Crumel v. Morton

• Court: Court of Appeals of North Carolina
• Decided: January 7, 2026
• Docket: 25-372
• Status: Published
• Author: Judge Tobias Hampson

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA

No. COA25-372

Filed 7 January 2026

Nash County, No. 20CVS001184-630

WILLIAM FITZGERALD CRUMEL, Plaintiff,

v.

MELISSA CROOM MORTON and SARAH ELIZABETH ANNE MORTON, Defendants.

Appeal by Unnamed Defendant from Order entered 29 October 2024 by Judge

William D. Wolfe in Nash County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 29

October 2025.

No brief filed for Plaintiff-Appellee William Fitzgerald Crumel.

Poyner Spruill LLP, by J. Nicholas Ellis and John J. Ferebee, III, for Defendants-Appellees Melissa Croom Morton and Sarah Elizabeth Anne Morton.

Pinto Coates Kyre & Bowers, PLLC, by Britney M. Millisor, Richard L. Pinto, and Lyn K. Broom, for Unnamed Defendant-Appellant Pennsylvania National Mutual Casualty Insurance Company.

HAMPSON, Judge.

Factual and Procedural Background

Pennsylvania National Mutual Casualty Insurance Company (Unnamed

Defendant) appeals from an Order denying its Rule 60(b)(6) Motion for Relief from

Judgment and denying its Motion to Enforce Settlement. The Record before us tends CRUMEL V. MORTON

Opinion of the Court

to reflect the following:

On 10 November 2017, William Crumel (Plaintiff) was involved in a car

accident with Melissa and Sarah Morton (Defendants). On 6 January 2020,

Defendants’ insurer, North Carolina Farm Bureau Insurance Group (NCFB),1 offered

to tender its policyholder limit of $30,000 to Plaintiff in exchange for a release from

further liability as to any future claims against NCFB and Defendants. On 20

January 2020, Unnamed Defendant, Plaintiff’s insurer, advised NCFB it would be

advancing the $30,000 payment to Plaintiff to protect its subrogation rights.

On 18 September 2020, Plaintiff filed a Complaint against Defendants alleging

the November 2017 car accident was a result of Defendants’ negligence. Defendants

filed their Answer denying the allegations and asserting the defense of contributory

negligence on 4 January 2021. On 7 April 2021, Unnamed Defendant, as the insurer

providing underinsured motorist coverage to Plaintiff, filed a Notice of Appearance

and Conditional Answer pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-279.21(b)(4).2

Despite attempts at settling the matter, a trial date was ultimately set for 13

June 2022. However, Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the action without prejudice

1 NCFB is not a party to the present action. 2 “A party injured by the operation of an underinsured highway vehicle who institutes a suit

for the recovery of moneys for those injuries and in such an amount that, if recovered, would support a claim under underinsured motorist coverage shall give notice of the initiation of the suit to the underinsured motorist insurer as well as to the insurer providing primary liability coverage upon the underinsured highway vehicle. Upon receipt of notice, the underinsured motorist insurer shall have the right to appear in defense of the claim without being named as a party therein, and without being named as a party may participate in the suit as fully as if it were a party.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20- 279.21(b)(4) (2023).

-2- CRUMEL V. MORTON

pursuant to Rule 41 of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure on 23 May 2022.

Settlement discussions continued between the parties over the course of the next

year, but eventually NCFB and Defendants allegedly indicated a refusal to settle the

matter.

On 18 October 2024, Unnamed Defendant filed a Motion to Enforce Settlement.

On 21 October 2024, at the hearing on the Motion to Enforce Settlement, Plaintiff

made an oral Motion to set aside his prior voluntary dismissal and resurrect the

original action under Rule 60(b)(6) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure. 3

Plaintiff and Unnamed Defendant asserted NCFB and Defendants had agreed to

settle the matter but now would not comply with the agreement. The parties

acknowledged that in order to seek judicial enforcement of the alleged settlement

agreement, they could either: (1) petition the trial court to set aside the voluntary

dismissal and reopen the original case pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6), or (2) file “a whole

new lawsuit” asserting a claim on the alleged settlement agreement. Counsel for

Unnamed Defendant stated they had elected to exercise the former option under Rule

60(b)(6) because filing a lawsuit on the alleged settlement agreement didn’t “seem

very efficient.” Unnamed Defendant argued justice demanded setting aside the

dismissal so that it could seek judicial enforcement of the alleged settlement

agreement.

3 The Rule 60(b)(6) Motion was made by Plaintiff, but Unnamed Defendant argued most of its

substance.

-3- CRUMEL V. MORTON

Following argument on the Rule 60(b)(6) Motion, Unnamed Defendant argued

its Motion to Enforce Settlement. Unnamed Defendant further elaborated on the

argument it presented in support of its Rule 60(b)(6) Motion, explaining why it

believed a settlement agreement existed between the parties and how NCFB and

Defendants had refused to comply. Defendants, for their part, maintained they had

never entered into a settlement agreement. The trial court took both Motions under

advisement.

