STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT ANDROSCOGGIN, ss. Docket No. AP-10-19 M(7 ~ -· ,.:-' ,\;T) -· '.~ f, ~'" t } F
EILEEN CROSSMAN,
Petitioner
V. DECISION AND ORDER
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE COMMISSION, STATE OF MAINE
Defendant
Petitioner Eileen Crossman appeals from the decision of the Maine Unemployment
Insurance Commission denying her unemployment benefits, based on the Commission's
majority determination that she voluntarily left her employment without good cause attributable
to her employment.
BACKGROUND
Crossman began working for Pinetree Garden Seeds, a husband and wife co-owned mail
order and internet seed and gardening supply company, on January 31, 2008. Crossman was a
seasonal employee. Her duties included answering phone, taking and preparing orders, printing
labels, and shipping.
On January 14, 2010, the owners held a staff meeting at approximately 10:00 a.m. Prior
to the meeting Crossman approached the husband co-owner and suggested that the location of
the meeting be changed to accommodate an employee who was unable to go up the stairs to the
meeting location. The co-owner did not address this request; instead he complimented Crossman on the cover of the company catalog that featured a painting she had created. 1 The parties then
proceeded into the meeting.
During the meeting the husband co-owner stated that he was surprised there were no
credit card transactions on the previous Sunday, an indication that no phone orders were taken.
Crossman, who was not singled out by anyone, but who had worked on the Sunday in question,
stated that the phone had not rung on that day. The husband co-owner replied that he found that
hard to believe. Crossman became upset and repeatedly asked if the husband co-owner was
calling her a liar. He responded by saying "I guess so." Crossman then told the husband co-
owner that he owed her an apology, and that he was an "idiot." The husband co-owner did not
respond.
Crossman then demanded her paycheck. The husband co-owner directed the business
manager to prepare Crossman's paycheck, which, as it was a payday, would have been issued
later in the day. Crossman left the room with the business manager, and the husband co-owner
"waved his hands in an up and down motion and sarcastically said "bye-bye"' and continued on
with the meeting. The co-owner husband never told Crossman she was fired, nor did he ask her
to leave. At no point did the Crossman say she had quit.
A day or two after the incident the wife co-owner, Crossman's friend and next-door
neighbor, called Crossman. Crossman did not return the call, nor any of the subsequent calls
1 Crossman painted the picture in 2008, hoping that it would be used on the 2009 cover, but it was used instead on the 2010 catalog. There is a dispute between Crossman and the owners as to whether she authorized the use of the painting, and whether she was told she would be compensated for its use on the catalog cover. According to Crossman, the co-owners agreed to pay her $1,000 for the painting. She also stated that prior to the January 14, 2010 meeting the husband co-owner told her "she would be surprised," which she took to mean that she would indeed be compensated for the work. The co-owners dispute this, arguing that they may have complimented Crossman on the work, but there was no discussion of compensation. However, whether Crossman is owed compensation for the painting has little bearing on this appeal.
2 made by the co-owner wife to Crossman. Crossman never made any efforts to contact the
employer at any time after January 14, 201 0.
Crossman subsequently applied for unemployment benefits, a request that was initially
granted by a deputy who determined that Crossman was discharged but not for misconduct. The
employer appealed that determination to the Division of Administrative Appeals, which held
hearings on April13 and Apri115, 2010. The hearing officer concluded that Crossman left her
job voluntarily without good cause associated with her employment. Crossman appealed to the
Unemployment Insurance Commission, which held a hearing on October 13, 2010 where it also
concluded that Crossman left her work voluntarily and without good cause associated with her
employment, and thus was disqualified from receiving benefits. Crossman now appeals to this
court pursuant to Rule 80C.
DISCUSSION
When acting as an appellate body pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 80C, the court directly
examines the record before the agency and reviews its decision for errors of law, findings not
supported "by substantial evidence on the whole record," or other indications that the decision
was "[a]rbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion." 5 M.R.S. § 11 007(4)(C)
(2011); see also 5 M.R.S. § 11006(1) (2011) ("Judicial review shall be confined to the record
upon which the agency decision was based ... "). The court generally gives "great deference to
the Commission's interpretation of its own regulations." Farley v. Maine Unemployment Ins.
Comm 'n, 624 A.2d 1233, 1234 (Me. 1993).
Maine's Employment Security Law disqualifies a claimant from receiving unemployment
benefits if the claimant voluntarily left regular employment "without good cause attributable to
that employment." 26 M.R.S. § 1193(1)(A) (2009). Therefore, Crossman "had the burden of
3 proving to the Commission that she resigned with good cause attributable to her employment."
Spear v. Maine Unemployment Ins. Comm 'n, 505 A.2d 82, 84 (Me. 1986) (internal citations
omitted). "Good cause must be measured against a standard of reasonableness under all the
circumstances." Id. (citing Merrow v. Maine Unemployment Ins. Comm'n, 495 A.2d 1197, 1201
n.2 (Me. 1985). Accordingly, courts "use an objective test to determine whether an employee
has good cause to leave [her] employment." Id. (citing Therrien v. Maine Employment Security
Comm 'n, 370 A.2d 1385, 1389 (Me. 1977) (noting that the objective standard is used because
"cases can be easily imagined where an employee's behavior is in fact grounded upon some
sincere but irrational belief').
