UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
DANNY TREY CROSSLAND CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS NO. 25-1595
CORRECTIONAL OFFICER COX SECTION AA@(5)
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
in forma pauperis pro se
This 42 U.S.C. § 1983 proceeding was filed by plaintiff, Danny Trey Crossland, a convicted inmate housed at the B.B. (Sixty) Rayburn Correctional Center in Angie, Louisiana. In his lawsuit against the defendant, Correctional Officer Cox, he claims that he was subjected to unwanted physical contact. He alleges the following occurred: On 7-26-25 around 9am I was laying on my stomach in a pair of boxers while on my bed. Correctional Officer “Cox,” thats her last name I dont know her first name, comes up to me and taps me on my right butt cheek, I guess to get my attention. While most males would be “oh yea, she touched my butt, I liked that”, I dont that was a violation of my respect and personal boundaries her being a correctional officer does’nt excuse her actions. If the roles where reversed and I did that to her I probabley would have been charged with attempted rape, sexual assault, sexual harrassment, molestation. I believe she needs to be held responsible for her actions. Im completely frustrated, aggrivated and feel anger, and violated EVERY other time she has woke me up she has kicked my bed which in turns shakes the whole bed. This incident needs to be delt with and not swept under the rug just because she is a female this shouldnt be loo1ked at like “she touched your butt you should have enjoyed it" because I didnt. 2 He requests “justice for… [defenidna nfotr’sm] ase xpuaaulp hearrisassment and indecent behavior.” A proceeding brought may be dismissed as frivolouBso ouknedre vr. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), if the claim alleged therein has no arguable basis in law or fact, 1 EIdCF No. 1, Complaint at 9. Koonce , 2 F.3d 114 (5th Cir. 1993), or sief ei ta flasoils to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii); 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). To avoid dismissal for failure to state on which relief may be granted, “[f]actual allegations must
be enough to raise a right to relief above the specGualrarteivtte vle. Tvehla, loenr the assumption that all the allegations ... are truBee (lel vAetnl. iCfo dropu. bv.t fTuwl oinm fbalcyt).” , 560 F. App’x 375, 377 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting , 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (internal quotation marks, citations, and footnote omitted)). Liberally construing the instant complaint, it is the recommendation of the undersigned Magistrate Judge that this matter be dismissed with prejudice for failing to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. To state a claim for relief under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege a violation of rights
protected by the United States CSeoen sFtliatgugti oBnro osr., Itnhce. vla. wBrso oofk sthe United States by a person acting under color of state law. , 436 U.S. 149, 155-56 (1978). Crossland’s purported § 1983 claim against Cox for sexual harassment must be dismissed because he fails to allege a constitutional violation. To the extent Crossland attempts to state an Eighth Amendment claim for sexual harassment under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, he fails to do so. Sexual SaebeuBsee aracnhdil ds ovm. Ce obfobramns of harassment can trigger Eighth Amendment protections. , 947 F.3d 1130, 1140 (9th Cir. 2020) (conBvricotwedn pv.r Sislooanner sexual-assault claims are properly analyzed under the Eighth Amendment);
Boddie v, .C Sicvh. nAicetdieorn No. 09-1066, 2010 WL 476720, at *1-2 (W.D. La. Feb. 10, 2010) (citing , 105 F.3d 857, 860-61 (2d Cir. 1997). An Eighth Amendment claim under § 1983, is comprised of two elements, one subjective and one objective. “First, the prisoner must show that the conduct was objectively ‘harmful enough’ or ‘sufficiently serious’ to reach Lagarde v. Metz constitutional dimensions.” Hudson, Cv.i vMilc AMcitlliioann No. 13-805-RLB, 2017 WL 457654, at *3 (M.D. La. Feb. 2, 2017) (quoting , 503 U.S. 1, 8, 20 (1992)). “Second, the subjective prong requires the pIdrisoner to Hshuodwso nthat the defendant acted with a
‘sufficiently culpable state of mind.’ ” . (quoting , 503 U.S. at 8). With respect to the objective component, the United HSutadtseosn Second Circuit Court of Appeals, relying on language cited by the Supreme Court in , set forth the following considerations: Hogan v. Fischer Analysis of the objective prHoundgs oisn “context specific,” , 738 F.3d 509, 515 (2d Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted), and “depends upon the claim at issue,” , 503 U.S. at 8, 112 S.Ct. 995. Although not “every malevolent touch by aI dprison guard gives rise to a federal cause of action,” the Eighth Amendment is offended by conduct that is “repugnant to the conscience of mankind.” . at 9–10, 112 S.Ct. 995 (internal quotation marks omitted). Actions are repugnant to thIed conscience of mankind if they aErsete l“lein vc. oGmampabtlieble with evolving standards of decency” or involve “the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” . at 10, 112 S.Ct. 995 (quoting Crawford v. Cuomo , 429 U.S. 97, 102–03, 97 S.Ct. 285, C5r0a Lw.fEodr.d2d 251 (1976)).
