Cruz Cardenas v. Garland

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
DecidedJanuary 17, 2025
Docket23-2580
StatusUnpublished

This text of Cruz Cardenas v. Garland (Cruz Cardenas v. Garland) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Cruz Cardenas v. Garland, (9th Cir. 2025).

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JAN 17 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ANTONIO CRUZ CARDENAS, No. 23-2580

Petitioner, Agency No. A079-620-227

v. MEMORANDUM* MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Immigration Court

Submitted January 14, 2025** Pasadena, California

Before: GOULD and BENNETT, Circuit Judges, and EZRA,*** District Judge.

Antonio Cruz Cardenas (“Petitioner”) is a native and citizen of Mexico.

Petitioner illegally entered the United States in or around 1990, when he was

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). *** The Honorable David A. Ezra, United States District Judge for the District of Hawaii, sitting by designation. between seven and nine years old. On November 1, 2000, Petitioner was

convicted of first-degree murder in violation of California Penal Code § 187(a),

and sentenced to twenty-five years to life in prison. After serving twenty-five

years in state prison, Petitioner was paroled on July 27, 2023. Petitioner was then

transferred from the custody of the State of California to the custody of the

Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”), where he was placed in administrative

removal proceedings. DHS found Petitioner removable as a noncitizen convicted

of an aggravated felony and issued Petitioner a final administrative removal order

on August 11, 2023. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A) (defining murder as an

aggravated felony).

Because Petitioner expressed a fear of removal, an asylum officer

interviewed him on August 24, 2023. The asylum officer made a negative

reasonable fear finding. On August 29, 2023, the immigration court served

Petitioner, via his custodial officer, written notice that an immigration judge would

hold a hearing on September 7, 2023, to review the asylum officer’s negative

reasonable fear finding. However, in a written notice dated the same day, August

29, 2023, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”) ordered Petitioner

to appear before the same immigration court on September 12, 2023. USCIS

personally served Petitioner with this notice on an unknown date.

2 On September 7, 2023, still detained, Petitioner appeared before an

immigration judge as ordered by the immigration court. At this hearing, Petitioner

stated that he did not have a packet from his state parole hearing with him because

he thought the hearing was scheduled for September 12, 2023, as stated in his

USCIS notice. The immigration judge did not continue the hearing but told

Petitioner he could describe the documents in the packet and state how they

support his case. After hearing Petitioner’s arguments and reviewing record

documents, the immigration judge issued a decision agreeing with the asylum

officer’s negative reasonable fear finding.

Petitioner now petitions for review of the order of the immigration

judge affirming the asylum officer’s determination that he lacks a reasonable fear

of persecution or torture in Mexico. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252,

and we deny the petition.

1. Petitioner’s removal proceedings did not deprive him of due process.

A removal proceeding violates due process if “(1) the proceeding was so

fundamentally unfair that the alien was prevented from reasonably presenting his

case, and (2) the alien demonstrates prejudice, which means that the outcome of

the proceeding may have been affected by the alleged violation.” Zetino v. Holder,

622 F.3d 1007, 1013 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Ibarra-Flores v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d

614, 620–21 (9th Cir. 2006)). “We review de novo due process challenges to

3 reasonable fear proceedings.” Orozco-Lopez v. Garland, 11 F.4th 764, 774 (9th

Cir. 2021) (quoting Zuniga v. Barr, 946 F.3d 464, 466 (9th Cir. 2019) (per

curiam)). “The decision to grant or deny [a] continuance is within ‘the sound

discretion of the judge and will not be overturned except on a showing of clear

abuse.’” Garcia v. Lynch, 798 F.3d 876, 881 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting Sandoval-

Luna v. Mukasey, 526 F.3d 1243, 1247 (9th Cir. 2008)).

Petitioner asserts that the immigration judge violated due process by holding

his review hearing on September 7 instead of September 12, thereby depriving him

of the opportunity to present additional evidence that he faces a reasonable

possibility of torture, and by denying his request for a continuance. But an

immigration judge “need not[] accept additional evidence and testimony from the

non-citizen” at a hearing to review an asylum officer’s reasonable fear

determination. Alvarado-Herrera v. Garland, 993 F.3d 1187, 1191 (9th Cir. 2021)

(citing Bartolome v. Sessions, 904 F.3d 803, 812–13 (9th Cir. 2018)); accord

Dominguez Ojeda v. Garland, 112 F.4th 1241, 1245 (9th Cir. 2024). Therefore,

the immigration judge did not need to accept additional evidence at Petitioner’s

hearing. Nor did Petitioner demonstrate any prejudice where the immigration

judge allowed Petitioner to testify to the information contained in the packet and

accepted it as true. Petitioner has not demonstrated that the presentation of the

packet itself would have changed the outcome of his immigration proceeding.

4 Given these facts, the immigration judge’s denial of a continuance also did not

amount to an abuse of discretion.

2. Petitioner also brings two constitutional challenges. “We . . . review

constitutional claims de novo.” Guerrier v. Garland, 18 F.4th 304, 308 (9th Cir.

2021) (quoting Pena v. Lynch, 815 F.3d 452, 455 (9th Cir. 2016)). Petitioner’s

equal protection constitutional challenge to the Attorney General’s authority to

place him in expedited removal proceedings, 8 U.S.C. § 1228(b), is foreclosed by

United States v. Calderon-Segura, 512 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2008). Id. at 1107

(holding a “rational basis exists for granting the Attorney General discretion to

place some non-[lawful permanent resident] aggravated felons into expedited

removal proceedings and others into potentially more lenient general removal

proceedings”). Likewise, Petitioner’s argument that § 1228(b)(1) is

unconstitutionally vague fares no better. Petitioner was convicted of murder,

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Related

Zetino v. Holder
622 F.3d 1007 (Ninth Circuit, 2010)
Sandoval-Luna v. Mukasey
526 F.3d 1243 (Ninth Circuit, 2008)
United States v. Calderon-Segura
512 F.3d 1104 (Ninth Circuit, 2008)
Uriel Garcia v. Loretta E. Lynch
798 F.3d 876 (Ninth Circuit, 2015)
Salomon Ledezma-Cosino v. Jefferson Sessions
857 F.3d 1042 (Ninth Circuit, 2017)
Tomas Bartolome v. Jefferson Sessions, III
904 F.3d 803 (Ninth Circuit, 2018)
Israel Alvarado-Herrera v. Merrick Garland
993 F.3d 1187 (Ninth Circuit, 2021)
Pena v. Lynch
815 F.3d 452 (Ninth Circuit, 2015)
Dominguez Ojeda v. Garland
112 F.4th 1241 (Ninth Circuit, 2024)

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