In this case, the Commission found that the husband co-owner did not fire Crossman;
rather Crossman left her job voluntarily. The court agrees. The evidence on the record
demonstrates that the co-owner never told Crossman she was fired, but that she "freely rna[ de] an
affirmative choice" to leave on January 14, 2010 after demanding her paycheck that she would
have received later that day. Snell v. Maine Unemployment Ins. Comm 'n, 484 A.2d 609, 610
(Me. 1984) (internal citation and quotations omitted).
The court also agrees with the Commission's finding that Crossman did not establish that
she had good cause to leave her employment. As noted by the Commission, and as demonstrated
by the evidence on the record, Crossman did not take reasonable steps to communicate her
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STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT ANDROSCOGGIN, ss. Docket No. AP-10-19 M(7 ~ -· ,.:-' ,\;T) -· '.~ f, ~'" t } F
EILEEN CROSSMAN,
Petitioner
V. DECISION AND ORDER
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE COMMISSION, STATE OF MAINE
Defendant
Petitioner Eileen Crossman appeals from the decision of the Maine Unemployment
Insurance Commission denying her unemployment benefits, based on the Commission's
majority determination that she voluntarily left her employment without good cause attributable
to her employment.
BACKGROUND
Crossman began working for Pinetree Garden Seeds, a husband and wife co-owned mail
order and internet seed and gardening supply company, on January 31, 2008. Crossman was a
seasonal employee. Her duties included answering phone, taking and preparing orders, printing
labels, and shipping.
On January 14, 2010, the owners held a staff meeting at approximately 10:00 a.m. Prior
to the meeting Crossman approached the husband co-owner and suggested that the location of
the meeting be changed to accommodate an employee who was unable to go up the stairs to the
meeting location. The co-owner did not address this request; instead he complimented Crossman on the cover of the company catalog that featured a painting she had created. 1 The parties then
proceeded into the meeting.
During the meeting the husband co-owner stated that he was surprised there were no
credit card transactions on the previous Sunday, an indication that no phone orders were taken.
Crossman, who was not singled out by anyone, but who had worked on the Sunday in question,
stated that the phone had not rung on that day. The husband co-owner replied that he found that
hard to believe. Crossman became upset and repeatedly asked if the husband co-owner was
calling her a liar. He responded by saying "I guess so." Crossman then told the husband co-
owner that he owed her an apology, and that he was an "idiot." The husband co-owner did not
respond.
Crossman then demanded her paycheck. The husband co-owner directed the business
manager to prepare Crossman's paycheck, which, as it was a payday, would have been issued
later in the day. Crossman left the room with the business manager, and the husband co-owner
"waved his hands in an up and down motion and sarcastically said "bye-bye"' and continued on
with the meeting. The co-owner husband never told Crossman she was fired, nor did he ask her
to leave. At no point did the Crossman say she had quit.
A day or two after the incident the wife co-owner, Crossman's friend and next-door
neighbor, called Crossman. Crossman did not return the call, nor any of the subsequent calls
1 Crossman painted the picture in 2008, hoping that it would be used on the 2009 cover, but it was used instead on the 2010 catalog. There is a dispute between Crossman and the owners as to whether she authorized the use of the painting, and whether she was told she would be compensated for its use on the catalog cover. According to Crossman, the co-owners agreed to pay her $1,000 for the painting. She also stated that prior to the January 14, 2010 meeting the husband co-owner told her "she would be surprised," which she took to mean that she would indeed be compensated for the work. The co-owners dispute this, arguing that they may have complimented Crossman on the work, but there was no discussion of compensation. However, whether Crossman is owed compensation for the painting has little bearing on this appeal.
2 made by the co-owner wife to Crossman. Crossman never made any efforts to contact the
employer at any time after January 14, 201 0.
Crossman subsequently applied for unemployment benefits, a request that was initially
granted by a deputy who determined that Crossman was discharged but not for misconduct. The
employer appealed that determination to the Division of Administrative Appeals, which held
hearings on April13 and Apri115, 2010. The hearing officer concluded that Crossman left her
job voluntarily without good cause associated with her employment. Crossman appealed to the
Unemployment Insurance Commission, which held a hearing on October 13, 2010 where it also
concluded that Crossman left her work voluntarily and without good cause associated with her
employment, and thus was disqualified from receiving benefits. Crossman now appeals to this
court pursuant to Rule 80C.
DISCUSSION
When acting as an appellate body pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 80C, the court directly
examines the record before the agency and reviews its decision for errors of law, findings not
supported "by substantial evidence on the whole record," or other indications that the decision
was "[a]rbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion." 5 M.R.S. § 11 007(4)(C)
(2011); see also 5 M.R.S. § 11006(1) (2011) ("Judicial review shall be confined to the record
upon which the agency decision was based ... "). The court generally gives "great deference to
the Commission's interpretation of its own regulations." Farley v. Maine Unemployment Ins.
