Crow v. Seaborne Freight & Logistics INC

• Court: District Court, D. Nevada
• Decided: July 11, 2025
• Docket: 2:25-cv-00135
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

4 DISTRICT OF NEVADA

5 STEPHEN CROW, Case No. 2:25-cv-00135-ART-NJK 6 Plaintiff, ORDER ON MOTION FOR DEFAULT 7 v. JUDGMENT AND OTHER PENDING MOTIONS 8 SEABORNE FREIGHT & LOGISTICS INC.; et al., (ECF Nos. 6, 9, 11, 20) 9 Defendants. 10 11 Plaintiff Stephen Crow moves for default judgment against Defendant 12 Seaborne Freight & Logistics, Inc. (ECF No. 20.) The Court grants Crow’s motion 13 and dismisses his other pending ex parte motions for claim and delivery and 14 preliminary injunctive relief as moot. (ECF Nos. 6, 9, 11.) 15 I. Background 16 Plaintiff Stephen Crow paid over $3 million for a box of diamonds and gold 17 from Judy Carl, a person with whom he communicated on social media 18 applications in 2023 and 2024 and may have met at a manufacturer’s wholesale 19 meeting in 2014. (ECF No. 18 at 4; see ECF No. 18-6.) Carl allegedly shipped the 20 box of gold and diamonds via Defendant Seaborne Freight, but Crow never 21 received it. (ECF No. 18 at 5.) 22 Crow sued Carl, Seaborne, and other companies and individuals allegedly 23 involved with procuring the box under the federal RICO and several state 24 statutes. (See ECF No. 1.) The Clerk entered default against Seaborne after it 25 failed to make an appearance upon being served. (ECF No. 16.) Seaborne has still 26 not entered an appearance. (See ECF No. 18.) 27 II. Legal Standard for Default Judgment 28 After the Clerk has entered default against a party, an opposing party may 1 seek default judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b). In deciding whether to grant default 2 judgment, the Court considers factors including “(1) the possibility of prejudice 3 to the plaintiff, (2) the merits of plaintiff's substantive claim, (3) the sufficiency of 4 the complaint, (4) the sum of money at stake in the action, (5) the possibility of a 5 dispute concerning material facts, (6) whether the default was due to excusable 6 neglect, and (7) the strong policy underlying the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 7 favoring decisions on the merits.” See NewGen, LLC v. Safe Cig, LLC, 840 F.3d 8 606, 613–14 (9th Cir. 2016) (citing Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471–72 (9th 9 Cir. 1986)). 10 III. Analysis 11 The Clerk has already entered default against Seaborne (ECF No. 17). 12 Accordingly, the Court considers Crow’s motion for default judgment. 13 A. Prejudice to Plaintiff 14 The possibility of prejudice to the plaintiff may be satisfied by showing that 15 a plaintiff lacks recourse without default judgment. Nolan v. Calello, No. 2:21- 16 CV-00981-AB-RAO, 2021 WL 4621945, at *3 (C.D. Cal. July 8, 2021); BBK 17 Tobacco & Foods, LLP v. Aims Grp. USA Corp., No. 2:22-CV-01648-GMN-BNW, 18 2024 WL 1160715, at *3 (D. Nev. Mar. 15, 2024). In this case, Crow has lost a 19 significant amount of money due to Seaborne’s alleged fraud, and Seaborne has 20 failed to respond or appear in the suit. (ECF No. 17.) This shows prejudice. 21 B. Merits of Plaintiff’s Claims and Sufficiency of Complaint 22 Crow’s complaint must allege facts that support plausible, legally 23 cognizable claims. NewGen, 840 F.3d at 613–14. Crow seeks relief for his fraud, 24 claim and delivery, and RICO claims. 