On 29 October 2024, the trial court entered an Order denying the Rule 60(b)(6)

Motion for Relief from Judgment and denying the Motion to Enforce Settlement

“procedurally and on its merits.” On 25 November 2024, Unnamed Defendant timely

filed Notice of Appeal.4

Issues

The issues on appeal are whether the trial court: (I) abused its discretion in

denying the Rule 60(b)(6) Motion for Relief from Judgment; and (II) erred in ruling

on the Motion to Enforce Settlement.

Analysis

I. Rule 60(b)(6) Motion

“ ‘[A] motion for relief under Rule 60(b) is addressed to the sound discretion of

4 Although Plaintiff brought the Rule 60(b)(6) Motion in the trial court, Plaintiff did not appeal

the trial court’s Order denying the Rule 60(b)(6) Motion, nor has he submitted any arguments to this Court.

-4- CRUMEL V. MORTON

the trial court and appellate review is limited to determining whether the court

abused its discretion.’ ” Yang Real Est. Invs., LLC v. Affordable Mini Storage of

Newton, LLC, _ N.C. App. _, _, 920 S.E.2d 231, 235 (2025) (quoting Sink v. Easter,

288 N.C. 183, 198, 217 S.E.2d 532, 541 (1975)). An abuse of discretion results when

the trial court’s ruling is “manifestly unsupported by reason or is so arbitrary that it

could not have been the result of a reasoned decision.” Brown v. Foremost Affiliated

Ins. Servs. Inc., 158 N.C. App. 727, 732, 582 S.E.2d 335, 339 (2003) (citation and

quotation marks omitted).

As a threshold matter, we address Defendants’ assertion that Unnamed

Defendant cannot use Rule 60(b)(6) to seek relief from Plaintiff’s voluntary dismissal

because a voluntary dismissal without prejudice is not a “final adjudication” for the

purposes of Rule 60(b). Under Rule 60(b) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil

Procedure, the trial court may “relieve a party or his legal representative from a final

judgment, order, or proceeding” for a number of reasons, including any reason

“justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule

60(b)(6) (2023). Generally, “relief from a voluntary dismissal is not available

pursuant to Rule 60(b), because no relief is sought from an order, judgment, or

proceeding as contemplated by the Rule.” Troy v. Tucker, 126 N.C. App. 213, 215,

484 S.E.2d 98, 99 (1997). However, “once the one-year period for refiling an action

has elapsed and the action can no longer be resurrected, the voluntary dismissal acts

as a final adjudication for purposes of Rule 60(b).” Robinson v. Gen. Mills Rests., 110

-5- CRUMEL V. MORTON

N.C. App. 633, 637, 430 S.E.2d 696, 698 (1993).

Here, Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the original action on 23 May 2022. Thus,

over two years had passed when Plaintiff and Unnamed Defendant made their Rule

60(b)(6) Motion on 21 October 2024. Therefore, Plaintiff’s voluntary dismissal

constituted a final adjudication from which Unnamed Defendant could seek relief

under Rule 60(b)(6). See id. However, we further conclude the trial court did not

abuse its discretion in denying the Rule 60(b)(6) Motion.

“The test for whether a judgment, order or proceeding should be modified or

set aside under Rule 60(b)(6) is two pronged: (1) extraordinary circumstances must

exist, and (2) there must be a showing that justice demands that relief be granted.”

Howell v. Howell, 321 N.C. 87, 91, 361 S.E.2d 585, 588 (1987) (citation omitted).

“[R]elief should be forthcoming only where both requisites exist.” Huggins v.

Hallmark Enters., Inc., 84 N.C. App. 15, 25, 351 S.E.2d 779, 785 (1987) (quoting

Baylor v. Brown, 46 N.C. App. 664, 670, 266 S.E.2d 9, 13 (1980)).

Unnamed Defendant’s sole argument for setting aside Plaintiff’s voluntary

dismissal is essentially a substantive argument asserting Defendants and NCFB

have breached the alleged settlement agreement. Unnamed Defendant has

presented lengthy arguments to this Court as to why there is a valid settlement

agreement, how NCFB and Defendants have breached that agreement, and

effectively contends NCFB and Defendants will “get away with” breach of the

settlement agreement if Plaintiff’s voluntary dismissal is not set aside so that

-6- CRUMEL V. MORTON

Unnamed Defendant may seek relief in the original action. See generally Est. of

Barber v. Guilford Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 161 N.C. App. 658, 662, 589 S.E.2d 433, 436

(2003) (“[T]o specifically enforce the terms of the settlement agreement[,] Defendant

could: (1) take a voluntary dismissal of his original action and then institute a new

action on the contract, or (2) seek to enforce the settlement agreement by petition or

motion in the original action.” (emphasis in original) (citing State ex rel. Howes v.

Ormond Oil & Gas Co., Inc., 128 N.C. App. 130, 136, 493 S.E.2d 793, 796-97 (1997))).

At the hearing in the instant case, counsel for Unnamed Defendant

acknowledged it could have elected to enforce the alleged settlement agreement

through filing a separate claim for breach of contract but instead chose to seek

enforcement of the alleged agreement by asking the trial court to reopen the original

action pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6) because filing a separate claim didn’t “seem very

efficient.” We are not persuaded Unnamed Defendant has shown extraordinary

circumstances exist or that justice demands setting aside Plaintiff’s voluntary

dismissal where Unnamed Defendant has conceded a separate avenue exists to

pursue its desired relief. See id.