, 796 F.3d 252, 256 (2d Cir. 2015). In , the Second Circuit held that even isolated instances of sexual abuse may rise to the level of a constitutional violation “if sufficiently severe or serious,” because “no amount of gratuitous or sexually-motivated fondling of an inmate's genitals—even if limited in duration or conduCcrtaewdf otrhdrough the inmate's clostehee as,l saos wRiacsk sth ve. cSahsoev herere—is permitted by the Constitution.” , 796 F.3d at 257-58; , 891 F.3d 468, 475-77 (3d Cir. 2018). Prisoners have a rSiegehFt atorm beer f vre. Be rfernonma nsexual abuse, whether at the hands of fellow inmates or prison guards. , 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (such sexual abuse is “sismeep layl snooWt paasrhti nogf ttohne pv.e Hnaivlteyly that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society”); , 695 F.3d 641, 643 (7th Cir. 2012) (“An unwanted touching of a person's private prisoner's constitutional rights whether or not the force exerted by the assailant is significant.”). Liberally accepting the allegations in Crossland’s complaint as true, he has not stated
a cognizable Eighth Amendment claim. In this case, plaintiff’s allegations of an unwanted physical tap simply do not meet the objective or subjective criSteeeriTa onseocne svs. aFrrye etom satnate a sexual harassment or abuse claim under the Eighth Amendment.
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
DANNY TREY CROSSLAND CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS NO. 25-1595
CORRECTIONAL OFFICER COX SECTION AA@(5)
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
in forma pauperis pro se
This 42 U.S.C. § 1983 proceeding was filed by plaintiff, Danny Trey Crossland, a convicted inmate housed at the B.B. (Sixty) Rayburn Correctional Center in Angie, Louisiana. In his lawsuit against the defendant, Correctional Officer Cox, he claims that he was subjected to unwanted physical contact. He alleges the following occurred: On 7-26-25 around 9am I was laying on my stomach in a pair of boxers while on my bed. Correctional Officer “Cox,” thats her last name I dont know her first name, comes up to me and taps me on my right butt cheek, I guess to get my attention. While most males would be “oh yea, she touched my butt, I liked that”, I dont that was a violation of my respect and personal boundaries her being a correctional officer does’nt excuse her actions. If the roles where reversed and I did that to her I probabley would have been charged with attempted rape, sexual assault, sexual harrassment, molestation. I believe she needs to be held responsible for her actions. Im completely frustrated, aggrivated and feel anger, and violated EVERY other time she has woke me up she has kicked my bed which in turns shakes the whole bed. This incident needs to be delt with and not swept under the rug just because she is a female this shouldnt be loo1ked at like “she touched your butt you should have enjoyed it" because I didnt. 2 He requests “justice for… [defenidna nfotr’sm] ase xpuaaulp hearrisassment and indecent behavior.” A proceeding brought may be dismissed as frivolouBso ouknedre vr. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), if the claim alleged therein has no arguable basis in law or fact, 1 EIdCF No. 1, Complaint at 9. Koonce , 2 F.3d 114 (5th Cir. 1993), or sief ei ta flasoils to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii); 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). To avoid dismissal for failure to state on which relief may be granted, “[f]actual allegations must
be enough to raise a right to relief above the specGualrarteivtte vle. Tvehla, loenr the assumption that all the allegations ... are truBee (lel vAetnl. iCfo dropu. bv.t fTuwl oinm fbalcyt).” , 560 F. App’x 375, 377 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting , 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (internal quotation marks, citations, and footnote omitted)). Liberally construing the instant complaint, it is the recommendation of the undersigned Magistrate Judge that this matter be dismissed with prejudice for failing to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. To state a claim for relief under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege a violation of rights
