Crosstex North Texas Pipeline, L.P. v. Andrew Gardiner and Shannon Gardiner

451 S.W.3d 150, 2014 Tex. App. LEXIS 12343, 2014 WL 5877903
CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedNovember 13, 2014
Docket02-12-00182-CV
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 451 S.W.3d 150 (Crosstex North Texas Pipeline, L.P. v. Andrew Gardiner and Shannon Gardiner) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Crosstex North Texas Pipeline, L.P. v. Andrew Gardiner and Shannon Gardiner, 451 S.W.3d 150, 2014 Tex. App. LEXIS 12343, 2014 WL 5877903 (Tex. Ct. App. 2014).

Opinions

OPINION

BOB McCOY, Justice.

I. Introduction

In six issues, Appellant Crosstex North Texas Pipeline, L.P. appeals the trial court’s judgment awarding Appellees Andrew and Shannon Gardiner over $2 million in damages for negligent nuisance. We reverse and remand.

II. Background

Between 1997 and 2002, the Gardiners bought two adjacent tracts of property — a sixty acre tract and a thirty-five acre tract — next to the horse farm in Denton County where they worked so they could ride their horses, run their cattle, enjoy the peace and quiet, and hold the land as a long-term investment for development. Farm-to-Market Road 1385 (FM 1385) borders the Gardiners’ land on two sides.

In 2005, Crosstex, which gathers, transports, and delivers natural gas to public utilities and other interstate pipelines, bought around twenty acres on FM 1385 across from the Gardiners’ land. In 2006, it obtained a pipeline easement from the Gardiners and then built on its land a compressor station that became operational in May 2007. The Gardiners sued Cros-stex for intentional and negligent nuisance, negligence in the installation and operation of the compressor station, and gross negligence. The trial court granted a directed verdict to Crosstex on the negligence cause of action, and ten of twelve jurors found Crosstex liable for negligent nuisance and awarded the Gardiners $2,042,500 in damages. This appeal followed.

III.Evidentiary Sufficiency

In its first issue, Crosstex argues that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the jury’s finding that it negligently created a nuisance. The Gard-iners respond that Crosstex was negligent in owning a station that created a nuisance for the area in which it was located.

A. Standards of Review

We may sustain a legal sufficiency challenge only when (l)the record discloses a complete absence of evidence of a vital fact; (2) the court is . barred by rules of law or of evidence from giving weight to the only evidence offered to prove a vital fact; (3) the evidence offered to prove a vital fact is no more than a mere scintilla; or (4) the evidence establishes conclusively the opposite of a vital fact. Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co. v. Martinez, 977 S.W.2d 328, 334 (Tex.1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1040, 119 S.Ct. 1336, 143 L.Ed.2d 500 (1999); Robert W. Calvert, “No Evidence" and “Insufficient Evidence" Points of Error, 38 Tex. L.Rev. 361, 362-63 (1960). In determining whether there is legally sufficient evidence to support the finding under review, we must consider evidence favorable to the finding if a reasonable factfin-der could and disregard evidence contrary to the finding unless a reasonable factfinder could not. Cent. Ready Mix Concrete Co. v. Islas, 228 S.W.3d 649, 651 (Tex.2007); City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 807, 827 (Tex.2005).

When reviewing an assertion that the evidence is factually insufficient to support a finding, we set aside the finding only if, after considering and weighing all [155]*155of the evidence in the record pertinent to that finding, we determine that the credible evidence supporting the finding is so weak, or so contrary to the overwhelming weight of all the evidence, that the answer should be set aside and a new trial ordered. Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 715 S.W.2d 629, 635 (Tex.1986) (op. on reh’g); Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex.1986); Garza v. Alviar, 395 S.W.2d 821, 823 (Tex.1965).

B. Negligent Nuisance

A nuisance “is a condition that substantially interferes with the use and enjoyment of land by causing unreasonable discomfort or annoyance to persons of ordinary sensibilities.” Barnes v. Mathis, 353 S.W.3d 760, 763 (Tex.2011) (citing Schneider Nat’l Carriers, Inc. v. Bates, 147 S.W.3d 264, 269 (Tex.2004)). An actionable nuisance may arise from an invasion of another’s interests attributable to activity that is intentional, negligent, or abnormal and out of place in its surroundings. Mathis v. Barnes, 377 S.W.3d 926, 930 (Tex.App.-Tyler 2012, no pet.); see also City of Tyler v. Likes, 962 S.W.2d 489, 503-04 (Tex.1997). Although not all nuisances are grounded in negligence, when negligence has created or contributed to the creation of a nuisance, the plaintiff must allege and prove a legal duty owed to the plaintiff, a breach of that duty by the defendant, and damage proximately resulting from the breach. Sage v. Wong, 720 S.W.2d 882, 885 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Wales Trucking Co. v. Stallcup, 465 S.W.2d 444, 447 (Tex.Civ.App.-Fort Worth) (“[Wlhere the act or condition in question can become a nuisance only by reason of the negligent manner in which it is performed or permitted, no right of recovery is shown independently of the existence of negligence.” (quoting 41 Tex. Jur.2d 591, § 17)), rev’d, 474 S.W.2d 184 (Tex.1971);1 see Weingarten Realty Investors v. Universal Servs. Co., No. 01-96-01400, 1997 WL 689435, at *6 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Oct. 23, 1997, pet. denied) (not designated for publication) (stating same); Columbian Carbon Co. v. Tholen, 199 S.W.2d 825, 828 (Tex.Civ.App.-Galveston 1947, writ ref'd) (stating same).2

[156]*156Liability for a negligent activity simply involves doing what a person of ordinary prudence would not have done or failing to do what a person of ordinary prudence would have done in the same or similar circumstances. See Timberwalk Apartments, Partners, Inc. v. Cain, 972 S.W.2d 749, 753 (Tex.1998). Likewise, liability for negligent nuisance depends on whether the defendant acted as a person or party of ordinary prudence would have under the same circumstances in a legitimate use of his property. See Gulf, C. & S.F. Ry. Co. v. Oakes, 94 Tex. 155, 163, 58 S.W. 999, 1002-03 (1900) (holding that railroad company was not liable for creating a negligent nuisance when it planted Bermuda grass that spread to neighboring property and facts failed to show that this was not a legitimate use of its property); see also Turner v. Big Lake Oil Co., 128 Tex. 155, 157-58, 96 S.W.2d 221, 221-22 (1936) (holding that for the plaintiffs to recover because the oil-well-operating defendants “permitted salt water to overflow their land, kill the vegetation, and pollute the water of their livestock, ‘they must allege and prove some specific act of neglect or must allege and prove that the water polluted was a water course’ ”); Humble Pipe Line Co. v. Anderson, 339 S.W.2d 259, 260, 265 (Tex.Civ.App.-Waco 1960, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (holding that negligence was an essential element of the plaintiffs’ nuisance cause of action against pipeline company for its pipeline having leaked and polluted their water well because pipeline did not constitute a nuisance per se);3 Tex. Lime Co. v. Hindman, 300 S.W.2d 112

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451 S.W.3d 150, 2014 Tex. App. LEXIS 12343, 2014 WL 5877903, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/crosstex-north-texas-pipeline-lp-v-andrew-gardiner-and-shannon-gardiner-texapp-2014.