United States Court of Appeals For the First Circuit
No. 23-2011
REYNALDO CRUZ,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
UNIÓN INDEPENDIENTE AUTÉNTICA DE LOS EMPLEADOS DE LA AUTORIDAD DE ACUEDUCTOS Y ALCANTARILLADOS; PUERTO RICO AQUEDUCT AND SEWER AUTHORITY; JENNIFFER A. GONZÁLEZ-COLÓN, in her official capacity as Governor of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico,*
Defendants, Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Pedro A. Delgado-Hernández, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Barron, Chief Judge, Thompson and Gelpí, Circuit Judges.
Matthew B. Gilliam, with whom Milton L. Chappell, Ángel J. Valencia, Veronica Ferraiuoli-Hornedo, National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation, Inc., and Estudio Legal Ferraiuoli, PSC were on brief, for appellant. José-Enrico Valenzuela-Alvarado, with whom Mariangeli Mercado-Torres and Valenzuela-Alvarado, LLC were on brief, for appellee Unión Independiente Auténtica de los Empleados de la Autoridad de Acueductos y Alcantarillados.
* Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 43(c)(2), Governor Jenniffer A. González-Colón is automatically substituted for former Governor Pedro R. Pierluisi-Urrutia. Alberto Tabales-Maldonado, with whom Erika Berríos Berríos, Lady E. Cumpiano, and Schuster LLC were on brief, for appellee Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Authority. Francisco J. González-Magaz, with whom Omar Andino Figueroa, Solicitor General of Puerto Rico, and Francisco González P.S.C. were on brief, for appellee Jenniffer A. González-Colón, in the official capacity as Governor of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.
July 24, 2026 BARRON, Chief Judge. In this appeal, Reynaldo Cruz asks
that we vacate and reverse the order and judgment of the United
States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico dismissing
his claims as moot. In our prior opinion in this appeal, we
rejected the bulk of Cruz's arguments challenging the District
Court's ruling. See Cruz v. Unión Independiente Auténtica de los
Empleados de la Autoridad de Acueductos y Alcantarillados
(Cruz I), 161 F.4th 11, 16 (1st Cir. 2025). We left open the
question, however, of whether Cruz could challenge that ruling on
one basis that the District Court had not reached, and we remanded
for further proceedings while retaining jurisdiction over the
appeal. Id. at 16-17. The District Court issued a ruling on
remand, and we now affirm.
I.
We recount the travel of the case to the extent necessary
to provide context regarding the outstanding issue on appeal.
In the complaint that Cruz filed in federal court in the
District of Puerto Rico, Cruz alleged violations of his
constitutional rights by his employer, the Puerto Rico Aqueduct
and Sewer Authority ("PRASA"); Unión Independiente Auténtica de
los Empleados de la Autoridad de Acueductos y Alcantarillados
("UIA"), of which Cruz was formerly a member; and Jenniffer A.
González-Colón ("Governor"), in the official capacity as Governor
- 3 - of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico1 (collectively, the
"defendants"). Id. at 13. Specifically, Cruz objected to the
withholding from his pay of union dues used for "political,
ideological, and other nonbargaining expenditures," and he
contended that such withholding -- and the Puerto Rico law and
collective bargaining agreement authorizing the
withholding -- violated the First Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution. Id. at 13-14. The complaint sought declaratory and
injunctive relief, restitution, compensatory and nominal damages,
and costs and attorneys' fees. Id. at 14.
While Cruz's suit was pending, the Supreme Court of the
United States decided Janus v. American Federation of State,
County, and Municipal Employees, 585 U.S. 878 (2018). PRASA
thereafter stopped deducting union fees from Cruz's pay and
explained that it did so in compliance with an Opinion Letter
issued by the Puerto Rico Secretary of Justice concluding that,
under Janus, unauthorized union fee deductions were
unconstitutional. Cruz I, 161 F.4th at 14. For its part, UIA
filed a motion with the District Court under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 67 that sought leave to deposit with the District Court
the full amount of compensatory damages Cruz sought, plus interest
1 Jenniffer A. González-Colón was automatically substituted for the former Governor of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 43(c)(2).
- 4 - and nominal damages. Id. The District Court requested that UIA's
deposit be "unconditionally tendered," and UIA subsequently
deposited funds in compliance with that order. Id. at 15.
The District Court thereafter issued an order in which
it dismissed all of Cruz's claims as moot. Id. As relevant here,
the District Court held that Cruz's request for declaratory relief
was moot because the challenged conduct had ceased, and that his
request for damages was moot because UIA had deposited with the
court "the amount corresponding to union dues and fees deducted
from [Cruz]'s wages."2 Id.