Comm 'n, 624 A.2d 1233, 1234 (Me. 1993).
Maine's Employment Security Law disqualifies a claimant from receiving unemployment
benefits if the claimant voluntarily left regular employment "without good cause attributable to
that employment." 26 M.R.S. § 1193(1)(A) (2009). Therefore, Crossman "had the burden of
3 proving to the Commission that she resigned with good cause attributable to her employment."
Spear v. Maine Unemployment Ins. Comm 'n, 505 A.2d 82, 84 (Me. 1986) (internal citations
omitted). "Good cause must be measured against a standard of reasonableness under all the
circumstances." Id. (citing Merrow v. Maine Unemployment Ins. Comm'n, 495 A.2d 1197, 1201
n.2 (Me. 1985). Accordingly, courts "use an objective test to determine whether an employee
has good cause to leave [her] employment." Id. (citing Therrien v. Maine Employment Security
Comm 'n, 370 A.2d 1385, 1389 (Me. 1977) (noting that the objective standard is used because
"cases can be easily imagined where an employee's behavior is in fact grounded upon some
sincere but irrational belief').
In this case, the Commission found that the husband co-owner did not fire Crossman;
rather Crossman left her job voluntarily. The court agrees. The evidence on the record
demonstrates that the co-owner never told Crossman she was fired, but that she "freely rna[ de] an
affirmative choice" to leave on January 14, 2010 after demanding her paycheck that she would
have received later that day. Snell v. Maine Unemployment Ins. Comm 'n, 484 A.2d 609, 610
(Me. 1984) (internal citation and quotations omitted).
The court also agrees with the Commission's finding that Crossman did not establish that
she had good cause to leave her employment. As noted by the Commission, and as demonstrated
by the evidence on the record, Crossman did not take reasonable steps to communicate her
frustration about the co-owner husband's remarks regarding the lack of phone calls and sales the
previous Sunday. See Spear v. Maine Unemployment Ins. Comm 'n, 505 A.2d 82, 85 (Me. 1986)
(noting '"employer[s] must be given an opportunity to change the offensive conditions. Hence,
the employee must reasonably make known his [or her] dissatisfaction to the employer.'") (citing
Merrow, 495 A.2d at 1201). Additionally, the co-owner husband's comments and conduct at the
4 meeting were not such that a reasonable employee would feel "compelled" to leave his or her
employment. See Spear, 505 A.2d at 84 ("Good cause for voluntarily resigning exists when the
pressure of real not imaginary, substantial not trifling, reasonable not whimsical, circumstances
compel the decision to leave employment.") (internal citations and quotations omitted).
Although it is unfortunate that the parties were unable to effectively communicate,
especially in light of the fact that they are neighbors and had been close friends, the court
concludes that the Commission's findings are supported by credible evidence, and the
Commission did not misapply the law in its decision that Crossman voluntarily left her
employment without good cause attributable to such employment.
The entry is:
Petitioner's appeal is denied. The dec· of the Unemployment Insurance Commission is a:t:fi
DA1ED:cl¢;
5 Date Filed 12-22-10 Androscoggin Docket No. AP-10-19 County
Action SOC Appeal
EILEEN CROSSMAN MAINE UNEMPLOYMENT COMMISSION P.O. Box 451 Sabattus, ME 042SO
VS.
Plaintiff's Attorney Defendant's Attorney
Pro Se Elizabeth Wyman, Esq. Office of Attorney General 6 State House Station Augusta, ME 04333 MARK FRANCO, ESQ. (Pinetree) PO BOX 4630 Date of PORTLAND, ME 04112 Entry
2010 Dec 22 Received 12-22-10: Notice of SOC Appeal filed. 2011 Jan 10 Received 01-07-11: Entry of Appearance of Elizabeth Wyman, Esq. for Maine Unemployment Commission filed.
Jan 27 Rec'd on 1/26/11 Entry of Appearance of Mark Franco, Esq. on behalf of Pinetree Garden Seeds. Jan 2S Received 01-2S-11: Administrative Record filed. II II On 01-2S-11: Notice and Briefing Schedule (SOC) filed. Petitioner's Brief is due on or before March 9, 2011. Copies mailed to parties on 1-2S-11. March 9 I Rec'd on 3/8/11 Petitioner's Brief filed with two exhibits.
April 15 I Rec'd 4-13-11 Brief of Respondent Maine Unemployment Insurance Commission s/ Elizabeth Wyman, Esq. May 11 On 05-11-11: Case set for hearing on June S, 2011 at 9:00 a.m. Notice sent to parties on 5-11-11. June 9 On 06-0S-11: Hearing held on SOC Appeal. Matter taken under advisement. Kennedy, J., Tape 391, Index 1464-2269, Eileen Crossman, Prose and Elizabeth Wyman, Esq. for the Defendant.