Unnamed Defendant took a strategic risk in pursuing relief through a Rule

60(b) motion rather than through a separate action on the alleged settlement

-7- CRUMEL V. MORTON

agreement.5 Cf. Sessions v. Sloane, 248 N.C. App. 370, 387, 789 S.E.2d 844, 857

(2016) (holding trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to conduct in

camera review of documents where defendants “took a strategic risk in not

submitting the documents to be sealed for in camera review.”). Nonetheless, both

Plaintiff and Unnamed Defendant acknowledged the decision to set aside Plaintiff’s

voluntary dismissal was fully within the trial court’s sound discretion, and “[o]ur

Supreme Court has indicated that this Court cannot substitute ‘what it consider [s]

to be its own better judgment’ for a discretionary ruling of a trial court, and that this

Court should not disturb a discretionary ruling unless it ‘probably amounted to a

substantial miscarriage of justice.’ ” Huggins, 84 N.C. App. at 25, 351 S.E.2d at 785

(quoting Worthington v. Bynum, 305 N.C. 478, 486-87, 290 S.E.2d 599, 604-05 (1982)).

Thus, Unnamed Defendant has not shown extraordinary circumstances exist

and that justice demands relief to justify setting aside Plaintiff’s voluntary dismissal

of the original action under Rule 60(b)(6). See Howell, 321 N.C. at 91, 361 S.E.2d at

588 (citation omitted). Therefore, on the facts before us, the trial court did not abuse

its discretion in denying Unnamed Defendant’s Rule 60(b)(6) Motion for Relief from

Judgment.

II. Motion to Enforce Settlement

5 We express no opinion as to the existence of the alleged settlement agreement or whether

Unnamed Defendant has a valid claim for breach of the alleged settlement agreement. Likewise, we express no opinion on Defendants’ arguments that Unnamed Defendant’s claim is barred by the statute of limitations.

-8- CRUMEL V. MORTON

Unnamed Defendant next argues, because the trial court denied its Rule

60(b)(6) Motion, the trial court’s Order denying its Motion to Enforce Settlement must

be vacated for lack of jurisdiction. Defendants, for their part, argue Unnamed

Defendant should be judicially estopped from asserting this argument because the

Motion to Enforce Settlement was filed by Unnamed Defendant and heard at

Unnamed Defendant’s request.

Generally, “a party is not entitled to seek relief on appeal from a trial court

action the party invited.” In re K.B.C., 295 N.C. App. 619, 625, 906 S.E.2d 840, 845

(2024) (citing Frugard v. Pritchard, 338 N.C. 508, 512, 450 S.E.2d 744, 746 (1994))

(other citations omitted). However, we give special consideration to issues of

jurisdiction; indeed, “[a] universal principle as old as the law is that proceedings of a

court without jurisdiction over the subject matter are a nullity and its judgment

without effect either on the person or property.” Hart v. Thomasville Motors, Inc.,

244 N.C. 84, 90, 92 S.E.2d 673, 678 (1956) (citations omitted). Accordingly, we will

address Unnamed Defendant’s jurisdictional argument.

“ ‘It is well established that where [a] plaintiff takes a voluntary dismissal

pursuant to [N.C. Gen. Stat. §] 1A-1, Rule 41(a)(1), no suit is pending thereafter on

which the court could make a final order.’ ” TOG Props., LLC v. Pugh, 276 N.C. App.

422, 426, 857 S.E.2d 535, 539 (2021) (alterations in original) (quoting Ward v. Taylor,

68 N.C. App. 74, 78, 314 S.E.2d 814, 818 (1984)). Here, Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed

the original action in the instant case pursuant to Rule 41(a) on 23 May 2022, which

-9- CRUMEL V. MORTON

effectively closed the file and left no suit pending upon which the trial court could

enter an order. See id.; see also Walker Frames v. Shively, 123 N.C. App. 643, 646,

473 S.E.2d 776, 778 (1996) (“A Rule 41(a) dismissal strips the trial court of authority

to enter further orders in the case . . . .”). Unnamed Defendant later sought relief

from the dismissal; however, because the trial court denied its Rule 60(b)(6) Motion,

Plaintiff’s voluntary dismissal remained in force with no action pending.

Thus, because there was no action pending, the trial court did not have

jurisdiction to rule on Unnamed Defendant’s Motion to Enforce Settlement. See TOG

Props., 276 N.C. App. at 426, 857 S.E.2d at 539. Therefore, the trial court’s Order

denying Unnamed Defendant’s Motion to Enforce Settlement is void for lack of

jurisdiction. Consequently, we vacate the portion of the trial court’s Order denying

Unnamed Defendant’s Motion to Enforce Settlement.

Conclusion

Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s denial of the

Rule 60(b)(6) Motion for Relief from Judgment. We vacate the trial court’s denial of

the Motion to Enforce Settlement.

AFFIRMED IN PART; VACATED IN PART.

Chief Judge DILLON and Judge STADING concur.

- 10 -