Cruz then filed a motion asking the District Court to
alter and amend its judgment under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 59(e). Id. In that motion, he requested that the court
enter "a declaratory judgment . . . adjudicating his legal claims
and entitlement to the UIA deposit." Id. The District Court
denied the motion, explaining that UIA "deposited the money that
[Cruz] requested" and that "the money is [Cruz's] for the asking."
Id. (second alteration in original).
Cruz timely appealed. Id.
On appeal, Cruz asked us to vacate the District Court's
order dismissing his claims as moot and direct the District Court
to enter judgment in his favor. Id. at 15-16. In his briefing to
2 The District Court also ruled that Cruz's request for injunctive relief was moot; Cruz did not appeal that ruling.
- 5 - our Court, Cruz argued that he was unable to access the funds UIA
had deposited with the District Court absent a declaratory judgment
in his favor on the merits of his claims. Id. at 16. We rejected
this "lead argument" by Cruz for challenging the District Court's
mootness determination, explaining that the District Court's
ruling entitled him to the funds he sought. Id.
We noted, however, that Cruz had also asserted at oral
argument that his request for declaratory relief was not moot
because, absent a declaration that his First Amendment rights had
been violated, "he may be unable to seek 'prevailing party'
attorneys' fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988." Id.
Because the District Court had "not address[ed] the prevailing
party issue below or how it might bear on the mootness issue," we
remanded to the District Court for consideration of that question,
while retaining jurisdiction over the appeal. Id. at 16-17.
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United States Court of Appeals For the First Circuit
No. 23-2011
REYNALDO CRUZ,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
UNIÓN INDEPENDIENTE AUTÉNTICA DE LOS EMPLEADOS DE LA AUTORIDAD DE ACUEDUCTOS Y ALCANTARILLADOS; PUERTO RICO AQUEDUCT AND SEWER AUTHORITY; JENNIFFER A. GONZÁLEZ-COLÓN, in her official capacity as Governor of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico,*
Defendants, Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Pedro A. Delgado-Hernández, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Barron, Chief Judge, Thompson and Gelpí, Circuit Judges.
Matthew B. Gilliam, with whom Milton L. Chappell, Ángel J. Valencia, Veronica Ferraiuoli-Hornedo, National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation, Inc., and Estudio Legal Ferraiuoli, PSC were on brief, for appellant. José-Enrico Valenzuela-Alvarado, with whom Mariangeli Mercado-Torres and Valenzuela-Alvarado, LLC were on brief, for appellee Unión Independiente Auténtica de los Empleados de la Autoridad de Acueductos y Alcantarillados.
* Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 43(c)(2), Governor Jenniffer A. González-Colón is automatically substituted for former Governor Pedro R. Pierluisi-Urrutia. Alberto Tabales-Maldonado, with whom Erika Berríos Berríos, Lady E. Cumpiano, and Schuster LLC were on brief, for appellee Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Authority. Francisco J. González-Magaz, with whom Omar Andino Figueroa, Solicitor General of Puerto Rico, and Francisco González P.S.C. were on brief, for appellee Jenniffer A. González-Colón, in the official capacity as Governor of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.
July 24, 2026 BARRON, Chief Judge. In this appeal, Reynaldo Cruz asks
that we vacate and reverse the order and judgment of the United
States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico dismissing
his claims as moot. In our prior opinion in this appeal, we
rejected the bulk of Cruz's arguments challenging the District
Court's ruling. See Cruz v. Unión Independiente Auténtica de los
Empleados de la Autoridad de Acueductos y Alcantarillados
(Cruz I), 161 F.4th 11, 16 (1st Cir. 2025). We left open the
question, however, of whether Cruz could challenge that ruling on
one basis that the District Court had not reached, and we remanded
for further proceedings while retaining jurisdiction over the
appeal. Id. at 16-17. The District Court issued a ruling on
remand, and we now affirm.
I.
We recount the travel of the case to the extent necessary
to provide context regarding the outstanding issue on appeal.
In the complaint that Cruz filed in federal court in the
District of Puerto Rico, Cruz alleged violations of his
constitutional rights by his employer, the Puerto Rico Aqueduct
and Sewer Authority ("PRASA"); Unión Independiente Auténtica de
los Empleados de la Autoridad de Acueductos y Alcantarillados
("UIA"), of which Cruz was formerly a member; and Jenniffer A.
