contain sufficient factual matter to state

any plausible claims, the District Court properly dismissed it under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

Accordingly, we will summarily affirm. All pending motions are denied.