Cruz v. ICE Field Office Director

CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Washington
DecidedDecember 3, 2021
Docket2:21-cv-00855
StatusUnknown

This text of Cruz v. ICE Field Office Director (Cruz v. ICE Field Office Director) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Washington primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Cruz v. ICE Field Office Director, (W.D. Wash. 2021).

Opinion

1 2

3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 8 AT SEATTLE

9 10 TRINIDAD MARTINEZ CRUZ, CASE NO. C21-0855JLR 11 Petitioner, ORDER v. 12 ICE FIELD OFFICE DIRECTOR, 13 Respondent. 14

15 Before the court are: (1) the report and recommendation of Magistrate Judge J. 16 Richard Creatura (R&R (Dkt. # 6)) and Respondent Immigration and Customs 17 Enforcement (“ICE”) Field Office Director’s (“the Government”) objections thereto (Obj. 18 (Dkt. # 7)); and (2) the Government’s motion to dismiss (Resp. & MTD (Dkt. # 5)). 19 Having carefully reviewed all of the foregoing, along with all other relevant documents, 20 and the governing law, the court DECLINES to adopt the report and recommendation due 21 to the changed circumstances; DENIES pro se Petitioner Trinidad Martinez Cruz’s 28 22 // 1 U.S.C. § 2241 petition as moot; and DENIES the Government’s motion to dismiss as 2 moot.

3 In December 2019, ICE charged Mr. Cruz, a citizen of Mexico, with being 4 unlawfully present in the United States and took him into custody. (See R&R at 1-2.) 5 Although Mr. Cruz applied for relief from removal, an Immigration Judge denied all of 6 his applications for relief and ordered him removed to Mexico. (See Annett Decl. (Dkt. 7 # 5-1) ¶ 9; Pet. (Dkt. # 1) at 11 (“Order of Removal”).) Mr. Cruz appealed the 8 Immigration Judge’s decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals, who affirmed the

9 Immigration Judge and dismissed the appeal. (See Annett Decl. ¶ 10.) He then filed a 10 petition for review of the Immigration Judge’s decision with the Ninth Circuit Court of 11 Appeals, as well as a motion for a stay of removal. (See Annett Decl. ¶ 11); see also 12 Petition for Review and Motion to Stay, Cruz v. Garland, No. 20-73697 (9th Cir. Dec. 13 17, 2020), ECF No. 1. Mr. Cruz’s appeal triggered an automatic, temporary stay of

14 removal and he remained in detention while that appeal was ongoing pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 15 § 1226(a). (See R&R at 2-4; Annett Decl. ¶¶ 11-12 (stating that “[i]f Petitioner’s order of 16 removal becomes final and the stay is lifted, [the Government] will expeditiously remove 17 Petitioner to Mexico”).) 18 While Mr. Cruz’s Ninth Circuit appeal was pending, he petitioned this court for a

19 writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 seeking release from immigration 20 detention or a bond hearing. (See Pet. at 2.) The Government responded to Mr. Cruz’s 21 petition and moved to have his petition dismissed, arguing that his detention is lawful 22 pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 236 and 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and did not violate due process. (See 1 Resp. & MTD at 1-2, 7-11.) Magistrate Judge Creatura recommended that the court 2 grant in part and deny in part Mr. Cruz’s 28 U.S.C. § 2241 petition (Pet. (Dkt. # 1)) and

3 the Government’s motion to dismiss. (See R&R at 2.) Specifically, he recommended 4 that the court deny Mr. Cruz’s request for release, but grant Mr. Cruz’s request for a bond 5 hearing because procedural due process requires allowing him a bond hearing that 6 comports with the procedural requirements of Singh v. Holder, 638 F.3d 1196 (9th Cir. 7 2011). (See id. at 2.1) The Government objected to Magistrate Judge Creatura’s 8 recommendation that Mr. Cruz be afforded an additional bond hearing because it had

9 recently learned that Mr. Cruz had already received an additional bond hearing that 10 comported with the procedural requirements of Singh. (See generally Obj., Ex. A (Dkt. 11 # 5-2) (“September 8, 2021 Bond Order”).) 12 After Magistrate Judge Creatura issued his report, however, the Ninth Circuit 13 ruled on Mr. Cruz’s petition for review. See Order, Cruz, No. 20-73697 (9th Cir. Sept.

14 17, 2021), ECF No. 15; Mandate, Cruz, No. 20-73697 (9th Cir. Nov. 26, 2021), ECF No. 15 19. It denied both his petition and his motion for a stay of removal. See Order, Cruz, No. 16 20-73697 (9th Cir. Sept. 17, 2021), ECF No. 15. Because the Ninth Circuit has denied 17 the stay of removal and issued its mandate, Mr. Cruz’s detention is now governed not by 18 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), but by the mandatory 90-day detention set forth in 8 U.S.C.

19 § 1231(a)(2). See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(b) (noting that “[i]f the removal order is 20

21 1 At the time Magistrate Judge Creatura issued his report and recommendation, he was only aware that Mr. Cruz had been afforded one bond hearing in February 2020. (See R&R at 22 2-3 (citing Annett Decl. ¶¶ 5-8; Custody Order of the Immigration Judge (Dkt. # 5-4)).) 1 judicially reviewed and if a court orders a stay of the removal of the alien, the [removal 2 period begins on the] date of the court’s final order”); Muhamd v. ICE Field Off. Dir.,

3 No. C20-0605RAJ, 2020 WL 6318686, at *1 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 28, 2020). Section 4 1231(a)(2) mandates that, “[d]uring the [90-day] removal period, the Attorney General 5 shall detain the alien.” 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2); see also Khotesouvan v. Morones, 386 6 F.3d 1298, 1299–300 (9th Cir. 2004). (“Congress has mandated the detention of an alien 7 ordered removed for 90 days. . . .”); Arango Marquez v. I.N.S., 346 F.3d 892, 898 (9th 8 Cir. 2003) (“Detention during the removal period is mandatory.” (citing 8 U.S.C.

9 § 1231(a)(2)). Moreover, Mr. Cruz’s current detention under section 1231(a)(2) is 10 certainly constitutional. See Khotesouvan, 386 F.3d at 1301 (concluding that the 90-day 11 period of mandatory detention under § 1231(a)(2) “passes constitutional scrutiny”). 12 Thus, Mr. Cruz’s habeas petition—which solely addresses § 1226(c) and 13 § 1226(a)—is now moot. “If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter

14 jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12. “A federal court 15 lacks [subject-matter] jurisdiction to hear a case that is moot”—that is, where no live 16 controversy exists, and the plaintiff can no longer obtain relief for his claim. Bishop 17 Paiute Tribe v. Inyo Cty., 863 F.3d 1144, 1155 (9th Cir. 2017). Because Mr. Cruz’s 18 petition is now moot, the court no longer has subject-matter jurisdiction and must dismiss

19 this action sua sponte. 20 For the reasons stated above, the court: 21 (1) DECLINES to adopt the report and recommendation (Dkt. # 6) in light of the 22 changed circumstances; 1 (2) DENIES as moot Mr. Cruz’s 28 U.S.C. § 2241 petition (Dkt. # 1); 2 (3) DENIES as moot the Government’s motion to dismiss (Dkt. # 5);

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