Crowder v. Progressive Parking Solutions

District Court, E.D. Wisconsin·Decided May 18, 2021·No. 2:19-cv-01473·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN

ROBERT LAWRENCE CROWDER,

Plaintiff, v. Case No. 19-cv-1473-pp

PROGRESSIVE PARKING SOLUTIONS,

Defendant.

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S AMENDED MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED WITHOUT PREPAYING FILING FEE (DKT. NO. 6); CONCLUDING THAT PLAINTIFF HAS STATED A TITLE VII EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CLAIM; ORDERING SERVICE AND ORDERING DEFENDANT TO FILE RESPONSIVE PLEADING

On October 9, 2019, the plaintiff (representing himself) filed a complaint alleging that the defendant, his former employer, violated his rights based on his race. Dkt. No. 1. The complaint did not indicate whether the plaintiff had filed a Charge of Discrimination with the federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission or a Fair Employment Complaint with the Wisconsin Department of Workforce Development Equal Rights Division before filing the lawsuit. On February 23, 2021, the court issued an order giving the plaintiff a deadline of March 26, 2021 by which to file either a Notice of Right to Sue letter from the EEOC or a notice of probable cause/no probable cause from the Wisconsin Equal Rights Division. Dkt. No. 5. On March 11, 2021—well before the deadline the court had set—the court received from the plaintiff an initial determination of no probable cause from the Wisconsin ERD, dated June 7, 2019. Dkt. No. 7. Along with his October 9 complaint, the plaintiff filed a motion for leave to proceed without prepaying the filing fee. Dkt. No. 2. On February 23, 2021,

the court denied without prejudice that motion without prejudice because the motion did not provide the court with enough information. Dkt. No. 5. The court gave the plaintiff the same deadline—March 26, 2021—by which to file an amended completed motion, id., which the plaintiff filed on March 11, 2021, dkt. no. 6. I. Amended Motion to Proceed without Prepaying the Filing Fee (Dkt. No. 6)

To allow the plaintiff to proceed without prepaying the filing fee, the court first must decide whether the plaintiff can pay the fee; if not, it must determine whether the lawsuit is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 28 U.S.C. §§1915(a) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). The plaintiff states that he is employed, unmarried and has no dependents. Dkt. No. 6 at 1. He works for Infinite Shield in West Allis, Wisconsin and has a monthly income of $2,150. Id. at 2. The plaintiff has monthly payments of $800 for rent, $250 for his vehicle, $500 for general household expenses and $100 for car insurance. Id. at 2-3. He owns a 2007 Chevrolet Impala worth an estimated $3,000 and has about $400 in savings. Id. at 3. As for any other circumstances relating to his finances, the plaintiff noted, “I have a lot of debt with bill collectors and that’s why my income is insufficient.” Id. at 4. The plaintiff reports monthly income of $2,150 and $1,650 in monthly expenses, resulting in a $500 monthly surplus. Someone who has $500 left over each month after he pays his bills ought to be able to pay a $400 filing fee for a lawsuit. But the plaintiff says that he has debts with bill collectors—debts

that he has not listed as part of his monthly expenses. The court has questions about why the plaintiff has not provided more information about these debts, but at this point, the court will allow the plaintiff to proceed without prepaying the filing fee. This does not mean that the plaintiff does not owe the filing fee; the Seventh Circuit has held that “every . . . person who proceeds [without prepaying the filing fee]” is “liable for the full fees,” because “all [28 U.S.C.] § 1915(a) does for any litigant is excuse the pre-payment of fees.” Robbins v.

Switzer, 104 F.3d 895, 898 (7th Cir. 1997); see also Rosas v. Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Chi., 748 F. App’x 64, 65 (7th Cir. 2019) (“Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), a district court may allow a litigant to proceed ‘without prepayment of fees,’ but not without ever paying fees.”). The plaintiff must pay the $400 filing fee over time as he is able to do so. II. Screening The court must also decide whether the plaintiff has raised claims that

are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §1915A(b). To state a claim under the federal notice pleading system, a plaintiff must provide a “short and plain statement of the claim” showing that he is entitled to relief. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2). A plaintiff does not need to plead every fact supporting his claims; he needs only to give the defendants fair notice of the claim and the grounds upon which it rests. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting

Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). At the same time, the allegations “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id. The court must liberally construe the allegations of her complaint. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). A. Facts Alleged in the Complaint The complaint states that the plaintiff was employed by the defendant, a valet parking company. Dkt. No. 1 at 2. He says that on January 2, 2019, he was discharged as an employee of the defendant. Id. The plaintiff alleges that

Jessica Berlin, an assistant manager of the defendant, approached him and escorted him to a table at Aurora Sinai Medical Center on North 12th Street in Milwaukee,1 where they had a discussion about the day before when the plaintiff accidentally had taken home a customer’s car key. Id. The plaintiff says that during this conversation, Berlin mentioned that a customer had said that the plaintiff was on his phone; he says the defendant had a rule not to have any cell phone usage. Id. at 2-3. The plaintiff alleges that as a result of his

cell phone use, Berlin terminated him as an employee. Id. at 3.

1 The plaintiff does not explain how he and a coworker ended up at a hospital several miles from his employer, or why they were there. The plaintiff says he feels that his rights were violated because he is African American; he says that a Caucasian employee recently had been caught on his cell phone before the plaintiff was discharged. Id. The plaintiff says that this employee was disciplined “for it multiple times but never” discharged. Id.

The plaintiff asserts that he had never been disciplined for anything—he got fired for this one incident. Id. The plaintiff filed a Fair Employment Complaint with the State of Wisconsin Department of Workforce Development Equal Rights Division and received a notice of no probable cause on June 7, 2019. Dkt. No. 7. The plaintiff seeks money damages, but says that the lawsuit isn’t about money. Id. at 4. He says he feels humiliated and that potential employers have looked at him differently when they found out what happened to him. Id.

B. Analysis Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 says that “an employer may not discriminate based on ‘race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.’” Abrego v.

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