25 1. Fraud 26 To allege fraud, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) requires a party to state 27 “with particularity” the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake. Fed. R. Civ. 28 P. 9(b). To satisfy Rule 9(b), the complaint must include “an account of the time, 1 place, and specific content of the false representations as well as the identities of 2 the parties to the misrepresentations.” Cuadros v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 3 No. 2:16-CV-2025-JCM-VCF, 2017 WL 2683681, at *4 (D. Nev. June 20, 2017) 4 (quoting Swartz v. KPMG LLP, 476 F.3d 756, 764 (9th Cir. 2007)). The plaintiff 5 must allege the following elements with particularity: “(1) a false representation 6 made by the defendant; (2) defendant’s knowledge or belief that its representation 7 was false or that defendant has an insufficient basis of information for making 8 the representation; (3) that defendant intended to induce plaintiff to act or refrain 9 from acting upon the misrepresentation; and (4) damage to the plaintiff as a result 10 of relying on the misrepresentation.” Greenstein v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 2:14- 11 CV-01457-APG-CWH, 2017 WL 1173916, at *4 (D. Nev. 2017) (quoting Barmettler 12 v. Reno Air, Inc., 956 P.2d 1382, 1386 (Nev. 1998)). 13 Here, Crow has alleged fraud with particularity. Judy Carl told Crow on or 14 about January 9, 2024, that she was inheriting diamonds, gold, and farmland. 15 (ECF No. 1-3 at 2.) She represented that she was shipping the diamonds and gold 16 with an agent named Jerome Bradley via Seaborne Freight & Logistics, and 17 Seaborne sent Crow a tracking number. (Id.) Judy Carl represented that she was 18 the owner of the box. (Id.) On or about November 5, 2024, Seaborne told Crow 19 that the tracking number had changed. (Id.) Seaborne’s agent, Michael Ali, 20 represented to Crow that the box and its contents would arrive at Harry Reid 21 International Airport in Las Vegas on January 21, 2025. (Id.) This, Crow alleges, 22 turned out to be false: the box was never delivered. (ECF No. 1 at 4-6, 11.) Each 23 time the box was allegedly going to be delivered, Seaborne canceled the delivery, 24 and Seaborne and other Defendants told Crow that he needed to pay more. (Id. 25 at 11.) Crow alleges that Seaborne knew these misrepresentations to be false 26 because no one ever never sent him the box, and Seaborne and other Defendants 27 stopped responding to requests to deliver the box. (Id.) Crow alleges that Seaborne 28 intended to induce Crow to pay $3 million in wire transfers for the box. (Id. at 1 11.) Crow has alleged $3 million in damages arising out of his reliance on 2 Seaborne’s misrepresentations that they would send the box. (Id.) Crow’s fraud 3 claim is alleged sufficiently. 4 2. Claim and Delivery 5 Claim and delivery is “an action for the repossession of personal property 6 wrongfully taken or detained by the defendant.” Cannabis Sci., Inc. v. Mohammad 7 Isam Afaneh, 2:13-cv-00114-GMN-CWH, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9661*, at *8 (D. 8 Nev. Jan. 13, 2013); NRS 17.120; see also Ovation Fin. Holdings, LLC v. Reborn 9 Skin Care LLC, A-21-828711-C, 2022 Nev. Dist. LEXIS 124*, at *4, *6 (8th Dist. 10 Ct. Nev. Jan. 24, 2022) (ordering delivery of equipment following default judgment 11 on claim-and-delivery claim). 12 Here, Crow has sufficiently alleged that Defendant wrongfully detained the 13 box that Crow owned. (ECF No. 1 at 11.) Plaintiff’s allegation of claim and delivery 14 is sufficient. 15 3. RICO Claim for Wire Fraud 16 “The elements of a civil RICO claim are as follows: (1) conduct (2) of an 17 enterprise (3) through a pattern (4) of racketeering activity (known as ‘predicate 18 acts’) (5) causing injury to plaintiff’s business or property.” United Bhd. of 19 Carpenters and Joiners of Am. v. Bldg. and Constr. Trades Dep’t, AFL-CIO, 770 20 F.3d 834, 837 (9th Cir. 2014). An enterprise “includes any individual, 21 partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union or 22 group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity.” 18 U.S.C. at 23 § 1961(4); see also Boyle v. U.S., 56 U.S. 938, 944 (2009) (“the RICO statute 24 provides that its terms are to be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial 25 purposes”). A pattern of racketeering activity “requires at least two acts of 26 racketeering activity, one of which occurred after the effective date of this chapter 27 and the last of which occurred within ten years… after the commission of a prior 28 act of racketeering activity.” 