González-Colón ("Governor"), in the official capacity as Governor
- 3 - of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico1 (collectively, the
"defendants"). Id. at 13. Specifically, Cruz objected to the
withholding from his pay of union dues used for "political,
ideological, and other nonbargaining expenditures," and he
contended that such withholding -- and the Puerto Rico law and
collective bargaining agreement authorizing the
withholding -- violated the First Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution. Id. at 13-14. The complaint sought declaratory and
injunctive relief, restitution, compensatory and nominal damages,
and costs and attorneys' fees. Id. at 14.
While Cruz's suit was pending, the Supreme Court of the
United States decided Janus v. American Federation of State,
County, and Municipal Employees, 585 U.S. 878 (2018). PRASA
thereafter stopped deducting union fees from Cruz's pay and
explained that it did so in compliance with an Opinion Letter
issued by the Puerto Rico Secretary of Justice concluding that,
under Janus, unauthorized union fee deductions were
unconstitutional. Cruz I, 161 F.4th at 14. For its part, UIA
filed a motion with the District Court under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 67 that sought leave to deposit with the District Court
the full amount of compensatory damages Cruz sought, plus interest
1 Jenniffer A. González-Colón was automatically substituted for the former Governor of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 43(c)(2).
- 4 - and nominal damages. Id. The District Court requested that UIA's
deposit be "unconditionally tendered," and UIA subsequently
deposited funds in compliance with that order. Id. at 15.
The District Court thereafter issued an order in which
it dismissed all of Cruz's claims as moot. Id. As relevant here,
the District Court held that Cruz's request for declaratory relief
was moot because the challenged conduct had ceased, and that his
request for damages was moot because UIA had deposited with the
court "the amount corresponding to union dues and fees deducted
from [Cruz]'s wages."2 Id.
Cruz then filed a motion asking the District Court to
alter and amend its judgment under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 59(e). Id. In that motion, he requested that the court
enter "a declaratory judgment . . . adjudicating his legal claims
and entitlement to the UIA deposit." Id. The District Court
denied the motion, explaining that UIA "deposited the money that
[Cruz] requested" and that "the money is [Cruz's] for the asking."
Id. (second alteration in original).
Cruz timely appealed. Id.
On appeal, Cruz asked us to vacate the District Court's
order dismissing his claims as moot and direct the District Court
to enter judgment in his favor. Id. at 15-16. In his briefing to
2 The District Court also ruled that Cruz's request for injunctive relief was moot; Cruz did not appeal that ruling.
- 5 - our Court, Cruz argued that he was unable to access the funds UIA
had deposited with the District Court absent a declaratory judgment
in his favor on the merits of his claims. Id. at 16. We rejected
this "lead argument" by Cruz for challenging the District Court's
mootness determination, explaining that the District Court's
ruling entitled him to the funds he sought. Id.
We noted, however, that Cruz had also asserted at oral
argument that his request for declaratory relief was not moot
because, absent a declaration that his First Amendment rights had
been violated, "he may be unable to seek 'prevailing party'
attorneys' fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988." Id.
Because the District Court had "not address[ed] the prevailing
party issue below or how it might bear on the mootness issue," we
remanded to the District Court for consideration of that question,
while retaining jurisdiction over the appeal. Id. at 16-17.
On remand, the District Court concluded that Cruz had
not waived the issue of whether he was a "prevailing party," and
it went on to hold that Cruz qualified as a prevailing party as
against UIA. The District Court also held, however, that the
prevailing party issue had "no bearing on the general mootness
issue or this case's dismissal." The District Court pointed to
the "well-settled" rule that "a party's interest in recouping
attorney's fees does not create a stake in the outcome sufficient
- 6 - to resuscitate an otherwise moot controversy." Diffenderfer v.
Gómez-Colón, 587 F.3d 445, 452 (1st Cir. 2009).
We then issued an order asking the parties "to address
why this Court should not affirm the dismissal of all of Cruz's
claims as moot."
II.
The parties submitted supplemental briefs in response to
our order, and every party agrees that we should affirm the
District Court's dismissal of Cruz's claims as moot. Because
everyone agrees that the prevailing party issue does not bear on
mootness and thus that Cruz's claims are all moot, we affirm the
District Court's ruling dismissing the claims.
The parties do raise various other contentions in their
supplemental briefs to our Court, including whether the District
Court's prevailing party determination was in error and whether
the present case should be dismissed against certain defendants.
Because those questions lie beyond the bounds of the initial appeal
over which we retained jurisdiction and no party argues that the
resolution of those questions directly impacts the only question
before our Court, we leave them to another day should they come
before us.
III.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.
- 7 -