Crumpton v. Owen

376 So. 2d 641
CourtMississippi Supreme Court
DecidedSeptember 5, 1979
Docket51355
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 376 So. 2d 641 (Crumpton v. Owen) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Mississippi Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Crumpton v. Owen, 376 So. 2d 641 (Mich. 1979).

Opinion

376 So.2d 641 (1979)

C. Gary CRUMPTON, Sheriff, State of Mississippi,
v.
Dr. William D. OWEN.

No. 51355.

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

September 5, 1979.
Rehearing Denied November 28, 1979.[*]

A.F. Summer, Atty. Gen. by Pete J. Cajoleas, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Jackson, for appellant.

Travis Buckley, Laurel, for appellee.

Before ROBERTSON, P.J., and BROOM and COFER, JJ.

COFER, Justice, for the Court:

This is an appeal by C. Gary Crumpton, Sheriff of Smith County, from an adverse order of a habeas corpus court of that county, wherein as officer in charge of Dr. William D. Owen, Owen, relator, he was made respondent.

Relator-appellee Owen filed the petition alleging that he was being deprived of his liberty by respondent-appellant and had been, and then was, illegally confined and detained by respondent, in his physical custody. He further averred that his detention was pursuant to an extradition warrant issued by the Governor of this state, based upon a charge that relator was a fugitive from the justice of the State of Indiana, when in truth and fact, he was not such and under the United States Constitution, and the Laws of Mississippi, he ought not to be delivered up to the executive power of Indiana where the offense for which he was in custody was allegedly committed.

Appellant-respondent assigns for error that the habeas corpus court erroneously discharged appellee when the evidence clearly established his presence in the demanding state at the time when the conspiracy crime was committed, and when there was a conflict in the evidence on the fugitive issue as to the five remaining charges laid in the indictments returned by the grand jury of the demanding state.

On May 27, 1977, the Vanderburgh County, Indiana, Circuit Court Grand Jury returned *642 six indictments against relator charging criminal offenses, "contrary to the form of the statute in such cases made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the State of Indiana," as follows:

(1) From on or about December 13, 1974, through and including the 14th day of October 1975, conspiring with Kenneth Eugene McCamish and Richard J. Russelburg, to commit the crime of possessing with intent to deliver a narcotic drug, hydromorphone, in an amount less than 10 grams;

(2) On or about June 21, 1975, delivering a narcotic drug, hydromorphone, to one Carolyn S. Baird;

(3) On or about June 21, 1975, delivering a narcotic drug, hydromorphone, to one Cynthia M. Gish;

(4) On or about July 4, 1975, delivering a narcotic drug, hydromorphone, to one Debra Hutchcraft Driskill;

(5) On or about July 5, 1975, delivering a narcotic drug, hydromorphone to one Debra Hutchcraft Driskill; and

(6) On or about July 6, 1975, delivering a narcotic drug, hydromorphone, to one Carolyn S. Baird.

On extradition request from the Governor of Indiana, the Governor of Mississippi, after hearing, duly issued rendition warrant, reciting that relator, having been indicted as hereinabove set out, had "fled from justice, and is to be found in the State of Mississippi, where he has taken refuge," and directing the Sheriff of Smith County or any other county, to arrest relator and deliver him to the custody of an agent designated by the Governor of Indiana, to be conveyed to the jurisdictional limits where he was charged. The warrant was issued on January 10, 1978, to respondent who took relator and, pursuant to the court's orders, released him on bond. The rendition warrant was introduced and is a part of the record.

At the conclusion of a long hearing, the judge stated that he did not understand that he was to adjudge the guilt or innocence of the accused, but he had the narrow restriction of the issue "as to where the relator was on June the 21st, July the 4th, 5th, and 6th of the year 1975." All agreed that the extradition proceeding and the Governor's rendition warrant were in order; that all jurisdictional facts necessary to the Governor's issuance of the warrant existed; and, in fact, the question of fugitivity of the relator was the lone matter for decision. The judge found the overwhelming legal, credible, and believable evidence was such as to convince him beyond a reasonable doubt, viewing the ex parte affidavits from Indiana and all the evidence adduced "with the dictates of a clear light of a conscience to guide this court," to be such that the petition for habeas corpus was granted and the relator-appellee was discharged. An order conforming to the opinion was entered on the 19th day of June, 1978.

The opinion in Taylor, Sheriff v. Garrison, 329 So.2d 506 (Miss. 1976), did much to collate the authorities and legal principles involved in extradition habeas corpus proceedings, and was used by the habeas corpus court for guidance in the trial and decision of the present case. In the present case the court and the parties put out of consideration the identity of the person sought in the proceeding, and that there was a crime sufficiently charged in the proceedings, leaving only the question of fugitivity of the relator, the indictee in the Indiana court.

In a long line of cases cited in the Garrison case, this Court held that the Governor's rendition warrant was prima facie evidence of the existence of every jurisdictional fact necessary to the Governor's determination; and that the Governor's warrant introduced in evidence made a prima facie case, placing upon the relator the burden of overcoming this prima facie case. We there held that fugitivity is a question of fact, and that

To be a fugitive from a demanding state, the subject person must have been within that state at the time the crime was committed. One is not such a fugitive if he establishes conclusively or beyond a reasonable doubt that he was without the borders of the demanding *643 state at the time of the commission of the crime. South Carolina v. Bailey, 289 U.S. 412, 53 S.Ct. 667, 77 L.Ed. 1292 (1933). (329 So.2d at 511).

Mississippi Code Annotated, section 11-43-39 (1972), one of the statutes in Chapter 43, Habeas Corpus, provides:

The judge or chancellor may issue or order subpoenas for witnesses and compel their attendance, as a circuit court could in term time, and fine witnesses or others for contempt. Whenever the personal attendance of a witness cannot be procured, his affidavit, taken on reasonable notice to the adverse party, may be received in evidence.

Appellee undertook to procure orders from the Indiana court to force certain witnesses, Cynthia Gish, Debbie Hutchcraft Driskill, and Kenneth Eugene McCamish, under authority of section 99-9-33, one of several sections which section 99-9-27 says may be cited as "[U]niform law to secure the attendance of witnesses from without the state in criminal cases." (Emphasis added). These efforts were denied by the Indiana court which, however, ordered the sheriff to produce Gish and Hutchcraft for deposing by relator's counsel when desired. McCamish was in jail and represented by counsel who refused permission to interview him.

While there in the effort to procure the court's order for their coming to Mississippi to testify, one of relator's counsel did succeed, in rather informal manner, in procuring statements of the women Driskill and Gish, and also of Linda K. Mattingly.

These statements were introduced over respondent's objection, in a hearing on relator's motion for a continuance.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Sonkin v. State
824 So. 2d 564 (Mississippi Supreme Court, 2002)
Howard Sonkin v. State of Mississippi
Mississippi Supreme Court, 2000
State v. McCurley
627 So. 2d 339 (Mississippi Supreme Court, 1993)
Allen v. State
515 So. 2d 890 (Mississippi Supreme Court, 1987)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
376 So. 2d 641, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/crumpton-v-owen-miss-1979.