Cruthird v. Hill

Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court

Cruthird v. Hill

796 N.E.2d 405, 440 Mass. 1011, 2003 Mass. LEXIS 703

CourtMassachusetts Supreme Judicial Court

DecidedSeptember 29, 2003

StatusPublished

This text of 796 N.E.2d 405 (Cruthird v. Hill) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Cruthird v. Hill, 796 N.E.2d 405, 440 Mass. 1011, 2003 Mass. LEXIS 703 (Mass. 2003).

Pincite

Opinion

In August of 2002, Cruthird commenced a civil action in the Superior Court. In December of that year, a default entered against the defendant in that action. The following month, on the defendant’s motion, the default was removed. Cruthird then filed his G. L. c. 211, § 3, petition seeking relief frpm the removal of the default. The case is now before us pursuant to S.J.C. Rule 2:21, as amended, 434 Mass. 1301 (2001). Cruthird has failed to satisfy his burden under rule 2:21 (2). First, he has failed to indicate whether he sought relief in the Appeals Court pursuant to G. L. c. 231, § 118, first par., or why such relief would not be adequate. “Review under G. L. c. 211, § 3, does not lie where review under c. 231, § 118, would suffice.” Greco v. Plymouth Sav. Bank, 423 Mass. 1019, 1019-1020 (1996), and cases cited. Second, he has an adequate alternative remedy insofar as he may pursue his claims after any final adverse judgment. “We have said repeatedly that relief under G. L. c. 211, § 3, is not a substitute for ordinary appellate review.” Pandey v. Pudlo, 416 Mass. 1008 (1993), citing Francis v. District Attorney for the Plymouth Dist., 388 Mass. 1009, 1010 (1983), and cases cited.

Judgment affirmed.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

In August of 2002, Cruthird commenced a civil action in the Superior Court. In December of that year, a default entered against the defendant in that action. The following month, on the defendant’s motion, the default was removed. Cruthird then filed his G. L. c. 211, § 3, petition seeking relief frpm the removal of the default. The case is now before us pursuant to S.J.C. Rule 2:21, as amended, 434 Mass. 1301 (2001). Cruthird has failed to satisfy his burden under rule 2:21 (2). First, he has failed to indicate whether he sought relief in the Appeals Court pursuant to G. L. c. 231, § 118, first par., or why such relief would not be adequate. “Review under G. L. c. 211, § 3, does not lie where review under c. 231, § 118, would suffice.” Greco v. Plymouth Sav. Bank, 423 Mass. 1019, 1019-1020 (1996), and cases cited. Second, he has an adequate alternative remedy insofar as he may pursue his claims after any final adverse judgment. “We have said repeatedly that relief under G. L. c. 211, § 3, is not a substitute for ordinary appellate review.” Pandey v. Pudlo, 416 Mass. 1008 (1993), citing Francis v. District Attorney for the Plymouth Dist., 388 Mass. 1009, 1010 (1983), and cases cited.

Judgment affirmed.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

796 N.E.2d 405, 440 Mass. 1011, 2003 Mass. LEXIS 703, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/cruthird-v-hill-mass-2003.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack