Crow v. Manitex, Inc.

550 N.W.2d 175, 1996 Iowa App. LEXIS 57, 1996 WL 380618
CourtCourt of Appeals of Iowa
DecidedApril 23, 1996
Docket94-1239
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 550 N.W.2d 175 (Crow v. Manitex, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Iowa primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Crow v. Manitex, Inc., 550 N.W.2d 175, 1996 Iowa App. LEXIS 57, 1996 WL 380618 (iowactapp 1996).

Opinion

HABHAB, Presiding Judge.

David L. Crow was injured in an accident involving a truck-mounted hydraulic crane manufactured by Manitex, Inc., a wholly-owned subsidiary of the Manitowoc Company, Inc. L.E. Myers Construction Company, a general contractor, leased the crane and employed Crow at the time of the accident.

The boom of the crane has three hydraulic and two mechanical extensions. The two mechanical extensions of the crane are part of an assembly known as the jib, which folds alongside the boom as extended hydraulically when not in use. The final mechanical extension, called the jib stinger, telescopes out of the jib. When fully extended, it is locked in place by means of a T-bar pin to prevent it from retracting back into place.

At the head of the jib is a semi-permanent stop pin which prevents the stinger from extending totally out of the jib. The stop pin is secured in place by snap rings. 1 Both the stop pin and the T-bar only go through the jib. There are no holes in the stinger. On a properly maintained Manitex truck crane, there is only one choice of holes in which to place the T-bar pin.

The accident occurred as the result of two Myers employees failing to properly pin the extension of the crane known as the stinger. Because a pin was missing, the employees had the choice of two holes to place the stinger pin in and they picked the wrong one. Also, without knowing it was improper, the employees attached a basket to the end of the stinger and attempted to hoist Crow in the air. As a result of the improper pinning, when the employees raised the crane the stinger suddenly retracted. Upon retraction, the basket attachment broke and the basket and Crow fell to the ground.

Crow brought an action against Manitex, Manitowoc, and several other defendants. He settled with all the defendants except Manitex and Manitowoc prior to trial. The court submitted the matter to the jury on theories of strict liability by reason of the alleged defective design of the crane’s pinning system and attachment assembly between the stinger and the basket. Additionally, the court submitted a negligence claim based upon Manitex’s failure to warn some users the basket could not be attached to the stinger. The jury returned a verdict in Crow’s favor, awarding him $740,000. The court denied Manitex and Manitowoc’s motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and new trial.

Manitex and Manitowoc 2 appeal.

I.

Manitex makes related claims regarding submission of the theories of liability. First, Manitex contends the district court erred in denying the motion notwithstanding the verdict. In reviewing a motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, we consider whether the evidence, taken in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, shows the movant was entitled to a directed verdict at the close of all the evidence. McGough v. Gabus, 526 N.W.2d 328, 334 (Iowa 1995). When reviewing such a ruling, we look to see whether the evidence on an issue was sufficient to generate a jury question. Id. Second, Manitex contends there was insufficient proof to support the giving of the instructions on the theories of liability. Parties have a right to have then-legal theories submitted to the jury as long as they are supported by the pleadings and substantial evidence. Anderson v. Low Rent Housing Comm’n, 304 N.W.2d 239, 249 (Iowa), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1086, 102 S.Ct. 645, 70 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981); Cerro Gordo Hotel Co. v. City of Mason City, 505 N.W.2d *178 509, 511 (Iowa App.1993). Error in giving or refusing to give jury instructions is reversible, only if prejudicial. Stover v. Lakeland Square Owners Ass’n, 434 N.W.2d 866, 868 (Iowa 1989).

II.

Manitex argues it had no duty to warn because the dangers of the Manitex model 1570 were known to the L.E. Myers employees. Manitex cites us to Nichols v. Westfield Indus., Ltd., 380 N.W.2d 392, 401 (Iowa 1985), and Crow cites us to West v. Broderick & Bascom Rope Co., 197 N.W.2d 202 (Iowa 1972). In addition, Crow argues that instruction 10(B) (10(B) concerns negligent failure to warn) was properly submitted for it conforms to comment b of section 388 of the Restatement 2d of Torts.

It is clear under Iowa law that when the risks involved are known and obvious, there is no need for a warning under the standard in section 388 of the Restatement. Nichols, 380 N.W.2d at 401. As Justice Carter stated in Nichols when speaking for the majority of our supreme court:

We conclude that under section 388 of the Restatement, a supplier’s duty is to warn of dangers which are not obvious with respect to the use of a chattel in the condition in which it was supplied. It does not require the supplier to give information concerning available means of amelioration of obvious dangers, even though it is aware of these means and a party to whom the chattel is supplied is not.

Nichols, 380 N.W.2d at 401. The risks in this case, by and through the testimony of those witnesses who were directly and indirectly involved in the accident, were readily apparent. Those who were involved were well aware of the danger of mispinning the jib stinger and the possible consequences resulting therefrom. The dangers in this case were not only known but were so readily obvious there was no need for a warning.

Robert Brown, one of the two men doing the pinning, testified they were aware of and had read the cautionary decal on the crane which warned if the crane was not pinned properly the stinger might suddenly retract. In addition, both the crane operator, Bob Ryan, and Brown testified they used the instruction manual so they would not improperly pin the crane. Given the awareness of the cautionary decal and deliberate attempt to follow the instructions, we find the men in charge of pinning the crane were aware of the danger involved in the pinning process; thus, there was adequate warning of the potential danger that could arise if the crane were improperly pinned.

As it relates to Ryan’s testimony concerning the instruction manual, it is clear the manual was in his possession and it was referred to so that they “would pin it right” and “didn’t mess up.” The employees took some fifteen to twenty minutes in their attempt to properly pin the stinger. They were well aware that if the wrong hole was pinned, a retraction of the stinger could occur snapping the stop pin and injuring the person in the basket. Taking the testimony as a whole, it is clear to us they knew of the possible danger, as well as the consequences stemming from it, and there was really nothing an additional warning could have accomplished.

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Bluebook (online)
550 N.W.2d 175, 1996 Iowa App. LEXIS 57, 1996 WL 380618, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/crow-v-manitex-inc-iowactapp-1996.