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4). Racketeering activity includes 1 “any act which is indictable under… § 1343 (relating to wire fraud).” 18 U.S.C. § 2 1961(1). 3 While Crow alleges facts showing conduct and an enterprise, (see ECF No. 4 1 at 2-3, 11), he does not allege plausible facts suggesting two acts of 5 racketeering. 6 The first instance of alleged conduct, wire fraud, is plausible because Crow 7 alleges sufficient facts to support it in his declaration (ECF No. 1-3) and several 8 exhibits (ECF Nos. 1-4, 1-5, 1-6, 1-7, 1-13, 1-14, and 1-15.). (ECF No. 1 at 12.) 9 Seaborne and Judy Carl represented that Crow would receive the box, but every 10 time the box was supposedly in route, Seaborne and others would tell Crow that 11 additional fees and costs were needed before it could be delivered. (Id. at 10-12); 12 see supra III.B.1. Ultimately the box never was delivered. (ECF No. 1 at 12.) 13 The second alleged racketeering act fails to meet pleading standards. Crow 14 alleges that this conduct “involved the creation and use of fraudulently recorded 15 instruments (including the recording of same) for misrepresenting the truth in 16 order to obtain loan funds from financial institutions.” (Id. at 12.) Unlike the other 17 allegations in this complaint, no facts in the complaint support this allegation. 18 See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“a complaint [does not] suffice if 19 it tenders naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement”). No exhibits 20 or other allegations show how Defendant fraudulently obtained loans from 21 financial institutions. (See ECF No. 1.) This allegation cannot serve as the basis 22 to prove a pattern of racketeering activity. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4). 23 Accordingly, these Eitel factors favor granting default judgment on the 24 fraud claim and the claim-and-delivery claim, but not on the RICO claim. 25 C. Damages at Stake in Relation to Seriousness 26 The damages at stake in the case are proportional to the seriousness of 27 Seaborne’s conduct. The amount that Seaborne allegedly defrauded Crow is 28 proportionate to Seaborne’s conduct. See, e.g., Perciballi v. Henry N., No. SACV 1 08-01168 JVS, 2017 WL 6184001, at *4 (C.D. Cal. 2017) (holding the amount the 2 Seabornes defrauded the plaintiffs is proportional to the harm caused). As 3 discussed above, Crow successfully states a claim for fraud against Seaborne, 4 and the Court finds Crow’s allegation of damages appropriate. 5 D. Disputes of Material Facts 6 There is no dispute concerning material facts at this stage in proceedings. 7 NewGen, 840 F.3d at 616. After the Clerk has entered default, “the well-pleaded 8 allegations of the complaint relating to a defendant's liability are taken as true, 9 with the exception of the allegations as to the amount of damages.” PepsiCo, Inc. 10 v. California Sec. Cans, 238 F. Supp. 2d 1172, 1175 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (citing 11 TeleVideo Systems, Inc. v. Heidenthal, 826 F.2d 915, 917–18 (9th Cir.1987)). 12 Accordingly, this factor also weighs in favor of default judgment. 