Crown Cork & Seal Co. of Baltimore City v. Brooklyn Bottle Stopper Co.

201 F. 344, 1912 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1026
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. New York
DecidedDecember 2, 1912
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 201 F. 344 (Crown Cork & Seal Co. of Baltimore City v. Brooklyn Bottle Stopper Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Crown Cork & Seal Co. of Baltimore City v. Brooklyn Bottle Stopper Co., 201 F. 344, 1912 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1026 (E.D.N.Y. 1912).

Opinion

CHATFIELD, District Judge.

Final hearing has been had in the present action, and the record has added nothing to change the conclusions which could have been reached upon the application for a preliminary injunction, wherein, among other matters, the defense of laches and the question of public acquiescence were substantially disposed of. The testimony upon final hearing consists almost entirely [345]*345■of opinions and arguments of expert witnesses, more deliberately and carefully presented than upon the application for preliminary injunction, but not changing the questions under consideration thereon, nor offering any new state of facts.

The machines in use by the parties to this action, the patents set forth in the papers upon the preliminary injunction and considered in the former opinion of this court, and, as has been said, the arguments of the experts, have furnished to the court merely a more full and satisfactory opportunity for taking up the precise points which, under the decisions, the court could not consider, in view of the intention of the parties to proceed to a final hearing.

The statement of the various patents involved and of the devices claimed as infringements, together with an analysis of the arguments presented, as set forth in the opinion upon preliminary hearing (reported in [C. C.] 190 Fed. 323), is available, and need not be repeated. We shall proceed at once, embodying that opinion as a part of this decision, with the exception noted below, to analyze the claims of the patents as they are now presented by a completed record.

One statement of the former opinion must be corrected at the outset, as the court described one feature of the Wheeler machine and patent incorrectly, and even, in a way, contradictory to the references to the Wheeler patent in other parts of the opinion.

On page 326 of 190 Fed., in that opinion, at the end of the first paragraph upon the page, the court says that in the Wheeler patent—

“the plungers exert pressure while the caps are carried a certain distance. Then, the plungers being released, the caps are expelled upon the outer or cooled portion of the disk, where the temperature is rapidly reduced, under the influence of a water jacket.”

The Wheeler patent and drawings show plainly that the plungers are arranged around the outer or cooled portion of this disk, and exert their pressure while the caps are carried a certain distance by the turning of the cooling ring or disk itself, and are released just before the caps are thrown out of the machine. The expulsion from the heated section onto the cooling ring is previous to the application of the plunger.

The corrected statement of fact shows a situation more nearly like that of the defendants’ machines, and brings us to the first defense; that is, noninfringement.

As was said in the former opinion, the defendant Johnson has manufactured machines with a knowledge of the use to which they were to be put. He appears by the record to be a contributory infringer, if infringement be shown against the defendants in the other two actions. The defendant the American Cork Specialty Company and Mr. Mundet, who is personally responsible for its acts in this matter, and the defendant the Brooklyn Bottle Stopper Company, with Mr. Alberti, who is responsible for that company’s acts, are using machines containing the same elements, and differing only, as was said in the former opinion, in the manner of transferring the caps from the heated plate to the disk or ring where the plungers operate.

[346]*346The Brooklyn Bottle Stopper Company’s, machine has the disk (around which the plungérs are arranged) placed in a vertical position, so that gravity is used to take the caps from the star or notched ring of the heating plate; whereas in the American Specialty Com■pany’s machine the'plunger ring is in a horizontal plane, and takes I the caps from the star ring by direct contact at the outer edge of the disks. The court can see no substantial difference between the two methods and the two machines, and either of them plainly infringe the complainant’s patents, if the claims of those patents be construed as valid and as meaning what the complainant contends.

It is suggested by the defendants that the Painter and Wheeler patents call for a means of transferring the crown corks from the point where pressure is applied to the point where the cooling process under pressure has sufficiently progressed. Claim 6 of patent No. 88?,-838, Painter, and claims 7 and 23 of patent No. 887,883, Wheeler. In claim 7 of the latter patent the “heating means” serves to move the closures to the “pressing means,” and the defendants suggest that jn the exhibit machine presented in court and made by the defendant Johnson the heating means, viz., the Bunsen burners, does not convey the closures to the plungers, but that the closures are conveyed by an upper or star disk, which conv.eys the closures over the heat while the heat is stationary. They point out that in the Painter and Wheeler patents the heat is- applied in a so-called oven, of which the lower floor or plate actually transmitting heat moves toward the plungers. But this neither changes the principles, nor would take the defendants’ machines out from the claims of the complainant’s patents, for one arrangement of these heating disks is merely an equivalent of the other, in that heat is applied through radiation; that is, the conveying means is actually a part of the apparatus for applying the heat, whether or not the conveyer be equipped with a second plate. We must therefore pass to the other questions presented by the defense.

Some attack has been made upon the allegations of ownership by the complainant, in that the formal certified copies of the assignments have not been presented in the testimony. But evidence was given that the complainant was granted these patents, and had the right to manufacture under them, and no objection is made upon the ground that this testimony was not the best evidence. It is useless, therefore, to consider the mere denial upon information and belief of what now appears to be uncontested facts.

Another defense is urged, viz., that the Alberti or Brooklyn Bottle Stopper Company machine is an aggregation and not a combination; that is, that the union of the two parts of the machine, by an appliance depending upon the force of gravity, would take that machine out of the category of a combination, and leave merely two machines or devices reciprocating in function. But unless we go so far as to hold that no machine can be an infringing combination, unless there be an invention involved in the precise difference from other devices, the suggested defense is without meaning. Any combination in which equivalents might be substituted for the original structure could be [347]*347¿ailed an aggregation rather than a combination, if it' is separable into distinct parts, at the point where the new mechanical 'equivalent was used.

The defense of multifariousness was disposed of upon preliminary injunction, and this disposition has not been affected by final hearing, except in so far as the point is involved in the general- considerations of validity and invention, when contrast is made of the various claims of the different patents.

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Bluebook (online)
201 F. 344, 1912 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1026, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/crown-cork-seal-co-of-baltimore-city-v-brooklyn-bottle-stopper-co-nyed-1912.