Crump v. Vital Core Health Strategies, LLC

District Court, D. Kansas·Decided June 21, 2024·No. 5:24-cv-03089·Unknown

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS

STEVEN CRUMP,

Plaintiff,

v. CASE NO. 24-3089-JWL

VITAL CORE HEALTH SRATEGIES, LLC, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE

Plaintiff Steven Crump is hereby required to show good cause, in writing to the Honorable John W. Lungstrum, United States District Judge, why this action should not be dismissed due to the deficiencies in Plaintiff’s Complaint that are discussed herein. Plaintiff is also given the opportunity to file an amended complaint to cure the deficiencies. I. Nature of the Matter before the Court Plaintiff filed this pro se civil rights case under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff is in custody at the Johnson County Adult Detention Center in Olathe, Kansas (“JCADC”). The Court granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Plaintiff alleges in his Complaint that Vital Core Health Strategies, LLC (“VCHS”), the medical provider for the JCADC, has a policy of denying chronic care and adequate medication for pretrial detainees. (Doc. 4, at 1.) Plaintiff alleges that although he was originally prescribed Flexeral [sic] for chronic pain, VCHS has a policy of denying narcotic pain medication for pretrial inmates. Id. at 2. Plaintiff alleges that he was only given Ibuprofen, Tylenol, and Naproxen for pain. Id. Plaintiff alleges that he was “talked into” taking “blood pressure medication” for pain. Id. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants were aware that of extreme side effects, but did not inform Plaintiff of the side effects of this medication. Id. Plaintiff alleges that he “had a heart attack due to this.” Id. at 3. As Count I, Plaintiff claims deliberate indifference based on VCHS’s policy. Id. at 4. Plaintiff alleges that he was taking Flexeral [sic] while suffering from “a separated spine, scoliosis, neuritis and a spine degenerative disease.” Id. He claims that he was left in severe

suffering when he was only provided over-the-counter medication and “blood pressure meds that almost killed [him].” Id. As Count II, Plaintiff claims a 14th Amendment violation based on “inadequate health care and denial of proper meds. to chronic care pretrial inmates.” Id. Plaintiff also asserts the following Counts: Count III – negligent medical care; Count IV – negligent training and supervision; Count V – intentional, negligent infliction of emotional distress; Count VI – gross negligence; Count VII – cruel and unusual punishment, unnecessary suffering; and Count VIII – supervisor liability. Id. at 4–5. Plaintiff names as defendants: VCHS; J. Ehrlich, Vice President, VCHS; Calvin Hayden,

Johnson County Sheriff; (fnu) (lnu) (1), Health Head Administrator at VCHS; (fnu) Stanton, doctor at VCHS; and Becky (lnu), Supervisor at VCHS. Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages. Id. at 6. II. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or an officer or an employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if a plaintiff has raised claims that are legally frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)–(2). “To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988) (citations omitted); Northington v. Jackson, 973 F.2d 1518, 1523 (10th Cir. 1992). A court

liberally construes a pro se complaint and applies “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). In addition, the court accepts all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true. Anderson v. Blake, 469 F.3d 910, 913 (10th Cir. 2006). On the other hand, “when the allegations in a complaint, however true, could not raise a claim of entitlement to relief,” dismissal is appropriate. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558 (2007). A pro se litigant’s “conclusory allegations without supporting factual averments are insufficient to state a claim upon which relief can be based.” Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). “[A] plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitlement to

relief’ requires “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted). The complaint’s “factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level” and “to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 555, 570. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has explained “that, to state a claim in federal court, a complaint must explain what each defendant did to [the pro se plaintiff]; when the defendant did it; how the defendant’s action harmed [the plaintiff]; and, what specific legal right the plaintiff believes the defendant violated.” Nasious v. Two Unknown B.I.C.E. Agents, 492 F.3d 1158, 1163 (10th Cir. 2007). The court “will not supply additional factual allegations to round out a plaintiff’s complaint or construct a legal theory on a plaintiff’s behalf.” Whitney v. New Mexico, 113 F.3d 1170, 1173-74 (10th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted). The Tenth Circuit has pointed out that the Supreme Court’s decisions in Twombly and Erickson gave rise to a new standard of review for § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) dismissals. See Kay v. Bemis, 500 F.3d 1214, 1218 (10th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted); see also Smith v. United States,

561 F.3d 1090, 1098 (10th Cir. 2009). As a result, courts “look to the specific allegations in the complaint to determine whether they plausibly support a legal claim for relief.” Kay, 500 F.3d at 1218 (citation omitted). Under this new standard, “a plaintiff must ‘nudge his claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.’” Smith, 561 F.3d at 1098 (citation omitted). “Plausible” in this context does not mean “likely to be true,” but rather refers “to the scope of the allegations in a complaint: if they are so general that they encompass a wide swath of conduct, much of it innocent,” then the plaintiff has not “nudged [his] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.” Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1247 (10th Cir. 2008) (citing Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1974).

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