13 E. Excusable Neglect 14 Seaborne’s neglect of this lawsuit is not excusable. When a defendant fails 15 to make an appearance after being properly served, this factor favors default 16 judgment. See Bd. of Trustees of Constr. Indus. & Laborers Health & Welfare Tr. 17 v. Bottom Line Constr., No. 2:23-CV-00830-JCM-DJA, 2024 WL 3104519, at *3 18 (D. Nev. June 24, 2024). Seaborne was served with the summons and complaint. 19 (See ECF No. 13.) It did not respond. Accordingly, this factor weighs in favor of 20 default judgment. 21 F. Policy Favoring Decision on the Merits 22 Here a decision on the merits is unlikely despite the federal rules’ strong 23 policy preference for deciding cases “upon their merits whenever possible.” 24 Newgen, 840 F.3d at 616 (citing Eitel, 782 F.2d at 1471–72). As Seaborne has not 25 participated in this case at all over its entire duration, the Court finds that 26 deciding the case on the merits is unlikely. See PepsiCo, 238 F. Supp. 2d at 1175. 27 This factor does not preclude the Court from granting default judgment. 28 Accordingly, the Court finds that the factors weigh in favor of granting 1 default judgment. 2 G. Damages 3 Crow has provided evidence of his damages. See Geddes v. United Fin. Grp., 4 559 F.2d 557, 560 (9th Cir. 1977) (allegations of damages not taken as true when 5 considering default). In the motion for default judgment, Crow requests 6 compensatory damages of $3,630,070.40 “as evidenced by wire transfer records.” 7 (ECF No. 20 at 10.) In Crow’s Declaration (ECF No. 1-3), he alleges over 8 $3,000,000 in fraud damages. (See ECF No. 1-3 at ¶ 20.) (“I sent wire transfers 9 that totaled over $3 Million concerning the acquisition of the subject box and its 10 contents”). The wire transfer records Crow attached to his complaint total to 11 $2,278,011.40 (ECF No. 1-7) and the exhibits attached to the motion for default 12 judgment (ECF No. 18) add another $783,770, for a total of $3,061,781.40: 13 • 8/2/24 transfer: $150,000 (ECF No. 1-7 at 2.) 14 • 8/7/24 transfer: $250,000 (Id. at 7.) 15 • 8/12/24 transfer: $150,000 (Id. at 12.) 16 • 7/22/24 transfer: $105,000 (Id. at 17.) 17 • 7/29/24 transfer: $167,500 (Id. at 23.) 18 • 8/16/24 transfer: $250,035 (Id. at 28.) 19 • 7/10/24 transfer: $69,600 (Id. at 32.) 20 • 7/3/24 transfer: $196,000 (Id. at 38.) 21 • 7/17/24 transfer: $225,600 (Id. at 44.) 22 • 2/17/24 transfer: $92,500 (Id. at 52.) 23 • 2/15/24 transfer: $1,500 (Id. at 58.) 24 • 3/11/24 transfer: $31,780 (Id. at 64.) 25 • 3/7/24 transfer: $33,000 (Id. at 65.) 26 • 3/18/24 transfer: $153,000 (Id. at 71.) 27 • 3/12/24 transfer: $54,200 (Id. at 76.) 28 • 2/28/24 transfer: $64,780 (Id. at 84.) 1 • 6/17/24 transfer: $100,000 (Id. at 90.) 2 • 6/25/24 transfer: $116,000 (Id. at 95.) 3 • 2/23/24 transfer: $40,950.40 (Id. at 101.) 4 • 4/16/24 ATM deposit: $26,566. (Id. at 102.) 5 • 8/21/24 transfer: $125,035 (ECF No. 18-15 at 2.) 6 • 1/24/24 transfer: $37,000 (Id. at 3.) 7 • 11/24/24 transfer: $50,000 (Id. at 6-7.) 8 • 12/17/24 transfer: $80,000 (Id. at 8-9.) 9 • 11/27/24 transfer: $73,700 (Id. at 10-11.) 10 • 11/4/24 transfer: $78,000 (Id. at 12.) 11 • 9/27/24 transfer: $190,000 (Id. at 13-14.) 12 • 9/6/24 transfer: $150,035 (Id. at 15-16.) 13 Based on the wire transfer records, it is unclear what the basis is for the 14 extra compensatory damages, totaling around $600,000. (See ECF No. 1-7, ECF 15 No. 18-15.) 16 Regarding the box, since Plaintiff requests a writ of possession and not the 17 value of the box itself, there is no need to evaluate Plaintiff’s appraisal of the box’s 18 value. (See ECF No. 20 at 10.) 19 The Court must also consider Plaintiff’s claim for attorney’s fees. “Under 20 both federal and Nevada law, valid contractual provisions for the payment of 21 attorneys’ fees constitute a sufficient source of authority supporting a fee award.” 