Crowe v. Malba Land Co.

76 Misc. 676, 135 N.Y.S. 454
CourtNew York Supreme Court
DecidedMay 15, 1912
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 76 Misc. 676 (Crowe v. Malba Land Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New York Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Crowe v. Malba Land Co., 76 Misc. 676, 135 N.Y.S. 454 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1912).

Opinion

Grato, J.

On August 6, 1906, the Re&lty Trust took a deed in the name of one of its clerks, Charles S. Conklin, to a tract of land in Whitestone, L. I. known as the Ziegler tract, a part of the Ziegler estate. A $300,000 first mortgage was given to the estate, and a second mortgage of $90,000 executed by Conklin to the Realty Trust. The Realty Trust prior to this had procured a syndicate of Com nectieut people to purchase the property, and the $90,000-second mortgage was executed as a part of that transaction.This syndicate at the time had not yet been organized into - a corporation, so that title to the property had to he taken in the names of individuals-, who in reality were mere agents or trustees for "the subscribers. The total amount which this syndicate was to pay for the property, including all expenses, was $640,000, made up of the $300,000 first mortgage above mentioned, the $90,000 second mortgage to the Realty Trust, and the balance in cash. On the said sixth day of August Conklin made a deed of this property to 'Samuel R. Avis, Roble P. Bishop and George W. Lewis, the trustees of the syndicate, and the sale thereof, worked up by the Realty Trust, was apparently consummated. Thereafter 'the syndicate became, through the action of these trustees and others, a Connecticut corporation known- as the Malba Land Company, to which on September 1, 1906, Avis, Bishop and Lewis conveyed the property. Later was formed the Melba Land Company, a Rew York feorporation, to which in turn the Melba Company of Connecticut made conveyance by deed of January 10, 1910.

This action is brought by the Realty Trust in the name of William M. Crowe, its clerk, to foreclose this $90,000 mortgage, and the question now arises whether the Malba Land Company, a Rew York corporation, the present owner of the land, can defend upon the ground that the mortgage was obtained through fraud and misrepresentation, perpetrated upon the subscribers and their trustees Avis, Bishop and Lewis by the mortgagee.

There can be no question but what the grantees Avis, Bishop and Lewis could maintain such a defense as against the Realty Trust although the deed ran from Conklin sub[679]*679ject to said mortgage, as the claim is that the Realty Trust, the mortagee, was the one who perpetrated the fraud directly upon said grantees and induced them to take the property subject to said mortgage through false statements regarding its validity. It is not claimed that fraud was practiced upon clerk Conklin, the mortgagor. Lathrop v. Godfrey, 3 Hun, 739.

Whether this defense of fraud can also be made by the Malba Land Company of Hew York depends upon the wording of the deeds of conveyance through which it took title. The deed of September 1, 1906, from Avis, Bishop and Lewis to the Malba Land Company of Connecticut states that it is subject to encumbrances of record.” The deed of January 10, 1910, of the Malba Land Company of Connecticut to the Malba Land Company of Hew York states that it is subject “ to liens and encumbrances of record.”

These statements in the deeds are not such a recognition of the Realty Trust’s mortgage as to estop the Hew York Company from setting up the fraud in its origin and procurement.

The rule seems to be that where a grantee takes subject to a mortgage expressly stating and recognizing it either by name or in amount, or else assumes the payment of the mortgage he is estopped from thereafter attacking it. If however, he takes the land subject merely to liens and encumbrances thereon, he may show that an alleged mortgage of record is not a valid, encumbrance but is void for fraud.

In the' following cases the grantee was estopped because he had assumed payment of the mortgage: Johnson v. Parmely, 14 Hun, 398; Parkinson v. Sherman, 74 N. Y. 88; Ritter v. Phillips, 53 id. 586; Lester v. Barron, 40 Barb. 297; Hartley v. Harrison, 24 N. Y. 170; while in Horton v. Davis, 26 N. Y. 495; Hartley v. Tatham, 26 How. Pr. 158; McConihe v. Pales, 107 N. Y. 404, and Preeman v. Auld, 44 id. 50, he was estopped because he had taken subject to the mortgage. The leading authority given upon this point is Bennett v. Bates, 94 N. Y. 354, which gives the rule as follows : The grantee of real estate who by his conveyance assumes the payment of a prior mortgage existing th'ereon, [680]*680or takes it expressly subject to such payment, is estopped from controverting the existence and validity of such mortgage. ' * * * To obtain the benefit of this principle it is essential that a mortgage should establish not only a liability upon the part of the grantor to himself for the mortgage debt, but also such a contract between the grantor and the grantee as obligates the latter to pay such debt. * * * This doctrine has not, as we have discovered, been extended to conveyances 'of land subject to a mortgage unaccompanied by convenants for its payment.”

The rule also found -further expression in Purdy v. Coar, 109 N. Y. 448, from which the following is taken: “He contends that Mrs. Coar, the defendant, was merely the purchaser of an equity of redemption, and took subject to the mortgage, and so cannot contest it. The pith of the doctrine is that the circumstances of the purchase amount to an admission of the validity and lien of the outstanding, encumbrance. But there was no such admission by Mrs. Coar. She did not take subject to the Walker mortgage, describing or identifying it as such, nor did Marshall, as grantee of Coar. The latter’s deed contains this languagesubject, nevertheless, to all liens- of mortgages and taxes thereon.’ Acceptance of this deed did not admit that there were any such liens.' If they existed, the title was subject to them, but their existence and validity was not conceded.”

As the deeds from Avis, Bishop and Lewis to the Malba Land Company of Connecticut and from the Malba Land Company of Connecticut to the Malba Land Company of Hew York merely state that the grantees take subject to the encumbrances of record, there is no recognition or admission of the validity of the Realty Trust mortgage any more than there was in the Coar case, and the Hew York Company can attack it upon the ground of fraud. These grantees did not assume the payment of the mortgage or take expressly subject to it but subject only to valid liens and encumbrances, and therefore the present owner, the Malba Land Company of Hew York, has the same right to defend as Avis, Bishop and Lewis had.

As the Malba Land Company of Connecticut has trans[681]*681ferred its property it has no further interest in this $90,000 mortgage and is not a proper party to this action. The motion made by the plaintiff to discontinue as to it should be granted.

It now remains to determine- whether or not the evidence shows that the defense of fraud is justified.

The following facts are fully established: That on and prior to June 19, 1906, Charles S. Conklin was'a clerk in the office of the Realty Trust as above stated. As fraud pierces through all methods and presents facts stripped of their legal formalities, whatever Conklin did was the act of the Realty Trust. Conklin was the Realty Trust. Anthony M. Clegg was the general superintendent of agents for the Realty Trust, and whatever representations he made were the representations of the Realty Trust. Legally and for this case Clegg was the Realty Trust. William S. Champ was vice-president of the Realty Trust, and also one of the executors of the William Ziegler estate, his coexecutors being William J. Gaynor and E. Matilda Ziegler. The Ziegler estate owned a tract of land at Whitestone, L.

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Bluebook (online)
76 Misc. 676, 135 N.Y.S. 454, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/crowe-v-malba-land-co-nysupct-1912.