protected by the United States CSeoen sFtliatgugti oBnro osr., Itnhce. vla. wBrso oofk sthe United States by a person acting under color of state law. , 436 U.S. 149, 155-56 (1978). Crossland’s purported § 1983 claim against Cox for sexual harassment must be dismissed because he fails to allege a constitutional violation. To the extent Crossland attempts to state an Eighth Amendment claim for sexual harassment under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, he fails to do so. Sexual SaebeuBsee aracnhdil ds ovm. Ce obfobramns of harassment can trigger Eighth Amendment protections. , 947 F.3d 1130, 1140 (9th Cir. 2020) (conBvricotwedn pv.r Sislooanner sexual-assault claims are properly analyzed under the Eighth Amendment);
Boddie v, .C Sicvh. nAicetdieorn No. 09-1066, 2010 WL 476720, at *1-2 (W.D. La. Feb. 10, 2010) (citing , 105 F.3d 857, 860-61 (2d Cir. 1997). An Eighth Amendment claim under § 1983, is comprised of two elements, one subjective and one objective. “First, the prisoner must show that the conduct was objectively ‘harmful enough’ or ‘sufficiently serious’ to reach Lagarde v. Metz constitutional dimensions.” Hudson, Cv.i vMilc AMcitlliioann No. 13-805-RLB, 2017 WL 457654, at *3 (M.D. La. Feb. 2, 2017) (quoting , 503 U.S. 1, 8, 20 (1992)). “Second, the subjective prong requires the pIdrisoner to Hshuodwso nthat the defendant acted with a
‘sufficiently culpable state of mind.’ ” . (quoting , 503 U.S. at 8). With respect to the objective component, the United HSutadtseosn Second Circuit Court of Appeals, relying on language cited by the Supreme Court in , set forth the following considerations: Hogan v. Fischer Analysis of the objective prHoundgs oisn “context specific,” , 738 F.3d 509, 515 (2d Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted), and “depends upon the claim at issue,” , 503 U.S. at 8, 112 S.Ct. 995. Although not “every malevolent touch by aI dprison guard gives rise to a federal cause of action,” the Eighth Amendment is offended by conduct that is “repugnant to the conscience of mankind.” . at 9–10, 112 S.Ct. 995 (internal quotation marks omitted). Actions are repugnant to thIed conscience of mankind if they aErsete l“lein vc. oGmampabtlieble with evolving standards of decency” or involve “the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” . at 10, 112 S.Ct. 995 (quoting Crawford v. Cuomo , 429 U.S. 97, 102–03, 97 S.Ct. 285, C5r0a Lw.fEodr.d2d 251 (1976)).
, 796 F.3d 252, 256 (2d Cir. 2015). In , the Second Circuit held that even isolated instances of sexual abuse may rise to the level of a constitutional violation “if sufficiently severe or serious,” because “no amount of gratuitous or sexually-motivated fondling of an inmate's genitals—even if limited in duration or conduCcrtaewdf otrhdrough the inmate's clostehee as,l saos wRiacsk sth ve. cSahsoev herere—is permitted by the Constitution.” , 796 F.3d at 257-58; , 891 F.3d 468, 475-77 (3d Cir. 2018). Prisoners have a rSiegehFt atorm beer f vre. Be rfernonma nsexual abuse, whether at the hands of fellow inmates or prison guards. , 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (such sexual abuse is “sismeep layl snooWt paasrhti nogf ttohne pv.e Hnaivlteyly that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society”); , 695 F.3d 641, 643 (7th Cir. 2012) (“An unwanted touching of a person's private prisoner's constitutional rights whether or not the force exerted by the assailant is significant.”). Liberally accepting the allegations in Crossland’s complaint as true, he has not stated
a cognizable Eighth Amendment claim. In this case, plaintiff’s allegations of an unwanted physical tap simply do not meet the objective or subjective criSteeeriTa onseocne svs. aFrrye etom satnate a sexual harassment or abuse claim under the Eighth Amendment. , No. 1:22- CV-00085-BU, 2023 WL 4998063, at *3-4 (N.D. Tex. July 24, 2023) (plaintiff’s complaints, consisting of name calling and voyeurism, are not sufficiently serious to state a claim for sexual harassment under the Eighth Amendment and because Toson cannot demonstrate that his alleged sexuaal phpaeraasl sdmisemnits wseads sufficiently serious, he will not be able to satisfy the subjective element), , No. 23-10800, 2024 WL 140441 (5th Cir. Jan. 12,
