Cruz-Lopez v. Blanche

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: July 14, 2026
• Docket: 22-1465
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUL 14 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

SANTOS GUILLERMO CRUZ LOPEZ, No. 22-1465 Agency No. Petitioner, A208-935-906 v. MEMORANDUM* TODD BLANCHE, Acting Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted July 10, 2026** Portland, Oregon

Before: GRABER, BERZON, and SUNG, Circuit Judges.

Petitioner Santos Guillermo Cruz Lopez, a native and citizen of Guatemala,

timely seeks review of a decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”)

dismissing his appeal of an immigration judge’s (“IJ”) order that denied his

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the

Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).1 “Because the BIA adopted and affirmed the

IJ’s decision here, we review both decisions.” Montejo-Gonzales v. Bondi, 166

F.4th 851, 854 (9th Cir. 2026) (en banc). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C.

§ 1252, and we deny the petition in part and grant it in part.

1. Petitioner failed to establish that “Guatemalans who cannot pay money to

the gangs” is a cognizable particular social group for purposes of withholding of

removal. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A); Conde Quevedo v. Barr, 947 F.3d 1238,

1242 (9th Cir. 2020) (stating standard of review). For a social group to be

cognizable, it must be “(1) composed of members who share a common immutable

characteristic, (2) defined with particularity, and (3) socially distinct within the

society in question.” Andrade v. Garland, 94 F.4th 904, 910 (9th Cir. 2024)

(citations omitted). As the agency explained, a person’s inability to make extortion

payments is not an immutable characteristic. See Plancarte Sauceda v. Garland, 23

F.4th 824, 833 (9th Cir. 2022) (“The critical requirement is that the defining

characteristic of the group be something that either cannot be changed or should

not be required to be changed in order to avoid persecution.” (citation modified)).

Petitioner has not challenged on appeal the IJ’s conclusion that his proposed group

1 Petitioner seeks review of the agency’s denials of his applications for withholding of removal and CAT protection but not its denial of his application for asylum.

2 22-1465 is not immutable, so he has forfeited any argument that his proposed social group

is cognizable. Hernandez v. Garland, 47 F.4th 908, 916 (9th Cir. 2022) (issues not

“specifically and distinctly” argued in the appellant’s opening brief are deemed

forfeited). Moreover, the record does not demonstrate that Guatemalan society, in

general, recognizes Petitioner’s proposed group as socially distinct. See Conde

Quevedo, 947 F.3d at 1242 (“Recognition of a group is determined by ‘the

perception of the society in question, rather than by the perception of the

persecutor.’” (citation omitted)).

2. Substantial evidence does not support the agency’s conclusion that

Petitioner failed to establish a nexus between his religion and his past persecution

and feared future persecution under the standards governing withholding of

removal. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(C); Rodriguez-Zuniga v. Garland, 69 F.4th

1012, 1018 (9th Cir. 2023) (stating standard of review); see also Barajas-Romero v.

Lynch, 846 F.3d 351, 360 (9th Cir. 2017) (holding that the “a reason” nexus

standard that applies to withholding of removal claims is “less demanding” than

the “one central reason” standard for asylum claims). Petitioner credibly testified

that, in 2006, four gang members who were armed with machetes approached him

as he was leaving his evangelical church. The gang members knew Petitioner by

name and told him that he should “not . . . go to church anymore because they

didn’t like religion,” that he had to pay them 300 quetzales each month, and that

3 22-1465 they would kill him if he kept going to church but failed to make the monthly

payments. Petitioner made monthly payments and continued going to church, but

one month after Petitioner missed one payment, the same four gang members

confronted him—again, as he was leaving church—and attacked him with their

machetes.

Although Petitioner’s assailants were clearly motivated by financial gain, the

record compels the conclusion that Petitioner’s religion was also “a reason

motivating the [gang] to target [him].” Rodriguez-Zuniga, 69 F.4th at 1019; see id.

at 1019 n.2 (“Our caselaw permits someone to establish a nexus when one of the

persecutor’s motivations is financial so long as another motivation . . . is based on

a victim’s protected characteristic.”); see also Ayala v. Sessions, 855 F.3d 1012,

1021 (9th Cir. 2017) (“[W]here the petitioner’s [protected ground] is at least ‘a

reason’ for the extortion, it is sufficient to meet the nexus requirement for

withholding of removal.”).

3. Substantial evidence supports the agency’s holding that Petitioner is not

eligible for CAT relief. See Uc Encarnacion v. Bondi, 156 F.4th 927, 935 (9th Cir.

2025) (stating standard of review). The record does not compel the conclusion that

any torture that Petitioner might experience in Guatemala at the hands of gang

members would occur with the acquiescence of a person acting in an official

capacity. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(1); Uc Encarnacion, 156 F.4th at 941; see also

4 22-1465 Andrade-Garcia v. Lynch, 828 F.3d 829, 836 (9th Cir. 2016) (“[A] general

ineffectiveness on the government’s part to investigate and prevent crime will not

suffice to show acquiescence.”).

Petition DENIED IN PART and GRANTED IN PART; REMANDED.

Respondent shall bear the costs on appeal.

5 22-1465