22 Hunt v. Zuffa, LLC, 528 F. Supp. 3d 1180, 1183 (D. Nev. 2021). A motion for 23 attorney’s fees must include a reasonable itemization and description of the work 24 performed, and an itemization of all costs sought to be charged as part of the fee 25 award. LR 54-14. The motion should also include a brief summary of the results 26 obtained; the time and labor required; the novelty and difficulty of questions; skill 27 required to perform the services properly; the preclusion of other employment by 28 the attorneys due to acceptance of the case; the customary fee; whether the fee 1 is fixed or contingent; the time limitations imposed by the client or 2 circumstances; the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys; the 3 undesirability of the case, the nature and length of the professional relationship 4 with the client; awards in similar cases; and any other information the court may 5 request. Id.; see also Kerr v. Screen Extras Guild, Inc., 526 F.2d 67, 70 (9th Cir. 6 1975). 7 Plaintiff has not provided briefing or evidence to justify an award of 8 attorney’s fees, and the Court accordingly does not grant his request. 9 The Court permits Plaintiff to submit a motion to alter judgment under 10 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 59 or 60 for the limited purpose of explaining 11 the legal and factual basis for the other $600,000 in compensatory damages and 12 attorney’s fees. 13 IV. Writ of Possession 14 “Every remedy is available that, under the law of the state where the court 15 is located, provides for seizing … property to secure satisfaction of the potential 16 judgment.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 64(a). Nevada provides for the seizing of property 17 through a writ of possession. NRS 31.840; see also Spectrum Leasing USA, Inc. v. 18 Elite Extraction Services Corp., 2:22-cv-00400, 2022 WL 1316362, at *1-*2 (D. 19 Nev. May 2, 2022) (ordering a show cause hearing on writ of possession). 20 The Court allows Plaintiff to file an affidavit showing: (1) “that the plaintiff 21 is the owner of the property claimed (particularly describing it), or is lawfully 22 entitled to the possession thereof”; (2) “that the property is wrongfully detained 23 by the defendant”; (3) the alleged cause of the detention thereof according to the 24 plaintiff’s best knowledge, information and belief”; (4) “that the same has not been 25 taken for a tax, assessment or fine pursuant to a statute, or seized under an 26 execution or an attachment against the property of the plaintiff, or, if so seized, 27 that it is by state exempt from such seizure”; (5) “the actual value of the property.” 28 NRS 31.850. 1 Although Plaintiff attached this information in Crow’s declaration (ECF No. 2 || 1-3), NRS 31.850 requires this information to be in an affidavit. 3 If the affidavit shows these five elements, the Court, under NRS 31.853, 4 || would issue an order directed to Defendant to show cause why the property 5 || should not be taken from Defendant and delivered to Plaintiff and set a hearing. 6 || NRS 31.853. 7 V. Conclusion 8 The Court grants Crow’s motion for default judgment against Defendant 9 || Seaborne Logistics (ECF No. 20) on Crow’s fraud and claim and delivery claims, 10 || but not on Crow’s RICO claim. The Court finds Crow’s damages under these 11 || claims to be $3,061,781.40. 12 Plaintiff may submit an affidavit under NRS 31.850 regarding the requested 13 || writ of possession, as well as briefing for additional compensatory damages and 14 || attorney’s fees. 15 The Court dismisses Crow’s other pending ex parte motions for claim and 16 || delivery and preliminary injunctive relief as moot. (ECF Nos. 6, 9, 11.) 17 18 Dated this 11th day of July, 2025. 19 i en 20 , fe dln 21 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 22 23 24 25 26 27 28