2024). By his own admission, Crossland was clothed and lying face down when the correctional officer tapped him briefly to get his attention. The single, brief unintrusive touch was not accompanied by any communication. Taken as true, the allegations here of a single brief tap on his buttocks by a prison guard, unaccompanied by words suggesting sexual harassment and believed by plaintiff himself to be an attempt to get his attention, do not objectively constitute a sufficiently severe or serioSeues Finosrttamnacne ov.f Gserexguga lC hoaurnatsys mSheenrti fof’rs Oabffuicsee to state a cognizable constitutional violation. , Civ. Action No. 24-236, 2024 WL 4372675, at *1 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 2, 2024) (complaint
dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under Section 1983 based on allegations that prison guard grabbed plaintiff’s buttock, whispered a sexually sCuugmgmesitnigves vc.o mBumlleonckt in plaintiff’s ear and yanked the back of plaintiff’s pants up) (citing , No. 3:15-CV-2245, 2019 WL 127112, at *6 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 8, 2019) (finding no violation wherDe ioshffmicaern “vt.o Cuocxhed Plaintiff's buttocks through his pants and made a suggestive comment”)); , Civ. Action No. 22-258, 2023 WL 3161654, at *4-5 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 27, 2023 (plaintiff’s claim of sexual abuse under Eighth Amendment rejected
awdhoepnt evdideo showed brief non-violent, non-intrusive taBpu trok es lve.e Spoinlagn idnmate’s midsection), , 2023 WL 3167430 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 28, 2023); , Civ. Action No. 23- 0300, 2023 WL 3391467, at *3-4 (S.D. Tex. May 11, 2023) (allegation that correctional officer sexually assaulted plaintiff by grabbing his “behind” while easfcfo’drting him to receive treatment failed toM satsasteey av .c Hlauimtsc uhpenorne wutheirch relief may be granted), , 2023 WL 8666017 (5th Cir. 2023); , Civ. Action No. 20-159, 2021 WL 3856743, at *4 (W.D. Wis. Aug. 30, 2021) (no reasonable jury could conclude that the conduct described by plaintiff— searching his property more thoroughly than his cellmate’s, leaving his underwear turned
inside out, smirking or giggling while talking to him, brushing against him briefly in a narrow space—constituted sexual harassment or sexual assault in violation of the Eighth Amendment). Because Crossland fails to assert that a serious incident of a sexual nature occurred, he also cannot meet the subjective component of the test under the Eighth Amendment. pro se “Generally, ... a Brew lsittiegra vn. tD srheotkueld be offered an opportunity to amend his complaint before it is dismissed.” , 587 F.3d 764, 767-68 (5th Cir. 2009). Plaintiff has 14 days from issuance of this Report and Recommendation to submit an amended complaint
and include any additional facts and circumstances surrounding this incident with Officer Cox to address the specific concerns cited herein; however, absent timely amendment that sufficiently addresses and overcomes the stated deficiencies, it is the recommendation of the undersigned Magistrate Judge that the complaint should be summarily dismissed with 3 prejudice for failure to state a claimR oEnC wOMhiMchE rNeDlieAfT cIaOnN be granted. IT IS RECOMMENDE D DISMISFSoErD t hWe ITfoHre PgoRiEnJgU rDeIaCsEons, that Crossland’s complaint be for failing to state a claim for which relief can be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) and § 1915A. A party’s failure to file written objections to the proposed findings, conclusions, and recommendation contained in a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation within 14 days after being served with a copy shall bar that party, except upon grounds of plain error, from attacking on appeal the unobjected-to proposed factual findings and legal conclusions accepted by the district court, provided that the parDtoyu hgalsa sbse ve.n U sneirtveedd S wtaittehs nAouttioce. Athssaotc s.uch
consequences will result from a failure to object. , 79 4 F.3d 1415 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc). 3rd New Orleans, Louisiana, this day of September, 2025.
________ MICHAEL B. NORTH UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 3 To the extent Crossland asserts any state-law claims, under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), a district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction if, as here, it “haNso dbilsem v.i sWsehdit eall claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” “District courts enjoy wide discretion in determining whether to retain supplemental jurisdiction over a state claim once all federal claims are dismissed.” , 996 F.2d 797, 799 (5th Cir. 1993). Douglass 4