Crossroads Lounge, Inc. v. City of Miami

195 So. 2d 232, 1967 Fla. App. LEXIS 5332
CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida
DecidedFebruary 7, 1967
DocketNo. 66-267
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 195 So. 2d 232 (Crossroads Lounge, Inc. v. City of Miami) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Crossroads Lounge, Inc. v. City of Miami, 195 So. 2d 232, 1967 Fla. App. LEXIS 5332 (Fla. Ct. App. 1967).

Opinions

PEARSON, Judge.

This appeal questions the yalidity of a zoning variance which was granted to a lessee of premises located less than 500 feet from another liquor establishment. The lessee (J & R Restaurant Corp.) had entered into an agreement to rent space, in a new building if it could secure a designated type of liquor license and secure a zoning variance. Thereafter, the lessee entered into an agreement to purchase the liquor license of a person whose property had been taken by eminent domain. The later agreement was also conditioned upon the lessee obtaining a variance.1 The City Commission adopted a resolution which granted the variance.2 The owners of the establishment which was located within 500 feet of the lessee brought suit in the circuit court to nullify the resolution. The circuit court found that the lessee had no hardship, but did not declare the resolution invalid because it felt that to do so would deprive the person who sold the license of his right to sell a valuable property. The final decree states:

“From the testimony adduced before me the Court is satisfied that the defendant, J & R RESTAURANT CORP., a Florida corporation, in and of itself does not satisfy the requirements of the Charter of the City of Miami as to hardship. However, it is the Court’s opinion that the hardship of the original licensee, Victor Scarpelli, is sufficient to justify the action taken by the Commission of the City of Miami.
[234]*234“It is further the Court’s opinion that in cases of this type the chancellor is not to second guess the legislative body of the municipality, but is only to determine whether facts exist upon which a legislative decision, agreeing with the chancellor’s view or not, could have been made. Since the licensee, Scarpelli, presented a bona fide hardship (taking of his property by eminent domain) a denial to him of the right to contract for the sale of his license would, in the Court’s opinion, compound the hardship.
“ * * * To deprive the licensee in this case of the opportunity to contract for the sale of his license, contingent on the procuring of a variance would, in the Court’s opinion, be pushing a man who was already about to fall.”

The main thrust of appellant’s attack upon the final decree is presented by its first point as follows: “Is the transferee of a liquor license entitled to a zoning variance by reason of the hardship of his trans-feror?”

An “exceptional and unique hardship to the individual landowner, unique to that parcel of property and not shared by property owners in the area, is an essential prerequisite to the granting of a ‘hardship’ zoning variance.” City of Miami v. Franklin Leslie, Inc., Fla.App.1965, 179 So.2d 622, 624. See also Elwyn v. City of Miami, Fla. App.1959, 113 So.2d 849. We have held a variance from a zoning ordinance on the ground of hardship to be invalid where the hardship was self-created because the owner knew of the restricted zoning ordinance prior to the acquisition of a beverage license. See Green v. City of Miami, Fla. App.1958, 107 So.2d 390.

The chancellor’s determination that J & R Restaurant Corp. did not show a hardship is supported by the record;3 therefore, the variance is invalid. See City [235]*235of Miami v. Franklin Leslie, Inc., Fla.App. 1965, 179 So.2d 622.

We do not discuss appellees’ point urging that a competitor does not have the standing to commence litigation attacking a resolution of the City Commission. This point appears to have been settled adversely to the appellees in Keating v. State, Fla.1965, 173 So.2d 673, and City of Miami v. Franklin Leslie, Inc., supra.

The final decree is reversed, and the cause is remanded with directions to enter a decree in accordance with the view expressed herein.

Reversed.

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Bluebook (online)
195 So. 2d 232, 1967 Fla. App. LEXIS 5332, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/crossroads-lounge-inc-v-city-of-miami-fladistctapp-1967.