Crowe. Julie v. Logan's Roadhouse

2019 TN WC 24
CourtTennessee Court of Workers' Compensation Claims
DecidedFebruary 10, 2019
Docket2018-05-0638
StatusPublished

This text of 2019 TN WC 24 (Crowe. Julie v. Logan's Roadhouse) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Tennessee Court of Workers' Compensation Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Crowe. Julie v. Logan's Roadhouse, 2019 TN WC 24 (Tenn. Super. Ct. 2019).

Opinion

FILED Feb 11, 2019 12:56 PM(CT) TENNESSEE COURT OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION CLAIMS

TENNESSEE BUREAU OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION IN THE COURT OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION CLAIMS AT MURFREESBORO

JULIE CROWE, ) Docket No. 2018-05-0638 Employee, ) v. ) ) LOGAN’S ROADHOUSE, ) State File No. 38592-2018 Employer, ) And ) ) AGRI GEN. INS. CO., ) Judge Dale Tipps Carrier. )

EXPEDITED HEARING ORDER GRANTING MEDICAL BENEFITS

This matter came before the Court on January 29, 2019, for an Expedited Hearing. The central legal issue is whether Ms. Crowe is likely to establish at a hearing on the merits that her injury arose primarily out of and in the course and scope of her employment. For the reasons below, the Court cannot find she is likely to prove this but holds Ms. Crowe is entitled to a panel of physicians.

History of Claim

Ms. Crowe worked as a manager for Logan’s Roadhouse. She testified that, on May 10, 2018, she and some other employees were “rolling silverware” in an area called the garage. When a large tub was filled with completed silverware rolls, she asked co- worker Kobe Beers to help her move it to the front of the restaurant. While they were moving the tub, she felt a pop in her right shoulder. Ms. Crowe did not report the injury at the time because she was the only manager present.

Ms. Crow continued to have severe pain in her shoulder, and she reported it the next day to her supervisor, Joanna Webb. Logan’s took no action regarding her injury. Ms. Crowe worked the next few days and then went to her personal physician, Dr. Olen Burns.

1 Dr. Burns’ records show that Ms. Crowe saw NP Alicia Harper on May 18 and reported shoulder pain that began when she carried a large bin and felt her shoulder pop. She said she could not hold her arm up or move it backwards without severe pain. NP Harper suspected a labral or rotator-cuff tear and recommended an MRI.

Eventually, Ms. Crowe contacted her district manager and received a password to complete her workers’ compensation claim documents online. She filed a First Report of Injury on May 24. Logan’s filed a Notice of Denial on June 19, stating that Mr. Beers did not see her lift the silverware tub and that Ms. Crowe had a history of right-shoulder problems.

After Logan’s denied Ms. Crowe’s claim, she emailed Dr. Burns about Logan’s contention that she had a preexisting condition. Dr. Burns responded:

I do not believe that I have had any communications with any entity about your shoulder pain. Our medical records show that you were seen by Alicia Harper (NP) on May 18 and had NEW shoulder pain. There was no mention of previous history of shoulder pain. The first time I ever saw you was in 2016 and there was no mention of prior shoulder problems then. So I’m not sure where anyone would be able to call that a pre-existing condition.

Kobe Beers testified at the hearing1 that the first time he heard of Ms. Crowe’s claim was when his supervisors asked him for a written statement. He denied ever seeing Ms. Crowe lift a bin of silverware. When asked if he ever helped her lift a bin of silverware, he responded that he helped “a lot of people” but could not recall all of them. On cross-examination, Ms. Crowe asked Mr. Beers if she asked him on May 10 to come to the garage and help her carry a bin of silverware to the front. He said, “Maybe. I don’t know. I can’t remember an exact day or anything about it.”

Ms. Crowe said she still suffers from shoulder pain. She asked the Court to order Logan’s to provide medical treatment and temporary disability benefits.

Logan’s countered that Ms. Crowe is not entitled to additional workers’ compensation benefits. It questioned whether the injury actually occurred as she described, arguing that the incident was unwitnessed and Ms. Crowe delayed telling anyone about it. Logan’s also contended that her problems were the result of a 1 Logan’s called several witnesses. Most of their testimony related to whether Ms. Crowe gave adequate legal notice of her injury, i.e., whether she received training in reporting workers’ compensation claims and when she actually reported this claim. Because Logan’s eventually conceded during the hearing that it had notice of Ms. Crowe’s claim within fifteen days of May 5, the Court finds it unnecessary to summarize that testimony or address the notice defense. 2 preexisting medical condition that was not aggravated by a work injury. Further, it argued that Ms. Crowe failed to establish that her shoulder condition arose primarily out of and in the course and scope of her employment.

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

Standard applied

Ms. Crowe need not prove every element of her claim by a preponderance of the evidence in order to obtain relief at an expedited hearing. Instead, she must present sufficient evidence demonstrating that she is likely to prevail at a hearing on the merits. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-239(d)(1) (2018); McCord v. Advantage Human Resourcing, 2015 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 6, at *7-8, 9 (Mar. 27, 2015).

Causation

To prove a compensable injury, Ms. Crowe must show that her alleged injury arose primarily out of and in the course and scope of her employment. To do so, she must identify a work-related incident, or specific set of incidents, identifiable by time and place of occurrence, that led to the injury. Further, she must show, “to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that [the incident] contributed more than fifty percent (50%) in causing the . . . disablement or need for medical treatment, considering all causes.” “Shown to a reasonable degree of medical certainty” means that, in the opinion of the treating physician, it is more likely than not considering all causes as opposed to speculation or possibility. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-102(14).

Applying these principles to the facts of this case, the Court first notes that Ms. Crowe’s description of the work-related incident has been unwavering – from her visit at Dr. Burns’ office, to the First Report of Injury she completed, to the Petition for Benefit Determination, her affidavit, and her testimony. She consistently described feeling a pop in her shoulder while carrying a bin of silverware at work. Logan’s presented no evidence of any other cause of the injury. Rather, Logan’s opposition is Mr. Beers’ testimony and the argument that Ms. Crowe delayed reporting the work injury.

Regarding the alleged delay in reporting, a factual dispute exists as to when Logan’s had actual notice of the injury. Ms. Crowe claimed she reported it to Ms. Webb the day after it happened. Ms. Webb testified that she knew of Ms. Crowe’s injury but was unaware that it occurred at work. Ultimately, this dispute is irrelevant. Regardless of when Logan’s received notice, it admitted Ms. Crowe reported her work injury within the fifteen-day period required by the statute. Further, it offered no authority for the proposition that merely delaying a report of injury until the end of the fifteen-day period constitutes cause to deny a claim.

3 As to Mr. Beers, the Court found him earnest, but his testimony and written statements ran the gamut between contradictory and immaterial. His written statements, which Logan’s emphasized were created on May 25,2 said that he had not seen Ms. Crowe lift any silverware “in the last week.” As the injury occurred over two weeks before May 25, these statements do not shed any light on whether Ms. Crowe lifted the bin on May 10.

Mr. Beers’ hearing testimony fared no better than his written statements. He first testified that he never saw Ms. Crowe lift a bin of silverware.

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Related

§ 50-6-102
Tennessee § 50-6-102(14)
§ 50-6-239
Tennessee § 50-6-239(d)(1)

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Bluebook (online)
2019 TN WC 24, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/crowe-julie-v-logans-roadhouse-tennworkcompcl-2019.